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1.1   Dynamic Game Theory
Game theory is concerned withthe modeling of situationsin which severalplayers' haveto make a
decision and each possible combination of decisions leads to a different result. which is valued by
each player in his own way. Given a model of such a situation. the theory studies several possible
outcomes of the game and investigates which outcomes satisfy desirable properties for the players.
If the players act cooperatively. one usually looks fora combination of decisions leading to a result
in which no player can improve his value without worsening the value of at least one other player.
Such outcomes are called Pareto optimal solutions. In contrast to a cooperative game, each player
can also optimize his own value without taking into account the objectives of the other players.
i.e. the players act noncooperatively in this case. In a noncooperative game, one usually looks for
a combination of decisions that leads to a result in which no player can improve his value, given
the decisions of the other players. by deviating unilaterally.  Such an outcome is called a Nash
equilibrium solution.  The following example of a game with two players has a Pareto optimal and
a Nash equilibrium solution. Due to its simplicity it clearly shows the features of cooperation and
noncooperation.
Example 1.1.1  Probably the most famous example of a game is the prisoner's dilemma. This
example can be found in any book on game theory. see for instance [89. p.  2361 or [ 10. p.  831
The story behind this game is as follows. Two criminals are suspected of having committed a
serious crime for which they are arrested. Since there is no direct evidence against them, their
' Synonyms are -agents", "persons". "decision makers'. "parties '. or "authorities".
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conviction depends on whetherthey confess or not.  They are put in separate cells and interrogated
privately.  If they both confess the crime, they will be sentenced to 5 years.  If only one of them
confesses and puts the blame on the other one, he will be sentenced to  1 year and the other will be
sentenced to 10 years. However, if neither one confesses, they will be convicted of a lesser crime
and sentenced to 2 years. The situation is illustrated in Figure  1.1. The numbers in the matrix are
the number of years the prisoners are sentenced. The first number belongs to prisoner 1 and the
second number belongs to prisoner 2.
prisoner 2
confess don't confess
confess              5,5             1,10
prisoner 1
don't confess 10,1             2,2
Figure 1.1: Prisoner's dilemma.
Clearly, the best joint solution for both prisoners is not to confess. Stated differently, the com-
bination of decisions "don't confess. don't confess" is a Pareto optimal solution. However, this
cooperative solution is highly unstable. since each player has an incentive to deviate to the option
of confessing.  If they both deviate, i.e.  if they both confess, they end up in a worse solution than
the Pareto optimal solution. Nevertheless, the combination of decisions "confess, confess" is a
Nash equilibrium solution: no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally.                       0
1.1.1   Dynamics and Information
In the prisoner's dilemma game the players make their decisions simultaneously. Alternatively.
the rules of the game could be such that prisoner 1 first announces his decision, and prisoner 2 is
able to observe this decision and uses this information to make his decision. If prisoner 1  chooses
to confess, the best choice for prisoner 2 is also to confess. If prisoner 1 chooses not to confess,
again the best choice for prisoner 2 is to confess. Prisoner 1 is aware of this strategic behavior of
prisoner 2, so he chooses to confess. Subsequently, prisoner 2 confesses. These rules of the game
are probably most interesting for the police force, since the prisoners are enforced to confess !  A
game in which one player announces his decision first and determines the decision of the other
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player is called a Stackelberg game. The player who decides first is called the leader and the
player who decides next is called the follower.
Instead of decisions. one usually distinguishes between actions and strategies [10].  If an expedi-
tion team has to decide whether or not to climb the Mount Everest on some day, then a strategy is:
"if the weather forecast for that day predicts perfect climbing conditions, then we start the climb,
otherwise we stay in camp 4". What the climbers will do on that day. depends on the weather
conditions, which is something not known beforehand by the expedition leader. The alternative
actions are to go climbing or to stay in camp 4.  In the Stackelberg prisoner's dilemma game as dis-
cussed above the strategy for prisoner 2 is: "If prisoner 1 confesses, I confess; if prisoner  1  does
not confess, I will". Once prisoner 1 has announced his action to confess. the action of prisoner
2 is to confess t00.
The following abstract example illustrates the role of the information in a game and how it affects
the solution. Similar examples can be found in [10. Example 1.2] and [ 110]
Example 1.1.2 Consider the situation where two firms are competing on the same market during
two periods of time. During each period the firms have to make strategical decisions (e.g.  ad-
vertising, investments) that influence the profits in a certain way. The objective of the firms is to
maximize their total profits over both periods. The situation and the possible expected profits are
shown in Figure 1.2. The profits are measured in euros. Clearly the values are not realistic; it is
the ratio between these values that matters. The decision points in the first and the second period
Do
N                   Y
1)   /                                                       1)2
\-N          .Y                 NY\
D                                      [).,                       I)                                      D
N Y N Y N Y N Y
D                       11, D, Do   D             11    1)             1) 4
N   N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
18       22       20       23        14       21        13        19       26       24       25       22        15        19       17 20 profi t firm  I
18    20    15     14    21    20    11     12    16    19    15    14    21     23    18 17 profit firm 2
Figure 1.2: Two-period game between two firms.
for  firm  1  are  Do  and  D i. . . . . 1),t, respectively. The decision points  in the first and the second
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period for firm 2 are Di· D  and /)-..   . /)it. respectively. At each decision point a firm has
two possible actions denoted by the symbols N and Y The game has 16 possible outcomes. As-
sume that the firms are not cooperating. For three different types of information structures. Nash
equilibrium solutions can be determined as follows.
(i)  The orderof the actions will be taken as depicted in Figure 1.2: in each period fi rm 1 dec ides
first and firm 2 decides second.  Firm 2 is able to observe the decision of firm  1  in both
periods and uses this information to decide between its alternative actions.  At the beginning
of the second period the firms know to which decision point the game has evolved.  The
solution of the game under this information structure can be found by working backward
in time. From each of the decision points /);.    .. /)i i. firm 2 chooses the action Y or N.
depending on which action leads to higher profit. For instance. at decision point /)7. firm 2
chooses for the action Y. since 20 euro is a higher profit than  18 euro.  This optimal action is
denoted by a bar in Figure 1.2. The optimal actions forthe decision points /)*.... /)i i are
denoted similarly. At decision point /) t. firm 1  knows that if it chooses the action N. firm
2 will choose the action Y subsequently, and if he chooses the action Y. firm 2 will choose
the action N. Since 22 euro is a higher profit than 20 euro. firm 1 chooses the action N at
decision point l)·,. This procedure can be repeated until for the remaining decision points.
each optimal action is denoted by a bar in Figure 1.2. Apparently. the Nash equilibrium
solution for the information structure under consideration goes along the decision points
/)i,  l)·t, and  l),-, and consists of the action N for firm  1  in both periods and the consecutive
actions N and Y for firm 2. The resulting profits for firm 1 and firm 2 are 22 euro and 20
euro, respectively.
(ii) The second information structure consists of simultaneous decisions during each period.
Furthermore. at the beginning of the second period the firms have observed the actions of
the first period. Stated differently. at the beginning of the second period the firms know to
which of the decision points  /) t. . /),. the game has evolved. At decision point l), the
firms have to announce an action simultaneously; each firm has to make a decision without
knowing what the other firm will do.  The four possible outcomes are depicted in Figure
1.3.  The pair of numbers in each box represents the profits for both firms resulting from
the corresponding decisions.  If firm I chooses the action Y and firm 2 chooses the action
N. both firms will not have an incentive to deviate unilaterally. Indeed. if firm 1 deviates
unilaterally. its profit changes from 20 euro to  18 euro, and if firm 2 deviates unilaterally.
its profit changes from  15 euro to  14 euro. Apparently. the combination of actions -Y for
firm  1. N for firm 2" is a Nash equilibrium solution for the game depicted in Figure  1.3.






Figure 1.3: Second-period game starting from decision point  /) t.
It is easily verified that this is the only such solution of this game.  In a similar way, one
can determine unique Nash equilibrium solutions for the second-period games starting from
the decision points  l).1.  1)-,•  and  /),i. The results are shown in Table  1.1. The profit pair
starting point action firm 1    action firm 2 profit firm 1   profit firm 2
83                        Y                        N                       20                      15
l),                  N                  N                  14                21
/)-,                  N                  Y                 24                19
/4                               Y                               N                               1 7                            18
Table  1.1: Nash equilibrium solutions for the second-period games.
corresponding to these solutions can be attached to the decision points  /)i . . .     . Dit, which
results in the first-period game depicted in Figure  1.4.  It is easily verified that the Nash
equilibrium solution of this game is the combination of actions "Y for firm 1,N for firm
2", leading to the profits:  24 euro for firm  1  and  19 euro for firm 2. Summarizing. with the
information structure under consideration, the Nash equilibrium solution for the two-period
game consists of the consecutive actions Y and N for firm 1 and the consecutive actions
N and Y for firm 2. This is clearly a different solution than the one obtained under the
information structure in case (i). It is interesting to note that firm 1, having a more profitable
information structure in case (i) (firm 1 acts as a leader in the Stackleberg-sense), has a
higher profit in the Nash equilibrium solution under the symmetric information structure
considered in this case. This shows that a more profitable information structure does not
necessarily lead to a higher profit.
(iii) The third information structure consists of announcing the actions for both periods simul-






Figure 1.4: First-period game under consecutive simultaneous decision rules.
taneously at the beginning of the first period. The firms have four possible actions: NN,
NY, YN, and YY, where the first and the second symbol refer to the action in the first and
the second period. respectively. There are 16 possible outcomes, which are shown in Table
1.2; the actions that are ordered vertically (horizontally) correspond to fi rm 1 (firm 2). It is
NN NY YN YY
NN 18,18 22,20 14,21 21,20
NY 20,15 23,14 13,11 19,22
YN 26,16 24,19 15,21 19,23
YY 25.15 22,14 17,18 20.17
Table 1.2: Two-period game under the third information structure.
easily verified that the combination of actions "YY for firm 1, YN for firm 2" is the Nash
equilibrium solution of this game, leading to the profits:   17 euro for firm  1  and  18 euro
for firm 2. Note that both firms have a higher profit in the Nash equilibrium solution un-
der the information structure in case (ii); in that structure the firms have more information
available. Thus in this example more information for both firms leads to higher profits.
LJ
This example illustrates that different information structures require different techniques to deter-
mine Nash equilibrium solutions, and in general, one obtains different solutions. The information
structure considered in the second case is usually referred to as a feedback information structure.
The firms are aware of the situation at the beginning of the second period and use this updated
information to make a decision for the second period. The information structure considered in
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the third case is called an open-loop information structure. The firms make binding agreements
at the beginning of the first period about the actions they undertake during both periods. i.e.  in an
open-loop Nash equilibrium the period of commitment equals the entire planning period.
A game in which a number of decisions have to made through time is called dynamic. The two-
period game of Example  1.1.2 is an example of a dynamic game. A typical aspect in a dynamic
game is the evolution of the "state" of the game. The state of the two-period game could for in-
stance be the number of customers the firms have. This number evolves from an initial state to
certain states after each period. The state is measured at discrete points in time.  A game with such
a state evolution is called a difference game. Games of this type with a finite set of alternative de-
cisions have been extensively studied in [101.
Rather than stepwise as in difference games, the state of a dynamic game can also evolve con-
tinuously through time. Such a game is called a differential game. As an example, consider the
following continuous-time version of an advertising model, which has been presented in [971.  In
this game, two firms can advertise with a certain intensity Ni C l) and 11 ,(1) (amount ofmoney spent
on advertising per unit of time) during a fixed period:  0  5  1  5 r. These intensities are normal-
ized and bounded: 0 u, C t)1 1. The total number of customers is constant and normalized
to 1.  At time t, the fraction of customers of firm 1 (the state) and firm 2 are denoted by .t·{ t) and
1-  .r{ 1 1,  respectively.   If firm  1  advertises, its fraction of customers increases proportionally to
its advertising intensity and the fraction of customers of firm 2. Similarly, if firm 2 advertises, the
fraction of customers of firm 1 decreases proportionally to firm 2's advertising intensity and the
fraction of customers of firm  1. This state dynamics can be described by the differential equation
.i'(1)=(1-.r(/))11,(t)-.t·(1)tt2(1).
Here,.i· denotes the time derivative of.r.  Per unit of time, each firm's profit is equal to a certain
positive constant c·, times its fraction of customers, minus his advertising intensity. The total profit
equals this quantity integrated over the time horizon from 0 to l'. The objective of each  firm is to
maximize these profits by choosing an appropriate advertising intensity, i.e. the criteria of firm  1
and firm 2 are
1                               1
itiax  (ri.1.(1) - '11(t))</1    and    illax  (01( 1 - .1.(t)) - '12(t))dt.t     J
0                                             0
respectively. Also in this continuous-time model, the information structure plays an important
role.  Suppose that the firms are aware of the initial customer allocation .1. and that they are not
allowed to use information about customer allocations at other points in time: they may even be
unable to observe future allocations until the end of the period. Using the initial information. the
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firms choose advertising functions zi„ thereby announcing theiradvertising intensity forthe whole
period from time 0 to time 1'.  If the firms are limited to such a choice. we say that their informa-
tion structure is an open-loop pattern. Alternatively, if both firms are able to observe the customer
allocation at any point in time, and to adapt their advertising intensities accordingly, we say that
their information structure is a feedback pattern. in this case. the firms choose feedback strate-
gies instead of control functions (actions) in the open-loop case. Although this advertising model
seems rather simple. analyzing it is a different story, especially under the feedback information
structure. Due to the constraints on the advertising intensities, one ends up with value functions
with singular surfaces of which little is known in this context [ 13. 961
In general terms, a two-player differential game involves a differential equation
1'=f{t.,1.. it,112)· ·t.CO)= .r,1
and for each player a criterion. which consists of an integral and a final time-penalty term:
1.
.1,(11,. ll·,1 = .  .lt..1. ul. ll.2)(lt + (1'l.t'll')1.
()
If player 1  aims to minimize .1 -  ./1 and player 2 aims to maximize the same criterion. the game
is said to be a zero-sum differential game. This terminology is justified by the fact that player 2
aims to minimize the criterion .12 -  -·1. so that the sum of the criteria, i.e.  ./1  + .12, is zero.  If
the game is not a zero-sum differential game it is said to be a non:ero-slim differential game.
Two well-established applications of zero-sum dynamic game theory are pursuit-evasion games
[10, Chapter 8] and worst-case design of controllers; for instance H. control theory can con-
veniently be embedded in a zero-sum dynamic game context [9]. In pursuit-evasion games the
final time /'is endogenously determined; for instance T = iii f { / Ic,( t..t·I/ )1 = 0} forsome scalar
function n. In contrast to that. in economic applications one usually fixes the final time or, alter-
natively, one takes it to be infinite (a case in which it is usually additionally assumed that q,  = 0).
Also in engineering applications one distinguishes between finite and infinite-horizon differential
games; for instance, the time-domain interpretation of an //,  norm can be finite or infinite.
Several information structures can be considered in a differential game. Most commonly used
are the open-loop and the feedback information patterns. In the open-loop case the players only
have access to the initial state. and in the feedback case they have access to the state at time t.
Other structures are for instance (i) the closed-loop perfect state pattern which consists at time 1
of the complete state history from time 0 to time /. and (ii) the memoryless perfect state pattern
which consists at time t of the initial state and the state at time /. Under any of these information
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structures a Nash equilibriumz is defined as  a pair of strategies  C u;. til )  such that no player has
an incentive to deviate unilaterally. i.e. (assuming that the players aim to minimize the integral
criteria)if ./ilt,T. 113) 1 ./1(1,1. uj} forallitt and ./2(ui. 4) 6 ./,( u;. ti,) forall,tz. Pontryagin's
minimum principle 1101] can be applied to obtain a set of necessary conditions which are satisfied
for open-loop Nash equilibria. Dynamic programming [17] is usually applied to study feedback
Nash equilibria.  Open-loop Nash equilibria are less realistic. However they are easier to study,
they often lead to analytic tractability. In contrast. feedback Nash equilibria are closer to reality.
but much more difficult to analyze, numerical techniques are often the only tool to study them.
Due to their simple structure, linear-quadratic (LQ) games are of special interest.  This structure
consists of state dynamics described by a linear differential equation and quadratic integral cri-
teria. Since LQ control theory was already well developed in the beginning of the 708. it was
expected in the 705 and the NOs that the same level of maturity could be reached for LQ differ-
ential game theory. In connection with to the successful development of H. control theory, this
level of maturity has indeed been reached for zero-sum LQ differential games. However, in a
nonzero-sum context, there are still many unsolved and challenging problems. Although a sur-
vey paper [60] and some mathematically rigorous papers [82.83] followed shortly after the pa-
pers [113,114] which initiated nonzero-sum LQ game theory, one can observe during the last
three decades several misunderstandings concerning existence and uniqueness questions. For in-
stance, some authors claimed that in the finite-horizon open-loop case a unique Nash equilibrium
always exists and moreover that it can be obtained from a set of asymmetric coupled Riccati differ-
ential equations. However. Eisele [43] presented several examples showing that open-loop Nash
equilibria need not to be unique. Engwerda [451 presented further results in this direction.  He
showed that the set of asymmetric Riccati differential equations may have no solution, even when
an open-loop Nash equilibrium exists.  He also showed that the finite-horizon game may have
a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium for each horizon length. while the corresponding infinite-
horizon game has multiple open-loop Nash equilibria. Furthermore. the limit of the open-loop
Nash equilibrium obtained by letting the final time approach infinity, is not necessarily an open-
loop Nash equilibrium for the infinite-horizon gamei. The limiting behaviorof the solutions of the
open-loop Riccati differential equations has  also been investigated  in  [4]: in a discrete  time con-
text, this limiting behavior of open-loop Nash and Stackelberg Riccati difference equations has
been addressed in [52]. In the feedback case, it has been claimed in [79] that the algebraic Riccati
equations corresponding to the infinite-horizon feedback LQ differential game have a unique pos-
2A Nash equilibrium is a solution concept for a noncooperative game. Other solution concepts exist for cooper-
ative games. See [581 for a review on cooperative differential games.
3A similar result has been obtained under the feedback information structure in [99].
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itive semi-definite solution under some weak conditions. However, Weeren et al. [1221 showed
that already in the scalar case these equations generally have either one or three solutions. thus
refuting the claim in [791 Precise conditions under which one or three solutions exist are given
in  [46].  Summarizing, both open-loop and feedback LQ differential games  have not reached the
same level of maturity as LQ control theory. Although widely applied in economic models. a the-
oretical basis in LQ dynamic game theory is still developing. For instance, global existence results
for the feedback Riccati differential equations have recently been obtained in [51]and [122]. The
authors of both papers stress the importance of easily verifiable conditions for existence, unique-
ness. and convergence of the solutions of these equations. Furthermore. more research on the
corresponding algebraic Riccati equations is required in order to obtain numerical solutions.
1.1.2 Applications
Dynamic game theory has many applications in economics and control engineering.  Ineconomics
one naturally encounters conflict situations. Game theory is an appealing way to model economic
conflict situations. Here we shall discuss a few applications which are naturally modeled by dy-
namic game theory. In control engineering one uses game theory e.g. in worst-case design of
controllers. This will be discussed later.
Environmental economical problems can conveniently be modeled using dynamic game theory.
Many production processes damage the environment. For instance the greenhouse effect is a re-
sult of modern technology. Dasgupta [37] has introduced a control model which analyses the
intertemporal trade-off between the benefits of production and the resulting damage to the envi-
ronment. This damage is caused by pollutants which cross national borders (through air or rivers).
Several countries are involved in this pollution process.  The work of Dasgupta has been extended
by van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw [1001 to a dynamic game setting where the countries are the play-
ers and where the state of the game is the average stock of pollutants spread out over all countries
involved. The countries control the pollution process by emission charges. In [100]. it is shown
that the feedback Nash equilibrium leads to a higher concentration level of pollutants and lower
emission charges than the less realistic open-loop Nash equilibrium. A similar result has been
found by Maler and de Zeeuw [86] in the context of an acid rain differential game. They model
the damage to the environment as a buffer stock which is depleted as long as the deposition ex-
ceeds a certain critical load. They show that for both the open-loop and the feedback Nash equi-
librium the depositions in each country converge to the critical loads in the long run. However,
the steady state value of the buffer stock in the feedback Nash equilibrium is lower than in the
open-loop Nash equilibrium, which implies higher depletion levels and hence more damage to
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the environment.
An interesting area in models of environmental problems is the theory around common-property
resources: see for instance [34] or [35]. Examples of such resources are ground water. fish pop-
ulations [78], or pastures [16]. The models have in common that a certain number of users (the
players) has access to a resource (the state), which is eitherexhaustible or renewable. The richness
of the resource clearly depends on the way it is controlled by the users. Additionally a resource
 
can be polluted when it is used as a waste sink. Miiler et al. [87] introduce a model describing the
dynamics of ecological systems such as shallow lakes. A typical element in this example is that
shallow lakes flip at a certain point from a clear state to a turbid state. This is due to agricultural
activities around the lake and its use as a waste sink. In order to prevent the lake from flipping,
coordination is required. The model in [87] is a nonlinear differential game. the open-loop Nash
equilibrium of which is computed.  It is shown that for a small number of communities loading
phosphorus in the lake, a constant tax on this loading leads to a clear lake. The feedback Nash
equilibrium is more realistic but due to the nonlinearity it seems to be too difficult to implement it
in this particular problem.  It is however shown that it is to be expected that this equilibrium results
in higher amounts of phosphorus. This is in line with the international pollution models discussed
above: pollution is higher in a feedback Nash equilibrium and since this concept is more realistic,
it shows the need for pollution coordination. Dynamic game theory seems to be a suitable way
for dealing with such coordination needs.
Also in macro-economic policy coordination, dynamic game theory is a natural modeling frame-
work. For instance, Tabellini [115] introduces a differential game model to study the strategic
interaction between fiscal and monetary authorities, who both influence the dynamics of the gov-
ernment debt by controlling fiscal deficits and money creation, respectively. This model has been
further deepened by van Aarle et al.  [2] by analyzing Stackelberg open-loop equilibria of the
game. Another application area concerns the introduction of the euro. This implies that national
currencies are replaced by a common currency in the EMU. However, fiscal authorities remain
controlled by the separate countries. Such a situation is put in a differential game context by van
Aarle [1].  He analyses several equilibria in a differential game between national fiscal authorities
and the ECB. Further results in this context are obtained in [47] and [3].
1.1.3 Uncertainty
A model is by definition an approximation of reality. In control engineering one uses a model of a
plant to design a controller. This controller is based on the analysis of the model. It depends on the
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accuracy of the model whether the controller gives good performance or not. High accuracy of a
model usually implies a high level of complexity. In economics. models can be used to coordinate
strategic behavior between economic agents. Assumptions need to be made in order to be able
to analyze the model. The more accurate the model is, the more effective the coordination is.
Simplifyingassumptions and parameter uncertainty in an engineering oreconomic model is called
model uncertainty.
Model uncertainty received a great deal of attention in control engineering. The basic idea usu-
ally is to construct a set of models, each of which describes the same plant.  Next. the controller
is designed such as to yield good performance for each of these models.  In this way the con-
troller is robust with respect to model uncertainty within this set. Clearly, this concept can be
worked out in many different ways. For instance one may assume that the set of models is gen-
erated by a stochastic process and choose a controller that minimizes the expected value of the
performance criterion. Alternatively. one can choose a controller that optimizes the worst possi-
ble performance within the set of models.  Such a controller is referred to as a worst-case design.
Zero-sum game theory is a natural framework to construct worst-case designs. Indeed. in this
context the set of models is generated by an unknown disturbance (taking values in a known set)
entering the system. The uncertainty is modeled as the maximizing player who aims at maximiz-
ing the performance criterion by choosing an appropriate disturbance. The controller designer
is the minimizing player who aims at minimizing the same performance criterion: in a minmax
design he chooses the controller that optimizes the performance corresponding to the maximally
disturbed model. This game-theoretic approach to robust controller design is in fact a way to treat
the  //,   control problem [9]. which in itsel f deals with model uncertainty in the following sense.
The system is assumed to be influenced by a disturbance and one looks for a controller minimizing
the  // . norm ofthe transfer function from disturbance to output. H. control theory was initiated
in  1981 by Zames  [ 126]  and has extensively been studied in the 80s and the 9Os: see for instance
19.42.50.53,57.76.118,128].
1.1.4   Rationality and Planning-Horizon Lengths
In engineering a model is based on several physical laws, like gravity or conservation laws.  In
economics a model is often based on rationality of the economic agents involved. Whether peo-
pie really act rationally is questionable. The climb to the summit of the Mount Everest on May
10.1996, included the important rational rule: "if we have not reached the summit at 2 p.m.. we
return to camp 4". Some climbers did not act according to this rule and were still climbing after 2
p.m.  Later in the afternoon. the good weather conditions suddenly changed into an horrible storm
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causing the death of some of the climbers. This example shows the need of verifying whether ra-
tionality can be used as an axiom in a model. A great deal of literature in the area of experimental
economics is devoted to this issue: see for instance [38]. In engineering one can always put one's
trust in physical laws. Whether or not one can rely on rational behavior in economics is uncertain.
In  an optimal control problem or in a dynamic game the planning horizon is either finite or infi -
nite. In engineering, an infinite-horizon problem can result from a minimization problem where
the underlying function space consists of functions defined on the interval from zero to infinity:
this is for instance the case in the infinite-horizon H. optimal control problem. In such cases, the
choice of an infinite horizon is motivated by mathematical convenience rather than by the specific
application (robust controller design in the  H..   case). In economics, it is usually the application
that determines the planning horizon. An infinite horizon does not seem realistic; who takes the
remaining of the existence of the universe into account in making strategical decisions? Usually
authors discount future income or costs by implementing a discount factor in the model. Alterna-
tively, one can model the problem with a finite horizon where its length is chosen in accordance
with the application (e.g. policy makers are usually elected for a fixed period). or simply in accor-
dance with the maximal period which seems relevant for the decision to be made. Once strategi-
cal decisions have been made, it is likely that the players (or decision maker in an optimal control
problem) involved have an incentive to reoptimize their decisions after some time because new in-
formation has become available to them. Partly, this incentive is dealt with by the feedback Nash
equilibrium concept due to its subgame perfectness [89, Chapter 9] (or strong time-consistency
[8]); this property states that the optimal strategies on the time horizon [O. T] are also optimal on
any time horizon [t. T]. In the world around us. people are continuously updating their decisions
by considering a new part of the future. One encounters such a behavior in important economic
situations but also in real games like a game of chess. Indeed, a chess player continuously de-
termines his action by thinking a number of moves ahead. After each move of his opponent. he
extends his planning horizon, thus determining a new initial optimal action based on the new in-
formation which became available due to the move of his opponent. Clearly, we naturally deal
with a bounded mind, i.e.  in real life our decisions are inspired by a boundedly rational point of
view. A moving horizon approach to model economic problems is a way to model this bounded
rationality.
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1.2     Objectives and a Review of the Thesis
Differential game theory would not exist if there was no optimal control theory. Many develop-
ments in differential game theory have been inspired by new achievements in system and control
theory. The objectives of this thesis are to set up differential game models using successful de-
velopments in the control areas: moving horizon control theory. disturbance decoupling theory.
and H. control theory. Furthermore. the feedback Nash equilibrium for infinite-horizon games
will be revised.  Each of these topics will be studied in a linear quadratic (LQ) framework.  A
clear advantage is that each of the mentioned control areas has been extensively studied in an LQ
setting. A disadvantage is its restrictiveness: in economic modeling one easily ends up in a non-
linear framework. Nevertheless. as indicated earlier in this introduction. at the beginning of the
21 st century LQ game theory has still many open problems and is extensively applied in economic
applications. which justifies the choice of an LQ setting in this thesis.
In Chapter 2 we introduce some notations and terminologies that are used throughout the the-
sis. A few words are spent on the algebraic Riccati equation; in particular on its stabilizing so-
lution. This solution plays quite an important role in Chapters 5,6, and 7. In Section 2.3 the
concept of a differential game will be made precise. Several technical elements are discussed in
order to prevent misunderstandings later on in the thesis. Specifically. the following notions are
discussed: state trajectories, control functions, information structures, strategy spaces. cost func-
tions, coupled constraints. horizon lengths. stability, deterministic and stochastic disturbances.
linearity. linear-quadratic aspects. time-invariance. and input-output structures.
In Chapter 3. a moving horizon solution concept is defined for the class of infinite-horizon differ-
ential games.  In this concept the players have a feedback information pattern.  At each time t, they
determine an open-loop Nash equilibrium for a finite-horizon game. Due to the feedback infor-
mation structure. the players have access to the state of the game at time 1.  This state is equal to the
initial state of the finite-horizon game, which is required information to determine an open-loop
Nash equilibrium. At time / the players only implement the initial control action corresponding
to this equilibrium. By repeating this continuously in time. a feedback strategy defined on the in-
finite horizon results. The feedback information pattern makes the concept practically significant
and the open-loop elements generate good analytic tractability.
Although the moving horizon concept will be defined for a general class of differential games
(time-invariance is the only assumption we make). it will be analyzed in more detail in an LQ
setting. One might expect here the use of fake Riccati equations: see for instance 140,102]. This
technique has been quite successful in LQ control theory to study stability of moving-horizon
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controllers '. However, since the technique owes its success to monotonicity properties of Riccati
differential equations, a property which solutions of coupled systems of Riccati equations do not
have, a generalization to a nonzero-sum game theoretic framework fails. Nevertheless, stability
of the moving-horizon solution concept will be investigated. Under some symmetry conditions,
a quadratic differential equation is derived for the closed-loop moving horizon matrix as a func-
tion of the length of the moving planning horizon. The analytic computability of the concept is
addressed under the same symmetry conditions. The results are illustrated by an analysis of the
scalar case and an economic example. Chapter 3 is self-contained and the following chapters can
be read independently of this chapter. The subject of Chapter 3 has also been addressed by Kun
[73].  Specifically, he replaced the local open-loop optimality by feedback optimality and obtained
1 some stability results in a nonlinear context.
In Chapter 4, the starting point is an input-output (this terminology is made precise in the next
chapter) differential game with an additive disturbance term in the differential equation. The ba-
sic question for each player here is:  is it possible to construct a feedback strategy in such a way that
my output is not influenced by the disturbance entering the system? Stated differently: can I find
a feedback strategy which decouples my output from the disturbance? Clearly, this decoupling
player has to take into account that the other players are also influencing his output. It will be as-
sumed that these players are not cooperating to establish his decoupling purposes. The problem he
faces is therefore called: the noncooperative disturbance decoupling problem. Necessary and suf-
ficient conditions on the system parameters are derived under which the answer to the above ques-
tion is positive. This is done for two different information structures: (i) the decoupling player is
not able to observe other players' feedback strategies and (ii) he observes the other players' feed-
back strategies and uses this information to construct his own feedback strategy. Both solvability
problems can be solved using standard techniques from geometric control theory. Particularly.
the solvability problem under the second information structure is solved using the notion of ro-
bust controlled invariance  [ 14]. The ensuing chapters can be read independently of Chapter 4.
Feedback Nash equilibria in infinite-horizon LQ differential games are usually determined from a
set of coupled symmetric algebraic Riccati equations. In general, this set has multiple solutions.
The equilibria obtained from these solutions are linear feedback strategies. A natural question
is: are all equilibria obtained from these solutions? The answer to that question is "no": Tsutsui
and Mino [120] have shown that there also exist nonlinear feedback strategies which constitute
a Nash equilibrium. A second natural question therefore is: are all equilibria obtained from the
solutions of the algebraic Riccati equations if the strategy spaces of the players are restricted to
·1Nowadays. fake Riccati techniques are also used in a nonlinear context. Furthermore, not only stability, but also
//._  robustness for nonlinear systems can be achieved by moving-horizon controllers: see for instance 1851.
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linear feedback strategies? The answer to that question is "yes", under the additional assump-
tion that the set of admissible linear feedback strategies is restricted to strategies that stabilize
the closed-loop system.  This is the main result of Chapter 5.  It is obtained without assuming
the state weighting matrices to be positive semi-definite. The proof is based on a result for the
corresponding one-player control problem: a linear. initial-state-independent. time-invariant, in-
ternally stabilizing state feedback law which minimizes a quadratic cost functional subject to a
linear system constraint exists if and only if it is generated by the stabilizing solution of the cor-
responding algebraic Riccati equation. This will be shown first in Chapter 5 and can be consid-
ered as a contribution to LQ control theory. It is well-known that LQG and LQ control theory
are linked through the certainty equivalence principle. Similarly, the feedback Nash equilibrium
can be interpreted stochastically leading to the concept of a variance-independent feedback Nash                   1
equilibrium, which is formally defined in Section 5.5. It is shown that such equilibria are charac-
terized by the solutions of the same set of algebraic Riccati equations.
Equally important questions as the ones posed in the previous paragraph are: how many solutions
does the system of algebraic Riccati equations have?  How can they be computed? In general. such
problems are less extensively studied in this thesis than the relations between systems of Riccati
equations and corresponding (robust) equilibria, which are extensively investigated in Chapters
5-7.  Nevertheless. a discussion on the number and computability of solutions of the Riccati equa-
tions in the two-player scalar case is included in all of these chapters. In Chapter 5 it is shown that
the solutions of the algebraic Riccati equations correspond to intersection points of hyperbolas in
a certain half-plane. Furthermore, the number of intersection points may vary from zero to three
and it is geometrically indicated how these situations. depending on the system parameters, occur.
In Chapters 6 and 7, model uncertainty in a differential game is expressed through a disturbance
term in the differential equation. Following the lines of Chapter 5 the strategy spaces of the play-
ers are restricted to internally stabilizing linear feedback strategies. The theory to be developed
in Chapters 6 and 7 can therefore conveniently be compared with the undisturbed case considered
in Chapter 5. The robust feedback equilibrium concepts to be defined in these chapters are both
inspired  by  H. control theory. Loosely speaking. Chapters  6  and 7 generalize the disturbance
attenuation problem with nonzero initial state and the soft-constrained differential game [9]. re-
spectively, to a nonzero-sum differential game setting.
Specifically, in Chapter 6 it is assumed that the disturbance is quadratically integrable On the pos-
itive real axis and that its norm is bounded by a given positive number,·. A similar condition can
be found in the H. control problem (or disturbance attenuation problem) in the sense that the
computation of the time-domain interpretation of the H. norm requires the maximization of the
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quotient of the norms of the output and disturbance. where the maximization is carried out over
the unit ball  in  L  . However. in this criterion the initial state is assumed to be zero.  The aim of
Chapter 6 is to generalize the disturbance attenuation problem for nonzero initial state. For this
generalization. an extensive study of the one-player optimal control problem is required.  This
problem consists of minimizing the maximally disturbed norm of the output of a linear system
with nonzero initial state where the maximum is carried out over the ball with radius,· in the dis-
turbance space' Chapter 6 starts  with an intensive investigation of the zero-player problem,  i.e.
purely the maximization problem (with a fixed linear feedback controller), the analysis of which
provides useful geometric insights for the rest of the chapter.
Chapter 7 differs from Chapter 6 in three respects:  (i) the norm of the disturbance term is not
restricted, (ii) the players weight the disturbance explicitly in their cost criteria with a negative
term. and (iii) the state weighting matrix is not assumed to be positive semi-definite. It is the
aim of the players to minimize the maximally disturbed cost criterion. The first two items cause
the one-player problem to coincide with the soft-constrained differential game, which has exten-
sively been studied in the literature. However, this problem seems to have been studied always
under the assumption that the state weighting matrix is positive semi-definite.  For that reason. a
comprehensive analysis of the soft-constrained differential game is contained in Chapter 7. This
material is used to define and analyze soft-constrained feedback Nash equilibria. A similar equi-
librium concept in an open-loop finite-horizon context has been developed in [63]
3,When the research of this problem was carried out. I was not aware of any reference in this direction. The closest
reference seemed to be 132]. Later. i201 was brought to my attention, which is a closer reference. Chapter 6 has been
written independently from this reference.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
2.1 Notations, Terminologies, and Theorems
The following notations and terminologies are standard throughout the thesis.
(i) A symmetric n x 11 matrix P is called positive de/inite if.t·TP.r > 0 for all.t· E  #r \ {0}.
This is denoted by P > 0. Similarly, /' is called positive semi-de»iteif.t·T P.t·  2  O for all
.t·  E  #r: and is denoted by P  2  0.
(ii) The Euclidean length of a vector a  e   #7" is denoted by  l a l
(iii)  Let  /' be a positive semi-definite n xii matrix and let a  E  #f', then
 (1 P:. ((Tpck. (2.1)
(iv)   For a matrix .1  e M
m .,"





(v)Let.4..    ..t'\ 6 1/ forsome vector space V, and let j E {1...   ..\}. Then
1   X \
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(vi)  For an .\-tuple s  = C o t. -,X) E 13 X · ·, li for given sets V,. we write
7-,(0) -(il.....1,-1.(1.-t,+1.....0\. 1 (2.4)
with c, e I-,.
(vii) The space of #F -valued functions that are quadratically integrable on  C l). x ) is denoted by
/.t(0. x ). This space is a real Hilbert space with inner product
(,·. it·) = f ,·C/)1 uit)d/.   r. t,· E Lt"(11. x ). (2.5)
0
The corresponding norm of,· E /.t (0. x ) is denoted by IIi·11. i.e. 11,·Il = V'(' · 41
(viii) The space of #P'-valued functions that are quadratically integrable on 10. / I for all 1' > 0
is denoted by L t.l,,  C 0. x ).
(ix)  Let.1' be a vector space, Y a normed space. D C .1'. and let /' be an operator from P to T.
If, for.,· E D and h E .1'. the limit
TC.,·+c,/,1-7(.r)lilli (2.6)
1 -/0                                                   (1
exists. it is called the Gateaux differential of  1 Lit .I· ,lith increment  h. and is denoted by
<97 C.t·:h). If the limit (2.6) exists for each h E .1'. the operator /' is called Gateaux differ-
entiable at .i·. Assume further that .1' is a normed space and that D is an open subset of.1'.
If for fixed.t· e D and each h E .1' there exists a ft e Y such that (i) h » u is linear and
continuous, and (ii)
lini (2.7)Hn.i·+ h)- T<.2/)-f/|M -0.
-0                                      11/,11
then 7, is called Fr chet differentiable at.r.and  N is called the Frtchet   differential  of -1 at x
with increment h  and is denoted by U  =  AT(.r. h ) (followingtheliterature [81. Section 7.21.
we use the same symbols to denote the Gateaux and Frdchet differentials).  If the Frdchet
differential of 7 exists at .,·, then (i) it is unique, (ii) the Gateaux differential exists at .1·.
and (iii) the Gateaux and Frdchet differentials are equal. Assume further that the operator
7  is Frdchet differentiable for each .1·  e  D.  At a fixed point .r  e  D, the Frdchet differential
d /'(.r:h) is. by definition. of the form cS /'C.,·: /1 )  =  .1, .h, with  .·1, a bounded linear operator
from.1' to Y. The correspondence .1· »*  . 1, defines a transformation from D into the normed
linear space consisting of all bounded linear operators from .1' to 3. This transformation is
called Fr3chet derivative of  I. and is denoted by 07'.  By definition, we have *G 7'{ .t': /1) =
0 / C.t· }h. Partial derivatives and differentials are denoted by i), and,0„ where the index refers
to the corresponding argument.
2. Preliminaries                                                                        21
Cx)   Let  V  and  W be vector spaces. The kernel and image of a linear operator /' from  V to  Vt;
are denoted by k,·r l' and iin I'. respectively.
(xi)  The real and imaginary part of a number:  f   4' are denoted by Re z and liii z. respectively.
(xii) A tli,0-player  zero-stint game is characterized  by a triple  (.1'.  Y. 72 ) where .1' and )' are sets
and where f isa function from the Cartesian product,'l' x j to #/. The set,1' (Y) is the strat-
egy set of the minimizing (maximizing) player, respectively.  For a given pair of strategies
C.t·. u )  E.1'  ·  ,)' the outcome of the game is f C .1.4 )· The minimizing (maximizing) player
tries to minimize (maximize) this outcome by choosing an appropriate .t· f  .1' (.4 E  3)·
The lower valite and upper vah,e of the game are defined by
2 := stti, illf 7-(.t·. 9):
VE) .re.1
7:=  illf stip.,2(.t'.,U).
.t'€.1' 4€Y
respectively.  It is easily seen that £  5 7, which justifies the terminology.  If the lower value
equals the upper value,  the common value 4-  · =  4  =  7 is called the value of the game. A
pair of strategies  { -F. 9)  E  .1'  x  Y is  called a saddle-point solution for the game if
VCY. 4) 5 9(7. 9)  5 4(.r. F) forall.t· E .1' and y E Y.
It is easily seen that if a saddle-point solution C 7. 9 ) exists, upper and lower value are equal
and the value of the game equals  4(7. fi)·   For a general account of static zero-sum  game
theory we refer to [98] and for an account of zero-sum dynamic game theory we refer to
[9,101
(xiii)  A matrix.le #1... is called smb/e if all its eigenvalues are in the open left-half plane.
(xiv)  For matrices.1  6  IR" "' and Be IR . the set F is defined by
F:= <1·' e IR
.I. .
j .1 + H/·'stable} (2.8)
(xv)  For a number.\   E  1\ and matrices  .1  C Ff and H, E #t (i -1. .  ...\),the set
Yx is defined by
F.r  :=     4..    ./'x)  ·-1 + X H,
/.''
stable                                                 (2.9)1-1
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(xvi)  Let .1' be a Hilbert space. The closed ball with center 0 E .1' and radius ,· > 0 is denoted
by H,, ii.e.
/1.. :={.1· C .1'111.1·11 5 1} (2.10)
(xvii) The expectation operator is denoted by E.
(xviii) A number zo f  d'i s called an invariant zero of the matrix  quadruple  { .1.  H.  ( :  D )  if
1 1 - 10,1  /3-  < 11(,1.111,·aiik  "  1 - sl  /  
1-    c '] L   c .       1,]
where the normal rank of a polynomial matrix (2( 2 ) is defined by
Iioi·itiraiik (2(: 1 = 111 aX {I·atik (2(2)Iz f  4'}.
The following two standard results are used throughout the thesis.
Theorem 2.1.1 Consider a real Hilbert space X,a bounded seu-adjoint linear operator 1  on X.
and an element.rt, E X. Let the quadratic functional f  :X  »114 be defined by
.fC.t) = <.,·.1.r> + 2 (t...1.11).
Then.  f  has  a maximum  ifand only if -"l is positive semi-definite and .2·„  E  in, 1  .  U these con-
ditions hold. f attains its maximal value at atl points -i· with /'7 = -.to. Furthermore  f (T j   =
(i ..,11>.
Lemma 2.1.2 (see e.g.  [88. Exercise 6.101) Let .t· E  Lt(0. x ) be differentiable and denote the
derivative by .i·. U .i· C f.iClt. x ), then .rl I j » 0 as t » x.
2.2 The Algebraic Riccati Equation
Quite an important role in this thesis is played by the algebraic Riccati equation. This equation
has extensively been studied in the literature: see for instance [21,23.76,118,123,128].  Here
we briefly review some aspects that are important for this thesis.
Let .1, (2. and H be real 1,    i, matrices with Q and /i symmetric. The algebraic Riccati equation
(ARE) is the matrix equation
Q  +  . 1 I .\'  +  .\.. 1  +  .\. H.\    = O. (2.11)
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Associated with this Riccati equation is the 211 . 21, Hamiltonian matrix
H:= 1 (2.12)1-6 -51
Of particular interest are solutions .\' of (2.11) with the property that .1 + R.\' is stable.  Next, we
define an operator from a certain set of 211  x 211 Hamiltonian matrices to the set of 11  x ti matrices,
with the property that each image is a solution of (2.11) that has this stability property.
Assume that the matrix H has no eigenvalues on the imaginary axis. Denote the spectral sub-
spaces corresponding to the eigenvalues in the open left-half plane and the open right-hal f plane
by .1'_ CH) and .14(H), respectively.  Let .\'i  and .\'2  be real 11  x 11 matrices such that
[.\.11
.l'_ C H)  =  im  1        1 . (2.13)
[.\.2]
If.\' i is regular, or, equivalently, if the two subspaces
[ol
.l'_CH)
and          i iii   L / 1
(2.14)
are complementary, we can define.\'  :=  .\'2.\'i-1.  The correspondence  H  »  .\' is called the Ric-
cati operator and is denoted by  Ric.  The domain cloiii(Ric)  of this operator consists of Hamil-
tonian matrices H with two properties: H has no eigenvalues on the imaginary axis and the two
subspaces in (2.14) are complementary. The image .\'  =  Ric·C H) has the following properties.
Theorem 2.2.1   (seee.g.  [128, Theoreni 13.51) Suppose 11 E (10111(Iii(') and.\'  =  Ric(H).  Then
C i i .\' is real symmetric:
(ii).\ satisfies the algebraic Riccati equation (2.11);
(iii) the matrix .A + UX is stable.
One can easily show that a matrix .\ with these properties is unique.  If this matrix .\ exists.  it is
called the stabilizing solution of the ARE. The existence of the stabilizing solution of the ARE can
be verified by checking whether the corresponding Hamiltonian matrix has no purely imaginary
eigenvalues. and whether the complementarity condition (2.14) holds. This second condition can
be replaced by a rank condition on the matrix sign of a certain matrix ([76, Theorem 22.4.11 or [77.
p.  175]). An extensive literature on algorithms for accurately computing the matrix sign exists,
and one finds a comprehensive list of references in the review paper of Laub [77].
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2.3 Differential Games
We take the definition of a differential game given by BaFar and Olsder [10, Definition 5.51 is a
starting point for the introduction of a general framework for the differential games considered in
this thesis. A modified version of this definition is given below. The modification is motivated by
the three types of information structures that are considered in this thesis.
Definition 2.3.1  An \ -player finite-horizon differential game involves the following:
(i) An index set N = {1. .\" } called the set (lf players.
(ii)  A time interval  Ii<i. t i] which is specified a priori and which denotes the duration of the
game.
(iii)  A set So consisting of functions from  li, 4 } to .Ko with .'4, a subset of R" .  This set is called
the trajectory space of the game. Its elements are the permissible state trajectories of the
game.
(iv)  For each i E N. a set U consisting of functions from Ito. til toN, with .0., a subset of //r ·.
This set is called the control space of player,. Its elements are the permissible control junc-
tions for player i. The value  u, C / )  is  called the action of player i  at time  l.
(v)  A differential equation
i= Kt..1.· 1,1. . U \ 1 .1. 1 0)  =  .1.t . (2.15)
The  solution .1·   E  So  is the state trajectory of the game corresponding to the  .\"-tuple of
control functions C u t. . , tt X)  e Ut , . 145 and the initial state .1·0.
(vi)   A function 1/, defined on  tti. t i} for each i  E N which determines the state information avail-
able to player i at each time 1  e  110. t ,}.  Specification of ,1,  characterizes the information
stritcture of player t.  In this thesis we use three different information structures:
(a)  if 11,     1/0.111  -+  8" . 4, ( 1 1=  .ro. the information structure of player,  i s said to be an
open-loop pattern;
(b)  ife : 1/0./11 -* R", 0(1) = .t·(t),the information structure of playeri is said tobea
feedback pattern;
(c) ifil,   [10./il » #t'" x m", .(1) = C.,·„..t·(t)),the information structure issaid tobe
a memoryless perfect state pattern.
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For more information structures we refer to [10, Definition 5.6].
(vii)   For each  i   e   N,  a  set  I,  of mappings  7 ,        (t.  il, C t) )   »-9   i t, (t )  called the strategy space of
player i. Its elements are the permissible strategies for player i.
(viii)  For each i EN. two functionals q,  : .4'0 -+  l/  and qi :  Ito. 1,1  x  .h'o x .V  x  ·     x  .5'1-  -4  8.
determining a functional .1,     F i x x  1- v -*  R as follows
.I,·(71.... ,-1\·) = 1 g, (t..r(t). 111(t).....it,·(1))dt + cl, (.r(ti)). (2.16)
to
The functional .4 is called the costfinction of player i.                                                                  0
An .\ -player finite-horizon differential game is well defined if (i) the function f and the strategy
spaces F, are such that the differential equation (2.15) admits a unique solution for each X-tuple
(Ul···· 'it:1) with N,(t) = 7,(t, 0(t)),1, e F„ and (ii) the functionals 0 and g, aresuch that the
integral (2.16) exists for each permissible X-tuple of strategies and for each i EN. Sufficient
conditions for the first condition to hold can be found in [10, Theorem 5.1]. All the differential
games considered in this thesis are well defined.
2.3.1    Generalizations and Special Structures
(i) Let
r: =  I'tx    · ·x I'X. (2.17)
The set of permissible strategies can be further restricted to a subset [o  C I' which cannot
be written as the Cartesian product of individual strategy spaces.  Such a game is called a
coupled-constraint dijferential game. In this situation the players cannot choose strategies
independently.  One can think of coupled constraints as a cooperative aspect in a noncoop-
erative game. Although each player has his own objective, there should be a coordination
between the players to choose the .\-tuples of strategies  in  the  set Fo. Coupled constraints
were studied in the context of static games in [106]. Recently, the concept of coupled con-
straints has been applied to an environmental compliance problem where agents are enticed
to obey pollution constraints jointly rather than separately [70].
(ii) An injinite-horizon differential game is defined just like a finite-horizon game in Definition
2.3.1  with t i=  x  and q,  -0 for all,  E N.A n. \ -player infinite-horizon differential game
is called stable if
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(a) 140;
(b) foreach permissible .\ -tuple of strategies in 1 the state trajectory converges to a steady
state value for all initial states .17) E .vo.
There exist situations where the state converges to a steady state value in a Nash equilib-
rium. and where a player can improve unilaterally to a strategy resulting in a state trajectory
that diverges to infinity. By imposing a coupled-constraint condition on the strategy spaces
the game can be made stable and thus such a deviation is not allowed. This condition can be
interpreted as a coordination betzveen the players to achieve the common stability objective.
(iii) A differential game is called disturbed if the right-hand side of the differential equation
(2.15) has an extra term „·, which is uncontrollable for all the players. This term lt' is called
the disturbance. Possibly, also the functions qi (see (2.16))depend on w. Wecall adifferen-
tial game deterministically disturbed if the disturbance tt' is an element of some topological
function space W: This space should be such that the differential game is well-defined for
each ti· E  VI,'; see the discussion following Definition 2.3.1. We call a differential game
stochastically disturbed if the disturbance ir is a stochastic process.
(iv)  A (disturbed) differential game is called linear if  k, =  #R""  and
\
./(/..1. 11 1..    . 1, \. 1,) = .ICI ).r + Z U,(t)it, + A'Ct)it·                           (2.18)
/=l
where  .1( / )  E   /N 1
1  . /
, ILV) E M"'m,,and Ett) e IR
...1  are matrices defined on [4. 1 J
with continuous entries.  Note that the game is disturbed if ECt)  4  0. A strategy corre-
sponding to a feedback information structure is called linear if
1, (/..1. )=  /.'' 1/ ).1 (2.19)
where  t,C/ )   E #i is  a matrix defined on  1/t . 4] with continuous entries.   We call  a
strategy corresponding to a memoryless perfect state information structure linear if
-,, C t..l·(,..t· ) = /'', C t..1·it ).t (2.20)
where /·IC/. .rt, ) E //t""' ' isamatrix defined on Ito. ti] A #r' with continuous entries.
(v)  A (disturbed) differential game is called linear-quadratic if the game is linear and if
\
9,11..t·. 1,1.   ..11\.,1.)=.1.I-(2'.1. + S "IR„Ctlit, 4- u.1-1,(t)(t.:
/= 1
(2.21)
q, C.t' 3 - .t· t Q, B·                                                                              (2.22)
' In this thesis. we always take 11' r I.31(1. x I.
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where Q,(t). QiI E R ..:, , R, , (t )   C   #t", v "t.  1, (1 )   e    #77 *7  are  symmetric  matrices  de-
fined on  to. tl } with continuous entries. Furthermore /i„  >  0 for all i  E  N. The matrices
Rit  for  i   f   j are called cross-control matrices. The matrices (2, and R„ are called state-
weighting and control-weighting matrices. respectively.
(vi) A differential game is called time-invariant if the functions .f and q, do not depend on the
time variable t. Similarly. the strategy of player i is called time-invariant if it does not de-
pend on the time variable 1.
(vii) We say that a differential game is of the input-OUtput type if an output function is asso-
ciated to each player. The output function of player i  is #91" -valued and is denoted by 2,
and depends in general on the time variable /, the state variable .i· and the control variables




where ('i  E  #ft" x" and D„  e #P, X /. j are constant matrices.  If the outputs z, are elements
of a normed space,  one can represent cost functions  as  11 r, 112.   If the game is disturbed,  3,




Because of its practical relevance, the feedback Nash equilibrium is a popular solution concept in
the area of dynamic games [3,35,86,100]. Unfortunately, this concept is usually not analytically
tractable and authors often use numerical techniques to study feedback Nash equilibria in a dy-
namic game. The open-loop Nash equilibrium on the other hand enables one to study a dynamic
game more analytically; especially in the class of linear-quadratic games [l, 2,47,44,45].  How-
ever, this concept has less practical relevance due to its limited information structure. In many
applications the two solution concepts are both computed, either analytically or numerically. and
the corresponding strategies are compared to each other [93,48,115].
Another basic question in a dynamic game model is the length of the planning horizon on which
the players base theirdecisions. Is it finite or infinite? And, if it is finite, what is its length? These
questions are not always easy to answer. A suitable approach dealing with this problem in a one-
player context seems to be the model of rolling horizon decision making [12,109,69,71]. In this
approach the decision maker bases his decision on a forecast over a finite horizon.  In the next
period he takes an additional period of the future into account in order to make the next optimal
decision. This procedure is repeated every period which justifies the term rolling horizon.  The
term horizon refers to the number of periods in the future for which the forecast is made. A similar
approach has been developed in the area of repeated games by Jdhiel [64,65]. The rolling horizon
concept does not seem to have received any attention in the area of differential games.  It is the
purpose of the present chapter to develop some ideas in this direction. Specifically. a concept,
called the moving horizon solution concept, is developed for the class of infinite-horizon time-
29
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invariant differential games where the information structure of each player is a feedback pattern;
thus making this concept practically relevant. The strategies of the players are at each point in
time based on a finite-horizon differential game with an open-loop information pattern, which
makes the concept analytically tractable.
The moving horizon solution concept for a differential game as introduced in this chapter is also
inspired by the development of modelpredictive control [5] in the last few decades. This method
has become quite popular in controller design problems for industrial processes. In model pre-
dictive control one optimizes forecasts of process behavior with a finite horizon process model.
Only the first input of the optimal input sequence is injected to the plant and the problem is solved
again at the next time interval using updated process measurements and a shifted horizon. Authors
often use the synonymous terms receding horizon control or moving horizon control to refer to
such a control scheme. The origin of this methodology goes back to a brief note of Kleinman
[671 who constructed a class of feedback controllers to stabilize a linear system which resembles
a moving horizon controller. The development of moving horizon control has been carried out
and generalized in many directions. To name just a few: systems with constraints both on state
and input, time-varying systems [74], and non-linear systems [90,91,55,56]; also robustness
properties have been studied [41,11]. An extensive literature review can be found in [5]. Moving
horizon control has also been applied in zero-sum game theory [75,85], thus connecting it to ill .
control theory. However, no literature seems available in the area of nonzero-sum game theory.
This chapter is a first attempt in that direction.
A choice between a finite planning horizon (and its length) or an infinite horizon is avoided by
the moving horizon approach. Nevertheless one still deals with the choice of the moving horizon
length.  In some cases the application could resolve this issue; for instance in production planning
problems these lengths are usually known. In such a case, the moving horizon length is an ex-
ogenous parameter. Alternatively. if such a natural choice is not possible, it could be preferable
to make the moving horizon length an endogenous parameter, i.e. to let it result from a certain
optimization problem.  In the present chapter a method is presented to choose the moving horizon
length in such a way that the distance between the moving horizon solution and a feedback Nash
equilibrium is minimized. Since in general feedback Nash equilibria are not unique [46,122]. this
additionally provides a refinement of this equilibrium concept that can be used to select a unique
feedback Nash equilibrium.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. The moving horizon solution concept is defined for  \ -
player time-invariant infinite-horizon differential games in Section 3.2. The concept is studied in
more detail in the class of linear-quadratic games in Section 3.3. In particular a necessary and
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sufficient condition is presented for a time-invariant moving horizon solution to exist uniquely.
Special attention is paid to the scalar case in Section 3.3.2. Suggestions about how to make the
moving horizon length an endogenous parameter are given in Section 3.3.3. The theory and ana-
lytic tractability of the moving horizon concept are illustrated by an economic example in Section
3.4. This example is a government debt stabilization differential game where the players are a fis-
cal and a monetary authority. The chapter ends with some concluding remarks in Section 3.5.
3.2 The Moving Horizon Solution Concept
Following the lines of moving horizon control, the players in a dynamic game determine optimal
strategies based on a finite horizon at each point in time. However, they only implement the ini-
tial control action. By repeating this continuously in time, strategies defined on the infinite time
horizon result. In this section a solution concept based on this notion is defined in the class of
.\-player infinite-horizon time-invariant differential games in which the information structure of
each player is a feedback pattern. This concept will formally be defined in Definition 3.2.1 below,
which requires some preliminary work.
Consider an \'-player infinite-horizon time-invariant differential game in which the information
structure of each player is a feedback pattern: see Section 2.3 for the notation and terminology.
The specification of such a game involves a differential equation of the form
./ f(.r, 11(1.•r),. .1.1·(t..r)). (3.1)
The strategy space  r, of player i i s defined as the subset of all  maps  from  [0.x)  x   R"  to  #f"' ·
such  that  for  each  C i 1• ·  ·  ·   • 7.5 )    f    I' t    x   ·  ·  ·   x 1'.; there exists a unique state trajectory  on  the




where s ,  e  I' , forj = 1. .\", and .t· is the solution of (3.1) with .t·C (})  = .t'o.  In the sequel, this
infinite-horizon differential game is referred to as the global game. In addition to the global game,
consider at each point in time  to a finite-horizon differential game on the time horizon  I/o. /0 + L j
for some fixed horizon length  L.  It is assumed that the information structure of the players is an
open-loop pattern for each such differential game.  In  the game on the time horizon  [10. to  +  Ll,
the strategies of the players are denoted by
f,(' : Itti. to + L] x #/" -* iR":   f.,f" : Ct..1.(tti)) F-+ ti,w{t),   tt  3/5 tot L.
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Note that the initial state on \vhich these open-loop strategies depend, is exactly the state  .,·C & )
of the global game at time to.  The strategy space lf" of player i in the game on the time horizon
110. lt, + /1 isdefined as the subset of maps from Itt,. 10 + i.] .  # '. to M"t. such that for each
(i.1.        .  .\)  E  1 ;'   ·    · ·  .  1't , there exists a unique state trajectory on the interval [to. 1(, + L 3
for each initial state .t·{ 4 ) Denote this state trajectory by .7'. Then,.i" satisfies the differential
equation
.i·'"{ r} =f (.i"CT).11;"CT).    ..,1,·8(T)) .    1,1 5 7 5 /„+ L. (3.2)
and initial condition .i·'' 1 1,1 ) = .t·{ /1,1. Furthermore. the cost function of player, is given by
1.,+1
.j,4 <I,;,1..   ·  .'< ..t.  1(,1) = . . q, (.5.t'(T). bI "ITI..... 11'<(r)) d/,
1„
where f Q" e 1,4 fur j = 1..    . -\". and .i·' isthe solution of(3.2) with initial state .t·{ 4 ) Weare
now able to formally define the moving horizon solution concept.
Definition 3.2.1  Let L  >  0.  Let for each 4  >  0. the set of .\ strategies f ,°  E  F,  for i  =
1..       ..\". constitute an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the game on the time horizon 11„. tu t L].
Then  the  set of .\ strategies  -,   El,. defined by
...,(1..'.):=i.;(/..1.). ,=1. .\-. (3.3)
is called a moving horizon solittion for the global game with moving horizon length L. Individual
strategies are called moving horizon strategies.                                                                     E
In a moving horizon solution the players face a finite-horizon game at each point in time. deter-
mine an open-loop Nash equilibrium for this game, and only implement the initial equilibrium
control action in the global game. In general there may exist multiple open-loop Nash equilibria
for the finite horizon games.  If this is the case, Definition 3.2.1 allows the players to switch be-
tween different equilibria as time evolves.  It may be expected that such a switching behavior leads
to unstable dynamics. In what follows, a moving horizon solution is constructed that excludes the
possibility of switching between different equilibria. In this construction. the time-invariance of
the functions f and .c/, plays an important role. The constructed moving horizon solution is also
time-invariant.
Let -11 ..     . -,1 be a set of open-loop strategies for the finite horizon game on the time horizon
[0.  /. 3.  Let &  e  #t'"  be the initial state of this game. Denote the corresponding state trajectory and
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costs by .7' and j,°. respectively. Let ti, > 0 and define the open-loop strategies i, : [to. ti, + /.1
R"  »  ##"' · for the game onthe time horizon Ito. 10 + L] by i,(T..1.1:= f.,c'Cr -1„..r). Denote
the state trajectory corresponding to these strategies and initial state E by .i·. By construction, we
have
.i.t,(r)=.f (·i·"(T}.4,1'(T. .51..   . i.t<(T.4 1).  l) TSL.  .2.1,{()1=(
and
.i·(r}=f{.i·(TI.i'(r.,5)·· .'ix{T.,S}J. tofrf/0+L. .i·(to)=t.
Since.f istime-invariant it follows that .i·(r) = .i·u(r -to) for all r E [to. 1„ + /.1. This implies
that
to + 1.
j,( 1.....ix. ) = ,/ 9,(.i'(T).51(T.().. .. f.\(T.E)}dr =
1.-,
to + L
=  .jlf  .q, (.i·0(T - /0). T.7(T - /0. 6)·····  t<.(T - /0.( ) (/T =
tu
L
=   .    6        ..0 1  -\    40-   ck
ji  .1 /1 /. 11(/.4 . ..  5: < . ( T. 6) )  dr  =  ./,9
0
The latter equality follows from the time-invariance of the function q,. Hence, the costs of player
i i n the game on the horizon  0. /.1 corresponding to the strategies 1 7. .      . 1 1 and initial state & are
equal to his costs in the game on the horizon [t„. to + Ll corresponding to the translated strategies
4. . . . .i· \ and initial state 6, for each point in time to. This observation implies the following
result.
Proposition 3.2.2  Let L  >  O.  Let it,\  be an open-loop Nash equilibriumfor the game on
the  time-horizon  41.1.1.  Then,  the  set  of X  time-invariantfeedback  strategies  -1,       IR"   »   Ili"'·
defined  by  -t,t.z' j  :=  =i,(0..r jis  a  time-invariant  moving  horizon  solution for  the  global game ,1'ith
moving horizon length L.
Only time-invariant moving horizon solutions as generated by the previous theorem are consid-
ered in this thesis. The game on the time horizon [(}. L 1 in which the players determine an open-
loop Nash equilibrium is referred to as the local game. A time-invariant moving horizon strategy
of player i corresponding to a moving horizon solution generated by a fixed open-loop Nash equi
librium of the local game typically depends on  L. and will therefore be denoted by 1,"" C.r: L ).
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Remark 3.2.3 In finite horizon problems cost functions can be provided with a terminal penalty.
which is obviously not taken into account by the moving horizon solution concept. Although it
would not make the analysis more difficult, it does not seem very realistic to do this in the moving
horizon solution concept, since the players never reach the endpoint of the local game.              0
Remark 3.2.4 An important issue that needs to be studied is stability, i.e.  does a moving horizon
solution stabilize the closed-loop system? The planning horizon length L of the local game plays
an important role in this.  It is to be expected that especially for small values of L stability problems
may arise.                                                                                                       E]
Remark 3.2.5 Important notions which are often dealt with in the literature are weak and strong
time consistency; see for instance [8] or [10, Section 5.6]. Time-invariant moving horizon so-
lutions generated by Proposition 3.2.2, which are time-invariant feedback strategies. are clearly
strongly time consistent. An important underlying assumption is that such moving horizon solu-
tions are generated by a fixed open-loop Nash equilibrium for the local game.                        B
Remark 3.2.6  It is important to realize that the moving horizon concept is not defined as an equi-
librium concept.  It is a method to play the game which may resemble reality better than control
strategies based directly on the existing equilibrium concepts.                                               0
3.3 Moving Horizon Control in LQ Games
In this section the moving horizon solution concept is analyzed in more detail in the subclass of
two-player linear-quadratic differential games. Such a game is specified by
./.(.r.„i. tt2  = .-1.r+ 131111 + l.:i,ti,· (3.4)
qi(.t'. (11·'12) . .1·TQI.t' + tti Rittli + t,j Hi2112· (3.5)
92(·t'. tti.tt2) = .rT(22.r + ul.,1 211'1 + lij R22112· (3.6)
with  .-1,  8,.  9„ and R, 1 constant matrices of appropriate dimensions. We assume that (2,2  0,
Rit = R22 = L and Rlk = 1/21 - 0.
3.3.1 General Formulation
As indicated in the paragraph following Proposition 3.2.2. we consider time-invariant moving
horizon solutions generated by open-loop Nash equilibria for the local game on the horizon I(}. L ].
3. Moving Horizon Strategies                                                                                    35
Engwerda [45. Theorem  1 ] has shown that a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium exists for each
initial state if and only if a certain matrix is invertible. In fact, if this condition holds, the unique
open-loop Nash equilibrium is given by  5, (T.E)  =  - /3,Ti·,(r), where the initial state is denoted
by  6.  Here, the functions  i· i  and  i· , follow from the two-point boundary value problem
.i·(T ) .i'(T)
(1
- 1·1(T) =--1/ l.'1(T) . .i'(O)= 6. L'1(L)= l.'2(L)=0. (3.7)(IT
1.'2<T)- -l' 2 { T )-
with matrix .1/ defined by
-.1     .4'1      .6'2
11 :=  (21  ..17'  0  .  4:= 8,8,1 (3.8)
Qi 0     ..IT
If the local game has a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium, the corresponding time-invariant mov-
ing horizon solution is clearly the unique moving horizon solution for the global time-invariant
game on the infinite horizon. This observation gives a necessary and sufficient condition for the
existence of a unique moving horizon solution in the subclass of two-player linear-quadratic dif-
ferential games. This condition is formulated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3.1  Consider the two-player linear-quadratic infinite-horizon time-invariant differ-
ential game
.i· = .1.r + Hitti + 82112.   ·I =   trTQ,1. + I.Jui  dt
0
with Q,  2  0.  Let the matrices  $,  and  .\I  be defined by (3.8).  Furthermore,  defnefor each  1,  >  O
the ii x n matrices H(L), Gi( L ),and (12 ( L) by
H  C  L)                                 r
(4(L) := e L.11 0
(;2( L)_                 -0-
Then there exists a unique moving horizon solution with horizon length  L  if and only if the matrix
NCI. ) is regular.  If this condition holds. the  moving horizon strategies  are  given by
3 ""(.r: I.)= -8,7-6',(L)H-1(L).t·.   i = 1.2. (3.9)
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Proof The uniqueness of the moving horizon solution follows from the fact that the open-loop
Nash equilibrium is unique. According to Proposition 3.2.2. we have -, 11 1/ C.'.: L I  =  f,C (I..t· 1  =
-B,it.·, C 11). The boundary value problem (3.7) implies that
.i(T) E
l't(T) =( -1/L l'1({ 1) .
<'2 (T L -l'2(0)_
Taking r = L. multiplying the left-hand and the right-hand side by , 9: and using the boundary
conditions tilL) = 1.·,(L) =Oyields
              lill j
L.·,(0)   =   (1,(L)   .i·(L).
l'1{02 -(;2(L)-
If HIL)isregular,then .i·(L b  =   // C/ . ) -1 6.  Fromthisweseethat i.·, C O)  =  (;, C L)H C L) -1 6, which
implies (3.9).                                                                                                   0
It is well-known that open-loop Nash equilibria for finite-horizon LQ differential games are also
generated by the solution of a set of asymmetric Riccati differential equations.  If this solution
exists on the complete interval  1). /.}, the moving horizon solution is also generated by this so-
lution. This property is formulated in the following corollary. In order to indicate the difference
with differentiation with respect to 1. differentiation with respect to L is denoted by a prime.
Corollary 3.3.2  Let  I.„ > 0.  Assume that the solution C It. 1 ;.) c,f the opendoop Riccati differen-
tia| equations
M= (21 -1-   1 ' 11,  -1- /1 .1 -  /,t K, /1  -_ /1 5/t. (3.10)
4 = 92 + .195 + /12.1 - /,2.Kt /'1 - /'1.h.1/'J. (3.11)
with initial conditions 13(0) =  1,1(03 = 0, exists on the interval 3. Lo\. Then the moving horizon
solution exists for each horizon length I. E \0. /.,11. The moving horizon strategies can be written
as
-1,1,(.t:L)=-H,i/1(L).t·. i -1.2. L E [0. L„}
For the existence of a unique moving horizon solution, the regularity of //1 l. ) needs to be studied.
In order to determine // C L I. one can eitherdirectly compute, or solve the linear coupled initial\//.
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value problem
//'(L) = -.4//(L)+.N,(;ICL) +.5(;2( l.). //((1) = 1. (3.12)
f ;; C L ) - (2; H f L ) + . -I t (;, C L 1. (i, (0)=0. i=1.2. (3.13)
Both methods do not only produce H C /  ) but also (,1 C L ) and (;,C /. ), which are not interesting in
determining whether the moving horizon solution exists. However,  in a special situation  H C L J
is uniquely specified by a second-order linear initial value problem. which only involves system
data. This situation occurs if the matrix  .-1.S is symmetric for i  = 1.2, which is clearly a rather
strong condition. Nevertheless, it is not unlikely that this condition is met in economic applica-
tions. For example, the government debt stabilization model introduced by Tabellini [115] (see
also Section 3.4 of the present chapter) and the acid rain differential game of Miiler and de Zeeuw
[86]  can be written in such a way that  . IN, is symmetric. Furthermore, this symmetry condition
clearly holds in the scalar case, which is an important case for economic applications. The second-
order initial value problem is formulated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3.3 If the matrices  AH, are  symmetric,  then
H"(L}  =  (.12 + ....1 Ql  + ·<2QJ)HCL).      1/(0)  =  L      H'(0)  = -.1. (3.14)
Proof Multiplying  (3.13) with .,2, adding the resulting equations  for,   =   1.2 and using  the
assumption  .S.I T  =  -1 0, yields
4(''l + ·SG'   = (.<t (21  + .' ·202}H + .·1(.4'1(41 + K26'2)·
According to (3.12), .vi C; a + .ht:(';2 can be replaced by /1' t .4 1/, which results in
-.i H' +  .%'1 61  + .5'2(;L  =  ( .12  +  .h.1 (21  + S. (22}H
Observe that the left-hand side equals //"; see (3.12). Finally, the initial conditions for 1/ and H'
follow directly from the initial conditions in (3.12) and (3.13).                                                   El
This result can of course also be used to study the existence of the open-loop Nash equilibrium
for a finite-horizon time-invariant linear quadratic differential game with .1.w, symmetric.
An important aspect of the moving horizon solution is stability of the corresponding closed-loop
matrix. From (3.9) it follows that this matrix, which we denote by .1 It{ L ), can be written as
..1.YH C  L I   =  .-1  -  { .01(;1 C L  1  +  .4,2 (;2 ( L ) )  //-1 C  L ) (3.15)
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In general one first needs to compute  H.  C ;i. and C:, for determining whether the moving horizon
closed-loop matrix is stable. However, in a special situation, again met if.-4.S is symmetric for i  =
1.2. this closed-loop matrix is uniquely specified by a first-order quadratic initial value problem.
which only involves system data. This initial value problem is formulated in the next proposition.
Proposition 3.3.4 Let L >0 and assume that 1 1 C 1. j is regular.  Ifthe matrices .-\Hi are symmetric.
then
(.1,7")'(L) = (.-1.·11"(L))2 - (.12 + .. 1(21 + .5.2(21) .   .1 't'"(11) = ..1. (3.16)
Proof Differentiating (3.15) and using (3.12) and (3.13) yields
(.-1.Vt')'  =  -  C.49 (71  +  N.2(;': )  H-1  +  (.49 (;1  +  ..'.2('.2 )H-' H'H-1   =
=  (11.YU)- - (.12 + .5.1(21  + S.1(22) + (.1.'..1  - h.1.-11) ('.'H-1  +
\ ,
+ (.·i'*2 - .4.2.-1 T) (&H  1    <.lyH)" - (.-12 + .4.1(21 + 3.2(22) ·
where the latter equality follows by assumption. The initial value follows from (3.12). (3.13), and
(3.15).                                                                                                                    0
A problem in computing j/, (;i and (;2 might be the large number of unknowns.  In the case t,  =  2.
the number of unknowns in (3.12) and (3.13) already equals 12. Moreover in the \ -player case the
number of matrix differential equations generating  H and  (; 1. .       . C.'.\. obviously equals  .\   +  1.
In the next proposition, this number (three if .\- = 2) is reduced to two in a special case.
Proposition 3.3.5 Assume that Q, = q,(1 for some q,  e  Iii and some matrix (1.  Let the matrix (;
be the solution of the inhomogeneous  linear differential equation
(,u{ l,} =(2//CL) t.11(;CL),    (,CO) = 0. (3.17)
Then (;,l L j  = qi(:l t. j for all  L 3 0
Proof   Let (;,CL) = q,(,C /.1. then (7,'(L)= 9, H(L) +.tr(;,CL) and (;,(01 = C).Obviously, C;
satisfies the equations by which (;, is uniquely specified. i.e. (3.13). But then it must hold that
ri = CL.                                                                           O
Remark 3.3.6  If the conditions of Propositions 3.3.3.3.3.4. and 3.3.5 hold. the moving horizon
solution can be analyzed and computed as follows. One starts by computing // from the initial
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value problem (3.14).  From the result, the existence of the moving horizon solution can be de-
termined.  If it exists, one proceeds by computing . 11,1" from the initial value problem (3.16).  At
this point in the analysis. it can be concluded whether the moving horizon solution is stabilizing.
Given the closed-loop matrix .-1 YH. (3.15) can be rewritten as (;//-t = (ql.Vitqz.S.2)-1(.1 -.1..t),
provided  that  q i .9 + (12·<2 is regular. Consequently, (3.9) produces the following expression for
the moving horizon solution:
7,"" (.r: L ) = -0 H'.1 C,11.h.1 + 92.h'2 )- 1( .1 - .1,7"( L ) ).r. (3.18)
provided that 0  + 92.X, is regular.                                                                                            0
This subsection ends with the following theorem, which deals with the behavior of the moving
horizon solution as the horizon length L tends to infinity. Clearly. this behavior is closely con-
nected to the limiting behavior of the open-loop Nash equilibrium of the finite horizon differential
game as the planning horizon tends to infinity.
Theorem 3.3.7 Consider the diferential game and the notations introduced in Theorem 3.3.1.
Assume that 11(1.j is regular for all I.  >  0.  Define R  :=  (:,It-1 and assume that 7,  .-
litiv....2 P,(L) existsfor  i  =  1.2.  Furthermore, assunie that.\-S, P,- fil' lisstable.  Then the
open-loop control functions corresponding to the moving horizon strategies -t,1 H C.r: L) that are
obtained in the limit  L  »  x constitute an open-loop  Nash equilibrium for  the  infinite-horizon
dijferential game under consideration.
Proof According to Corollary 3.3.2, /1 {L) and /3 C L ) satisfy the set ofopen-loop Riccati differ-
ential equations (3.10) and (3.11). Since the limit of P, CL) for L  -4 x exists, Pt and Pi satisfy
the corresponding set of open-loop algebraic Riccati equations. It follows from [45. Theorem  12]
that under the additional stability condition on  .1  -  f J PI  -  .4.2/'2, the control functions
11,(t) - -HT-P ft{.1-,hiP,-5.212).1.c'.    i = 1.2.
where the initial state is denoted by .t'ti, constitute an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the infinite-
horizon game. The theorem now follows from the observation that these open-loop equilibrium
control functions can in feedback form be written as -B,TP'.1. = litilL».  1,""(.r: L).            0
A more detailed analysis of the limiting behavior of the open-loop Nash equilibrium for the fi-
nite horizon game as the planning horizon tends to infinity can be found in 110. Section 6.5.3].
For example, relatively weak sufficient conditions on the system data for the conditions listed in
Theorem 3.3.7 to hold are given in this reference.
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3.3.2   Scalar Case
The formulation of a linear-quadratic differential game simplifies substantially if the system pa-
rameters are all scalar. In this section it is assumed that this is the case and in order to indicate
the difference with the general formulation of the previous section, the system parameters -1. H,.
and (2, are denoted by a, 6„ and 0. respectively. Recall that it is assumed that q,  3  0. The condi-
tions on the system data listed in the Propositions 3.3.3,3.3.4, and 3.3.5 are all satisfied. For that
reason. the scalar case can conveniently be analyzed using the lines of Remark 3.3.6.
Let
/1 := 4,12 + .'191 + .•24'2·   s, := 6;. (3.19)
then. according to Proposition 3.3.3, // satisfies H" - 5,2// = 0. HCO) = 1 and 1/'(0) = -ct.
Consequently.   // C L 1   -   c „1 1( /i L)  - C ct//,)sitiliC/,L) ifit > (}and HCL) = 1 ifit = 0. 1nboth
cases we have  H (L)  9,6  0 for all  L  >  C). Hence. Theorem 3.3.1 shows that the moving horizon
solution exists for all L  > 0.
Denote the moving horizon closed-loop matrix (a scalar in the present case)by  a. 1 11 C L ).  Then,
according to Proposition 3.3.4. a uu satisfies the quadratic differential equation 4''ii  w    =   <'*i  H __   ,2
with initial condition *t „ „C t) ) =a.  The solution can be obtained by separating the variables.  We
have (1(t \, H/l"il,9 - 111) = dL. Since
1. clitilii  i  it
./  (tiI// - 11,2 =2 v '11.(.1,-111 -iI-
for 1, 4 0. it follows that at·('tailial,H//1 = -ilt/. + ('0 forsome constant ('0, or equivalently,
,11/,t = -/,tarih{jiL + (') forsome constant (' Forreference below. we state this result as a
separate lemma.
Lemma 3.3.8 Let 0 be a nonzero real number.  The solution of the differential equation .2  =
r6 - rri is giien  by  .i· C L )   =   - ,r taii 11 (r r L  +  ( ' )  ,t,ith  ( 'an arbitrary constant.
The constant ( ' can be determined using the initial condition a ittiC O)  =a. We obtain
1      /1 tacli/HCL) - _titaiili(/il. - A).    A := -log-. (3.20)2 P - <1
if V t O. or equivalently. if .:iqi + .:.,q, > 0. If :ic/1 + 0,92 - 0, then civit{l.) = a. This
degenerate case will not be further analyzed, i.e. we assume that .:191 + 2</2 > 0. From (3.20),
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we see that a it,t is strictly decreasing and approaches -1, as L approaches infinity. Furthermore,
(11„t has a unique zero at L := A/it. Hence, the stability of the moving horizon solution depends
on the sign of I. Indeed,  if L  SO, the moving horizon solution is stabilizing for all  L  >  0, and
if L> 0 the stabilizing property holds if and only if L  > I.  It is easily seen that the sign of L i s
uniquely specified by the sign  of a. The results obtained  so far are summarized in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3.3.9 Consider the two-player infinite-horizon linear-quadratic time-invariant differ-
ential game
.i' = a.t· + bliti + 62112.   ./, = f (q,1.2 +  ,) di
0
with q, 20. There exists a unique moving horizon solutionfor al horizon lengths L. Further, let
the numbers s, and It be deftned by O.19), assume that siqi + s.zq·z > 0, and defne
1      It + rlL:= r-log-.
lit         11 - a
Then ifc,  50 the moving horizon closed-loop system is stable for all  L  >  0 and if a  >  0 this
closed-loop  system  is  unstable for 0  <  L  S  L  and  stable for  L  >i.
Remark 3.3.10  If a  >  0, then
1                  1 + (SIC/1 + 8242)/a2 + 1I= log
1141+ (·viqi + Siq2)/(12     \/1 + (.Niqi + S242)/a2 - 1
This expression shows that if (siqi + ·:292)/ai is close to zero, then L is relatively large. This is
forinstance the case ifst qi + 3292  < <  ct:  In this case relatively large horizon lengths are required
to stabilize the closed-loop system. Alternatively, if 18191 + ·9242 )/a2 is large, which happens for
instance if:191 + 32q2 >> a: then L is close to zero. In this case, also small horizon lengths are
stabilizing.                                                                                                      O
The monotonicity property  of a.7IH indicates  that for increasing values  of  L, the convergence
speed of the closed-loop moving horizon dynamics also increases. Indeed, for a small stabilizing
value  of the planning horizon length  L, the players continuously consider it important to  mini-
mize short run costs. By implementing the corresponding control actions it is to be expected that
it lasts a relatively long time before the system reaches its steady state value. This phenomenon
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/5
L = Li
0                                         -L = L.,
Figure 3.1: Moving Horizon State Trajectories (Ll < I·2).
is illustrated by Figure 3.1, where the graphs of two stable moving horizon state trajectories are
drawn for the same positive initial state.
The moving horizon strategies follow immediately from (3.18). We have
XII/, 40(a + p tanli(kiL - A))
7, t.t·:L) .i·.    i = 1.2. (3.21)
8 1(/1 + 32(/2
For each initial state .t·o, a unique open-loop control function corresponds to (3.21) for each player.
We denote this control function by uvH (t:.t·o. L). The behavior of u,vH (t:.t·o. L ) is characterized
by the following theorem and illustrated by Figure 3.2.
Theorem 3.3.11 Consider the differential  game and notations  introduced in Theorem 3.3.9.  As-
sume that :ici, + s 1(11 >  0. The moving horizon strategies  ,1 H l .r·. L) are given by 0.21).  Denote
the co rrespondin g control functions by   ,1 H tt : .r o.  l. ), where  .1·0 is  tile  initial state.  The n,  the  tra-
jectory u ' H lt·,.r„. L)  is strictly increasing if bi.ro >  0 and strictly decreasing if bi.ro < 0 for all
L > 111ax{0.I}. Forany horizon lengths  Li  and  Ll with inax{0. L} < Li < t·2 we have
big,·.ro
0 < 1, IHCO: .1.0. Lt)< 11,"HCO. ro. L,)<  lim 111'"CO: .ro. L) =                          (3.22)LAx ' B- a
ifb, J·o < 0. and
biq,i·o lili
CO: .ro. L) < it,vHC O:.ro. L, ) < u,"HCO: .ro. Li ) < 0. (3.23)- - = lilli lt,
Il - (l L» 1
ifbi.ro > 0. FinaUy, there isaunique numbert > Osuch that it,1'H(t:.1·0. Ll) = u,vH(t:.ro. L2).
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Proof   We have
bicir.'.t,
It,„1'(1:.1.11. L) =                  (,1 - clit,IC 1.) )' ''/1,(t. 1/
91» 1 + 92.4 2
The first part is readily seen by computing 49". The second part ((3.22) and (3.23)) follows from
the monotonicity of ct.,IH  and the fact thataiti/(/· )  -*  -P  as  L  »x.  For the third part,  note
that the equation rt,vt'(1: .rci. Lt ) = tt,9 H(/: .,·Il. 1.2) is equivalent to
54*4)-'1.vii(l.211, = a -all//(/.2)
(t-  c t.i t/ ,C  L i  )
Since a „„ is strictly decreasing, this equation has exactly one solution t > 0.                        0
0                                                     L = 1.·,
L =LI
Figure 3.2: Moving Horizon Control Trajectories (Li < Li)
Two graphs of u,v"(t:.ro. L ) in the case /4.ri, > 0 are drawn in Figure 3.2. They correspond
to two different values  of the horizon length  L.   Let  2 -  be  the t-coordinate corresponding  to the
intersection point of the two graphs. By increasing  L  from L 1  to  L, the initial moving horizon
control action decreases.  In fact it is readily seen from the figure that this property holds for all t
between 0 and /-    For / >t- the situation is the other way around, i.e. by increasing  L  from L i t o
L, the control value increases. Hence. for small values of the planning horizon length the short run
moving horizon control actions. i.e. for 1 between 0 and 1- are closer to the target value zero than
for large values ofthe planning horizon length.  In the long run. i.e.  for t  >  t-, the moving horizon
control actions are closer to the target value for larger values of the planning horizon length.  This
property is clearly consistent with the moving horizon concept. By implementing the moving
horizon solution for a small value of /.. the players gain in the short run a control action relatively
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close to the target value. However, they pay a price in the long run. where their control action is
relatively far from the target value.
In both Figures 3.1 and 3.2, one can easily compare the moving horizon solution trajectories for
some initial state with the open-loop Nash equilibrium on the infinite horizon corresponding to
the same initial state. Indeed, Theorem 3.3.7 implies that for large values of L2, the corresponding
state and control trajectories resemble the optimal trajectories from the open-loop Nash equilib-
rium on the infinite horizon. It is clearly visible that the convergence speed of all the trajectories
is higher for the open-loop Nash equilibrium than for the moving horizon solution.
3.3.3 An Endogenous Moving Horizon Length
The horizon length L could be considered as an exogenous parameter. It might however be de-
sirable to avoid the choice of a moving horizon length. The present section suggests a method
to make L an endogenous parameter. Since the moving horizon solution fits in the scope of dif-
ferential games with feedback information structure, it seems plausible to minimize the distance
between a feedback Nash equilibrium and the moving horizon solution by varying L. The analy-
sis in this section is limited to the scalar case and ends with a remark about how one could exploit
the minimization process in the general case.
It is well-known [10, Section 6.5.3] that feedback Nash equilibria for an infinite-horizon linear-
quadratic differential game are generated by solutions C ki. t·, 3 of the set of feedback algebraic
Riccati equations
91 + 2ak.1 - Slki - 2.:2klk·2 - 0.
42 + 2al·2 - 2.:1 6.14 - 02AS = 0.
I f a pair of non-negative numbers  C 1·1 • 1.2 ) satisfies this set of equations, then the feedback strate-
gies
7,FBC 2) = -6,1·,.r.   i = 1.2.
constitute a feedback Nash equilibrium. We measure the distancel between a feedback Nash equi-
librium and the moving horizon solution by the Euclidean distance between the corresponding
pair of feedback maps, or equivalently, between the points (see (3.21))
a + it tailli{iti - A)
C kt ·4) and I qi· 92)·
$191 + 3292
i Other choices could have been made for a distance measure: for instance in terms of the corresponding cost
values.
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It is convenient to introduce the notations ty,  :=  1:,q, and K,  :=  .:, 1·,. The distance between a feed-
back Nash equilibrium and the moving horizon solution is then measured by the distance between
the points
a + ittaith{PL - A )
Ch. 1. h.2 ) and ((71. 02}.
(Ti  +  al
where ( Al · Al ) is a pair of non-negative numbers satisfying the set of equations
01 + 2(t, 1 - K  - 2Kth·2 = (1· (3.24)
02  +  2,/62  -  2Mt K,  -  K j  = 0 (3.25)
The graphs of the equations in this set are hyperbolas in the  C 4. „2)-plane (these equations are
studied in more detail in Section 5.6 of the present thesis).  In [122] it has been shown that this
set of feedback algebraic Riccati equations has either one or three solutions in the first quadrant
of the ( · t.  ·2 )-plane.  This has been further specified  in [46, Theorem 21:  if a  5 0, there exists
one such solution and if a  > 0, there exists a unique solution if and only if
30# - 30027 - .1(,2/16 > 0. (3.26)
If a  >0 and (3.26) does not hold, there are three solutions. One can easily verify that the graph
corresponding to (3.24) approaches infinity for t, 1  1 0, strictly decreases fort,· i  >  0, and intersects
the Ki-axis at +,·1 =a t 4(tz--trrr . Similarly. the graph corresponding to (3.25) intersects the  ,-
axis at K2 - (1 + 4# t (T·2' strictly decreases for t,·1   >  0. and  approaches zero for  · i   »  x.  see
also Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Sketch of Hyperbolas with One and Three Intersection Points
The moving horizon solution corresponds uniquely to the point
MUHCL).1,·j,HCLI = AA"'(LI{O't.(7,1. h. 1 1// CL).= ct + it tanh(/t/. - A) (3.27)
01 + rT 1
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The graph{ ( ·1,1,1(L).h-j"ICI.)Imax{0.75} < L < x} isaline segment from CO.0) ifc, 5 0. or
from rtz-C al. 02 ) if a  >  0. to 3% ( al. 0, ).  This line segment consists of all stabilizing moving
horizon solutions; we refer to it as the moving horizon graph.
The geometrical structure of both the feedback Nash equilibrium and the moving horizon solu-
tion concept allows for a convenient numerical determination of the moving horizon length L that
minimizes the distance between a feedback Nash equilibrium and the moving horizon solution.
If there exists a unique feedback Nash equilibrium, this minimization produces a unique, endoge-
nously determined moving horizon length.  In case of three such equilibria, three horizon lengths
result, and one could take the horizon length corresponding to the smallest distance. Additionally,
this method selects generically one of the three equilibria with the property that it is closest (with
respect to the distance measure chosen here) to the moving horizon solution for some specific
unique horizon length. The numerical procedure is illustrated by the following example.
Example 3.3.12  Let a  =  3.4  -  2. and 02  =  1.  Then 1,  =  2V/1  One can easily verify that
(3.26) is violated. implying that there are three feedback Nash equilibria. The two hyperbolas in













Figure 3.4: Hyperbolas and Moving horizon Graph Corresponding to Example 3.3.12.
picture clearly shows the existence of three feedback Nash equilibria. The corresponding inter-
section points are denoted by Et, E,. and E,. The thick line segment in this picture is the moving
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horizon graph. It is clear from inspection that the distance between equilibrium E, and the mov-
ing horizon graph is minimal at the end-point of the moving horizon graph. This corresponds to
a horizon length  L  =  x. The minimal distance between the other two equilibria and the moving
horizon graph can be found as follows. The line perpendicular to the moving horizon graph and
intersecting the 52-axis  at CO. o ) is described by the equation
G/
K·2=--Al +0·  at [al.a,21· (3.28)
C2
where
a { ai + 4) (a  + P) C (Ti  +  0&)
01 := 02 4=
02(01  + 02) 02(01 + 02)
Apparently, there exist two solutions (K l· *2.a) ,  with Ki    >0  and  a   €I a l. 021,ofthe  set  of
equations  (3.24),  (3.25),  and  (3.28).   The  pair  C t,1 • K,)  of such a solution corresponds to either
equilibrium El or 6. The number o in this solution can be used to find the point at the moving
horizon graph which corresponds to the minimal distance of the moving horizon graph and the
corresponding equilibrium. Finally, one finds the corresponding moving horizon length L from
(3.27).  It is clear from inspection that equilibrium 6 has the smallest distance to the moving
horizon graph and one can compute the corresponding horizon length L . 0.45. This number is
close to L . 0.38.                                                                                             O
Remark 3.3.13  The idea of making the moving horizon length endogenous by minimizing a dis-
tance between the moving horizon length and a feedback Nash equilibrium could be generalized
to the multi-variable case as follows. Assume that the solutions Pf L and 1'2 L of the set of open-
loop Riccati differential equations (3.10) and (3.11) with initial condition PPL(0)  =  PfL(0)  =  0,
exist. Define
41..= Qi +  AT p L  +  11)L A -  pt L sl pi L -  pt)L'q lp?L _  D L€ p L.
92 :-  (22 +  AT PTL +  PTL .A -  p?L Sl pi'L  -  1,7Ls:21'?L  -  Pi L f<j PTL .
Here, the right-hand sides correspond to the set of feedback algebraic Riccati equations.  Now, one
could select a moving horizon length  I.  such as to minimize the expression  11 A ( L ) 11  +  | 1 . 2 ( L ) 11,
where 11 · 11 is a matrix norm. Clearly, the resulting length depends on the matrix norm that has
been chosen.                                                                                                    0
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3.4    A Government Debt Stabilization Game
The present section illustrates the analytic computability of the moving horizon solution in an
economic example where feedback Nash equilibria cannot be determined analytically. This eco-
nomic example is taken from [2]; it has originally been introduced by Tabellini [115].  It is a linear-
quadratic differential game, thus the theory of the previous section is applicable. The model con-
cerns monetary and fiscal policy interaction in a government debt stabilization differential game.
In this game, the government debt is modeled as the state and the players are fiscal and monetary
authorities. The differential equation is given by
rd +.f-  m.       4 0)  =  do.
with d the government debt, .f the primary fiscal deficits controlled by the fiscal authority, and 1,1
the seignorage controlled by the monetary authority. Furthermore, i·d represents the interest pay-
ments on government debt and do the initial stock of outstanding government debt. The objectives
of the players are described by the cost functionals
·/f(.f. m) =   ((,f - 7)2 + KICd- d)2) exi,(-61)ill
0
and
.j„,(.f- m) = ,)  ((111 - 171}2 + I, 2(d -Il}2) exp(-61)fit.
0
respectively. The parameters  4  and x 2 are weights, 7, Tii,  and J are given target values, and d is
a discounting factor. All the parameters introduced so far. i.e. 1·, 4, the weights, the targets and
the discounting factor are assumed to be positive. Furthermore, it is assumed that do -d >  0,
rd+ f -m >  0, and 3 - r  2 0. These assumptions are taken from [2. Section 2], in which one can
find a detailed description of the differential game under consideration. They computed the open-
loop Nash equilibrium and the cooperative solution. The open-loop Nash equilibrium has been
computed in a different manner by Engwerda [45]. The feedback Nash equilibrium seems not
analytically computable.  In what follows. the moving horizon solution of the government-debt
stabilization game will be computed and analyzed following the lines of Remark 3.6.
The model under consideration can be written in the linear-quadratic format (3.4), (3.5). and (3.6).
by  introducing a two-dimensional state variable  .1·   =   Iii    .1·217 ,  and two scalar control variables
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11 i  and 1/2 as follows (see also [45, Section 6]):
·ti = Cd-(/1 exi,(- 4/21: (3.29)
.2'1 - <1'2 +/ - m) exp(-4/21: (3.30)
ui = (.f - .f)('xi,(-3/12): (3.31)
[/2  =   C m - )(.xi)(-,0//2 ) (3.32)
Furthermore, the matrices  . 1.  /3,.  and  Q, are defined by
[,· -9    1 1             [11                                   [1  01
1.    8, .=   .    82:=  -11.   Q,:= 4 1
1. (3.33)
[  O    -5                    0 j             [O  t}j
Since
n = .'' = 11 01
P 01
it follows that .1.2, is symmetric. Hence. according to Prooosition 3.3, it follows that // satisfies
h i l      h l i lthe second order differential equation (3.14). Write H = 3, then, since
_11 21    h 221
[02      t.  -  61
12 + Ki (21 + .22(12  
to         6,/ 1]
With
0.- *(1-42)2 + A.   A := Al + K.2· (3.34)
the matrix elements of // satisfy the following coupled system of second-order linear differential
equations:
/'1,1 =01/,11 + (r-(i)/121·   /,11(0)=1.   h'il(0) =-(r - d/2): (3.35)
h'1'2 =02h12 + 11 - 6}h·22·   hl2(0) -0·  h 2(0) =-1: (3.36)
It.':1 -  62/4)hz'. /121(0) =0.  hLCO) =0: (3.37)
/1'',2
= (dZ/ 1)11 21. 11·22(0) =1.  1162(0) =A/2. (3.38)
The last two equations are in fact decoupled equations. The solutions are easily found. Indeed.
we have h,iCI.) = O and hz,CL) = exi,{ci/./2). This reduces (3.35) to h,1,1    =    4,1/1 i i   and  thus
hit(Ll = c·„sli(o/.) - C{,· -,9/21/0}sitili{c,L). Hence
1· - A/2
clet //(/.) = {c·,isl,(„L)
- :.lith(c,L) exp(,FL/2) (3.39)
(,
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Since  Ir - 8/21 <o,i t follows that det H( L)  96  0 for all L>O, and hence, the moving horizon
solution exists for all L  > 0. According to Proposition 3.4, the closed-loop matrix is uniquely
specified by the initial value problem (3.16). Write .1 YH  = 1 , then a t. . . . . a.1 satisfy the
Fal      (1 2
La 3       ad
following coupled system of first-order quadratic differential equations:
al = af + al(13 - 02 ai(0) =r- 6/2. (3.40)
ci  = (12(al + a.t) - (r - 6-).   a2(0) = 1. (3.41)
a.1 = (13(at + (74), a:'(0) = 0. (3.42)
(14 = 02(13 + ai - 32/4, a.,(O) = -6/2 (3.43)
It is immediately clear that a3( L)  = 0, which reduces (3.40) and (3.43) to the decoupled initial
value problems
a'l = at - 02 at (0)  =r- 6/2: (3.44)
Ct' = CL - 62/1. a.iCO) = -6/2 (3.45)
The solutions can be determined using Lemma 3.3.8. Indeed, this lemma shows that the solution
of (3.44) is given by
al (L) - -0 tanli CoL - 0). (3.46)
with
1.-6/2    1     n tr- 8/28  : =  -tanh -1 & -log (3.47)
- (1 1              8   -   1·   +   6  f 2
Due to the fact that  Ir -  6/21  <  n, the argument of the logarithm is positive, which implies that
the number 0 is well defined. The solution of (3.45) can also be determined from Lemma 3.3.8.
However, since the initial condition is an equilibrium point of the differential equation, we imme-
diately deduce that the solution is constant, i.e.
6
(14(L)-   -2 (3.48)
Substituting (3.46) and (3.48) in (3.41) yields the following inhomogeneous linear initial value
problem for the function a 2 :
C 6
(2 = - ty + o tanli(o L - 19)  al - (r - d).    c,2(0) = 1. (3.49)
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An inhomogeneous quasi-linear differential equation .t''  = p.t' + 0 can be solved ill the following
Way.  Substituting .t·  =  .t· 1.1·2 yields .t·1.1·2 + ·1 1.1.<2  =  P.1.1.1.2  + 0, Or equivalently, .1·2(·21  -  p.ri)=
C-- .1.1.t· . Now, one first solves the homogeneous equation /1 = p.1 1 by separating the variables.
Next,.1·2  can be determined from .r&  = a/.rl, which produces  .t·  =  .1·1·1.2.  Thus in order to solve
(3.49) we set c,2  =  r u· and consider the homogeneous equation
r' = - t,J + a tianh(GL -61)  r.
(6
Separating the variables and integrating yields (we can omit the integration constant here)
((6                 6L
logi' = -
J <1 + o tatili(o L - 61)  dL = -1- - log cosh(o L - 61).
r, M./2   i tThus it· needs  to be determined from  ti·'   = - ( , · -0 J e          costit a L-0) .B y integrating  this
equation it follows that
u·=  -(r-  6
Si)  
#SLX·z cosh(o L - 0)dL =
tr- 6 j . SL'2(6
=.1 -cosh(aL -0) -asinli(oI.-0)  +('.
\2
with ( ' an arbitrary constant and where we introduced the constant
·j    =  K i   +  K2  -  r(8  -  r) .
Hence we obtain
(12(L) = -1- -n tanliCAL - 0) | + ( '
r-6 (6 (-SL/2
3 (2 3      cosh(aL - 0)
The constant ( ' can be determined from the initial condition c,2 CO)= 1. Forthiswe shall use the
properties
0                       1· - 6/2coshe = -.   sinh 0 =
JXI                  EI
which can easily be seen using the identities
C l t a) 5               1                                 /1  t a\ &               a
COSIi log 1-1 = Silill log  t -  1 = . laI< 1.\1  -  0/            41  - 02 1  -  a  3                41   -  w
By applying these properties we straightforwardly derive that ( ' =  n 42/.3, and thus the solution
of (3.49) is given by
aL(L) = 1 (C,·-6) <--0 tanh(BL- 0) 1 +  OV/)-f -8.[./2  (3.50)
3 C      \2               /  cosh(o L - 0)/
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Using the closed-loop matrix .1 YH, we next determine the moving horizon government-debt tra-
jectory, which we denote by d.,IH( 1. L).  From this trajectory we shall study among other things
the moving horizon closed-loop stability. The moving horizon state variables can be determined
from the closed-loop dynamics
.Pl =at(L).rlta·2(L).1·2· .1' 1   )   =  .1'10 i= do-d (3.51)
i'·2 = a.,(L).1·2· ,1'2C0) - 1·20     1'3 + 7-m (3.52)
This initial value problem can be solved as follows. From (3.52) it is immediately clear that
·1'2 - f '14<.1,20· (3.53)
Substituting this in (3.51) results in a scalar linear inhomogeneous differential equation for the
variable  .r 1 · Substituting  in this equation  .1·1   -   61 6 shows  that  if 6,  is a solution  of the corre-
sponding homogeneous equation.  6 can be determined from 6  2  -  a,  "12.t· zo.  It is easily seen
that  61   can be chosen  as  61   =   r '1 1. Hence, 6 satisfies  6 - (12 e ( 44 -" 1 j/.1.20· which shows  that we
have to distinguish between the cases at  =  a.: and a i  4  a.t. We obtain
(((21 2ot + (-'}e«,2, (11   =   44 1
·2'1   <
02.r20 <,14( + ('r·'lf. al 0 0.1.
.   a.1  -  a l
Here ( ' is an arbitrary constant which can be determined using the initial condition .t·1 C O)  =  ·1' ttl·
This produces
1-1 = 1 1
c,2.1'201 + .rio)("11. t/ 1  = (7.1:
(3.54)
(12.1.20  <4/ - e'lit    .rloe'Jit. (7 1  0  al
( /4   -   0 1
Using this result and (3.29) we obtain
·IH(/:L = < ((12(L).t·20/+
.rio)I-1,(L)'. 01(L)-c,4(L):
(3.55)
d: C l ) t{ cio - d- C I.))(-hi L )1. all'.) f (11(1.).
with
h(L) := n tanli(n L -0)- 6/2. (3.56)
- .t'20
,/:(L.)  := c/+ -i-(ci- 1.+ (1\1/2(·(L)). (3.57)




a siiili(oL - 0) -   cosh(oL - 0)
Note that a t{L) = a.t{ L)i f and only if h{L) =0. The function h i s called the adjustment speed.
The government-debt dynamics is stable. i.e. it reaches a steady-state value, if and only if h(L)
is positive. Clearly. if n  - 8/2  <  0, h ( L) is negative for all  L  >  0.  If n  -  6/2  > 0, there exists
a number L i.e. the unique root of hCL) = 0, such that h( L) < O for L < i, and h(L) > O for
L>L. The condition  0-  6/2 >O i s equivalent to the condition  j>0.I n the analysis of van
Aarle et al.  [2] the same condition turned out to be necessary and sufficient forthe open-loop Nash
equilibrium to be stable. Indeed, according to Theorem 3.7,  if L  -+  x, the open-loop controls
corresponding to the moving horizon solution constitute the open-loop Nash equilibrium. In the
sequel it is assumed that  3 > 0.  Next we determine an explicit expression for the critical value
i. The equation hCL) =0 can be written as tanh(oL -0) = d/20. Thus
a i  - 8  -  tanli- 1 - = -log8     1     a t 6/2
20      2    '  0 - 5/2'
or equivalently,
1        (a + r- 8/2)(a + 6/2)
L = ·33"
log (3.58)
L              C a  - (1·  - 8/2 ) ) (0  -6/2 )
Lemma 3.4.1  The critical value L is positive.
Proof The argument of the logarithm in (3.58) can be rewritten as
C 1 + ( r - 6/2)/o)(1 + 6/(20))
(1 - (r - 6/2)/n)(1 - d/(20)
Recall  that  1 1 - 8/21 <a. Furthermore, since  J>O,w e  have  a  > 6/2. Consider the function
L'(.1'..1/) = (1+.,·)(1+'1) forl.rl < land 0<9< 1. It is easily seen that r C r. 9) > 1 if and only if(1-.1·)(1-y)
g>  -.t·. Clearly we have 8/(20 ) >C r- 6/2)/a, which completes the proof.                          0
This lemma implies  that  if the moving horizon length is small, i.e. smaller than  L, the moving
horizon government debt converges to infinity exponentially fast. If L  =  L we see from (3.55)
that the moving horizon government debt converges to infinity linearly. Let us further consider
the case that (11< H reaches a steady state value as time goes to infinity. Recall from (3.55) that
d·,IH(t: L)=d»(L) + (do- dx(L))£-1,(L,t.   L > i. (3.59)
54                                                                             3.4. A Government Debt Stabilization Game
Note that dut'(t: L) » d. (L) as t -* x for all L > i,justifying the notation d„ for the steady
state  debt.   In  the next lemma the steady state  debt is investigated  in more detail; specifically  in
relation to the initial debt as a function of L.
Lemma 3.4.2 If.1·10-(6-r).rgo/3 5 0, thendx(L) > doforall L > L. If.riu-(6-r).rzo' 3 >
0, then there exists an D  >L so that cl»(L) >  dc,forall L<L<  L , d. CL-) = cl„and
dr<L) < duforall L > L".
Proof Because h( L) > 0 for all L > L. also t· (L ) > 0 for all L > i. Moreover, it iseasily
seen that i·(L) » x as L 1 L, t·(L) 1 0 as L » x, and t· is strictly decreasing for all L > L.
Now. consider
d. (L)- do = -(.1·10 - (6 - 1·).t·20/3) + 0·1'20 \ Ii,·(L)/ 3.
If.rio  -  ( 6  -  r).1'20/ 3  5   0, the right-hand  side  of this equation is positive  for all  L   >   L,  from
which the first part of the lemma follows.  Let  .rio  - (6  - 1 ).1'20/ 1 > 0. Then the right-hand side
of the equation approaches x a s L 1 L and a negative number as L  »  x and it equals zero for
a unique value of /.  >  /.,  say  L-. This proves the second part.                                                                          0
Thus  under the condition  .im  - ( (S-  r).I'20/  1  5 0 the steady state debt exceeds the initial  debt
for all values of L larger than the critical value  /.. This condition can equivalently be written as
do -d < Cd- 1).2·20/1 Recall that { 6 - 1·).,·20/ 4 is positive. Soifthe difference between initial
and target debt is not too big, the moving horizon steady state debt is larger than the initial debt
for each stable horizon length. Alternatively. if
6 := .riti- ((i - r).1·20/·1>0.
or equivalently, do - U >  Cd -  r ).1·2(1/ ·3. there exists another critical value of L, i.e.  L-, such that
the moving horizon steady state debt is closer to its target than in the initial situation if and only
if the moving horizon length is larger than L- . Apparently, the difference between the initial  and
target debt should be sufficiently large for such a critical value to exist. Note that the number L- is
the unique root of the equation d. . (L) =d o i n the interval C i.x) .I t i s not possible to determine
L- analytically; a numerical computation is of course straightforward.  In the sequel we assume
that (  >  0.  The next result states that the moving horizon steady state debt is decreasing in  L.
However, the target debt will never be reached.  It also states that for different values of the horizon
length, the corresponding moving horizon debt trajectories do not intersect.
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Lemma 3.4.3 The trajectory  t  »*  d\1 H (t .  I.)  is constant for  L  =  L*  and decreasing for  L  >   L- .
For any  horizon  lengths  Li and  L 1 with  L-   <  I. 1  <   L i we  have
7   +   .r ·06   -   1· j       i = lini d.. (L) < d,( L 2) < d. ( Ll) < do. (3.60)
L-+ X
Finally, the graphs of t ,» d\1 H ( t . L i ) and 1 + d 1 " 1 ( t ·. L .2 ) do not inte rs ect .
Proof Taking the derivative of d·i"' with respect to t and using the facts d.* C L- )  =  do and
d: (L)  <  do for all L  > L' directly yields the first part of the proposition. The second part, i.e.
(3.60), follows from the assumption 6-r>0, and the basic observations concerning the function
r made at the beginning of the proofof the previous lemma.  For the third part, assume there exists
a to > 0 with d.vH(10: Li) = d''H{ to: L2 )· Then, according to the mean value theorem there must
exist a number L 1 with Li < Li < £2 so that C Odl,H/OL)(to: L„) = O, or, equivalently,
d'. (L3) (1 - C -h(L,)to   _ (do - d.z (L3))h'( L.  }tof-h(L,)10  . 0.
Observe that the left-hand side  of this equation is negative, which is obviously a contradiction.  0
In Figure 3.5 four graphs of the moving horizon government debt are drawn.  Note that the limit
limL-+ - d...(L) also equals d o- <a s depicted in this figure. Thus [do-C. do] indicates the range of
the moving horizon steady state debt. Furthermore, the difference between the target and steady
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Figure 3.5: Moving Horizon Government Debt Trajectories (Ll < L2).
We summarize the results obtained so far in the following theorem.
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Theorem 3.4.4 Consider the government debt stabilization game
d  =  rd +.f  -  t,1.       d(01  =  4:
·1 f  =   j  f -st  tf f  --Ijz + A'(d- d)2) Cit.  I./,„ = «  f -di  C„, -717)2 + h.2(d- d)2) dt.
0                                                          0
The parameters 1·. (1,1.8.7.7.iii.Ki. Klare positive constants.  Assume that (10 - (1 > 0, 1(1-t-  f -
"m  >  0,  and 6 -  1   >  0.  There exists a unique  moving horizon  solution for each  horizon  length  L.
Let
14     =  El  +  A24
A :- ViC,· - ct/2)2 + A.:
j. := 1 log  Co + r - d-/2)Co + 8/2)
20     Cn - (r - 6/2))Co - 6/21
Then   I.   3-   0  and  the  moving  horizon  closed-loop  government  debt  trajectory,  say  iP[1' tf:  1.3.
reaches  a  steady  state  value  if and  only  if  L  >   j..We  have
d.1'H(t: L) = d. (L) + (ch,-dxCL)),-"AL,t.   L > i
with
h(L) ·= n tailli((i L - 61) - 6/2:
<12(L) := 71+ ill((i- ,+ Ov/21'{ L ,):
1.( L ) := c - 9 /2/ ( n si,iliC c, L - 0} - C 6/2 ) cosh C o L - 0) ) :
1 0 + r- i-/2
0  · =   -log
2     c, -,· + &/2
./'20 I= nd +   f   - -m .
1:= A- 1.(,f- 1.).
The value cl .l L) is equal  to the steady value  of the moving horizon closed-loop government debt
trajectory. Let
C := do -d- (8 - 1.).1·20'·1.
Then, if 6  S 0, the steady state government debt exceeds the initial debt (ands hence the target
debt) for each  i.  >   1..Assume further  that  4  >  0.  Then there exists a unique root of the equation
cl -»1 t.)  =  cl„  in the  interval  C i.. xj.   Denote  this  root  by  L- .  The  steady  state  government debt
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is smaller than the  initial debt if and only if L  >  L-.  The larger the value of L is. the closer  the
steady state government debt is to its target value. but it is a/waA's strictly larger titan the target
vallie.
Next, we determine the moving horizon strategy of the fiscal player.  For that purpose we first
determine the closed-loop moving horizon strategy  it#tit (.t·: L) corresponding to the "two-state
variable" game, which is related to the government debt stabilization game through (3.29)-(3.33).
From (3.9) and Proposition 3.3.5 we obtain
uivH(.t·:L) = -BI'('.t{ L }H-1(L).t· = -qiB,T(;CL)H-1 (L).r
Here we have qi = Al, the matrix Bt is given by (3.33), and CH-1 is obtainable from (3.15).
Indeed, this equation implies
h 01 1 [r-8/2 -al(L) 1 - ('2(L )-16(L)H-'CL)=-1
to 01           L    0        0  1
which uniquely specifies the first row of GH-1 Since Bi has a zero on the second row. this is
the only row of G'H-1 we need. We find
AIH,       Altti   l.t·: L) = - ((al(L) - t· + 6/2).rl + (a·,(L) - 11.1·2). (3.61)K
Instead ofdetermining the moving horizon strategy of the fiscal player, we shall determine his cor-
responding fiscal control function, which we denote by .fAIH(t: L). An expression for this func-
tion can be found by replacing the state variables.rt and 3·2 in (3.61) by the moving horizon state
trajectories which we have determined earlien Indeed, they are uniquely specified by the initial
value problem (3.51), (3.52). The solution of this problem is given by (3.54) and (3.53), which is
expressed in terms of a t, a2, and a.i· For these closed-loop matrix functions we have determined
the expressions (3.46), (3.50), and (3.48), respectively. Substituting them into the moving hori-
zon state trajectories and into (3.61), and using (3.31) shows that the moving horizon closed-loop
fiscal control trajectory can be written as (we shall only consider the stable case L > L)
.f-1IHCt: L) = f.»CL) + (fLIL) - .f»(L))# -1,(L)#.   L > i. (3.62)
with
K i .1'20 < Or      \
.f»(L) =f- - <1+ -F=t.(L)/1. (3.63)1     Vt'-
fo(L)-7-11  r(do -d) t.r·20 + Ch(L) -
0·1'·20 26-8,L/2 ,
R                                 .icoshCoL - 0))
(3.64)
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Sinceh(L) > O wehave f·'tHCO: L) = fo(L) and f.wi,(t: L) -* .f»(L) ast -* x forall
L   >   i; thus fo(L)  and .f: C L ) denote the initial and steady state value of the moving horizon
fiscal control trajectory, respectively. Recall that we have assumed that .1> 0 and 4  > 0. The first
assumption was made in order to ensure that for sufficiently large values of the moving horizon
length  (L   >   i ), the government debt reaches a steady state value  as  time goes to  infinity.  The
second assumption has been made in order to ensure that for sufficiently large stable values of the
moving horizon length (L  >  L -  >  L) , the moving honzon steady state government debt is closer
to its target value than in the initial state.  Let us further assume that L  2  L".  In the next theorem
we show that the moving horizon fiscal control trajectory is constant for L  =  L;  i.e.  in that case
it equals the value
= KI
f= :.f - -I -(r,rio + 3.20)· (3.65)
In this theorem. it will furthermore be shown that this trajectory is increasing for L  >  L-; as time
evolves the value of the fiscal policy moves closer to its target value. The initial and steady state
value are shown  to be decreasing and increasing  in L, respectively. Finally,  we  show that for two
different values of the horizon length, the corresponding moving horizon fiscal control trajectories
intersect exactly once. All the properties listed in the following theorem are illustrated by Figure
3.6.
Theorem 3.4.5 Consider the government debt stabilization game»m Theorem 3.4.4.  Let all the
assumptions made in this theorem be fulfilled.  Furthermore, the notations  introduced in Theorem
3.4.4 are also used here.  The moving horizon fiscal control trajectory  Pt H U : L) corresponding
to the moving horizon strategy of the jiscal player is given by (3.62)-(3.64). Let the value f- be
defined by 0.65) and assume that C > 0. Then, the trajectory f\111 lt: L) is constant for L -  L-
(the constant value is  f- ) and strictly increasing for  L  >  L".  Moreover, for any horizon lengths
Li  and  L 2  with  L -  <Li<   L ,  we have
.-     6.1 -
(3.66).f   --4(n- 6/21 -  lim./I,(L)< ./.0(Lz)< A,(Li)< f-
A                                                  L -4 x
and
.f"   <  .f. (L i  )  <  .f..  C L 2 )  <   t.liT   ./.- ( L )   =  f-  +  11 C
i.. (3.67)
K
Finally, there exists a unique 1 > 0 satisfying fv H lt : L ij = f\1 H l t ·. L l)·
Proof Since d- C L- ) = cio we can derive an explicit expression for r( L- ) from (3.57) Inserting
this expression into (3.63) and (3.64), and using the identity
E -JL/2/cosliCOL -61) = t·(L}hCL)
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yields .6,(L-) = .f» (L-) = ./'-. This implies that J.vHCLL-)= .f- for all 1 2 0. Since t· is
strictly decreasing it follows that ./.. is strictly increasing. Next, we analyze the monotonicity of
.fo. The derivative of fo is given by
./.6(L) = _11/i'(L)   _ n. .-OV/2(.CL}j + 1!1222/,(L),·'CL).5                 1         J     4-A 1
In Lemma 3.4.2 we showed d: C L j < do  for  L    >    L '. This inequality is equivalent to 4 -
.1'2(in V/2,·(L)/ j > 0, implying that fo isstrictly decreasing. The fact that ./u{ L-) = f.{ L') com-
bined with the monotonicity properties of.fti and j.  implies that fo{ L ) < .f: (L)  for all  L>L:
From this we conclude that (0.1  'H/01)(t: L ) = -(./b( L) - ./'» CL))/t( L )f·-1,(L}t  , 0, which com-
pletes the first part of the theorem. The second part of the theorem consists of (3.66) and (3.67).
The limits for l. -+ x directly follow from ,·CL)-4 0, hCL) »n- d/2 as L »x. The other
assertions in (3.66) and (3.67) follow from the proof of the first part of this theorem. For the third
part, let F'(1) = f.un(t: Li} - ./ 'IN{t:L·2). Then. obviously F(0)  > Oand linit»» F(t) < 0.
showing the existence of a number t with the desired property. For the uniqueness, consider the
equation F(t) =O,o r equivalently,
6(h(£21-h(Li)), = /,(L·2)(./.-(L2)- fo{L·2))
h{ Li)(f»(Li)-.fo(Lt))
Since h( Lz )( f- (L 2) - A'( L·2) ) >h(L i) ( fx (L , ) - ./I ( L i) ) >0 and h{ L2 )  > h( L l)w e observe
that this equation has exactly one solution. This shows the uniqueness property.                     El
f
- L -4-1
«ss« ':,;/SCS----f                                                             L='.
Figure 3.6: Moving Horizon Fiscal Control Trajectories (Li  < L,)
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Remark 3.4.6 The limit of./ : for L  » x can also be written as
-          h. 1.120
(3.68)lim  f: (L) =f- -
L-* x '  '                               4
The limits in (3.66) and (3.67) are written such as to show the maximal difference between initial
and steady state moving horizon fiscal control values, respectively. The format in (3.68) shows
furthermore that the target value f is never reached and that the difference between the steady
state value of the moving horizon fiscal control trajectory and its target value always exceeds the
value O/ d·                                                                                          0
Remark 3.4.7 Theorem 3.4.5 implies that for any L >L- ,a unique number 1>0 exists, which
satisfies the equation ·f 11" C t:  L )  =  .f- . This enables us to define a function i· on (L' . x) implic-
itly by
t= 1.·(L) :*> fl/H(t: L)= f- (3.69)
Geometrically, the point  (6·C L) . .f- )  is the intersection point of the curves corresponding to  the
equations .f = .f ( 1. L) and .f = .1-in the Cl..1.) -plane. The equation .f""+1(1: L) = .f- can be
written as
/       .1.200 V \ /         .t·,on  ,67          \
(r + h(L)) t< -     1    1.(L)/1 E-"11), = 1.  6 -     3 1.(L)/1
(3.70)
Now, L > L- implies that C - .1'20(1 vlr(L)/  i  >  O (see also the proof of Theorem 3.4.5), which
shows that this factor is unequal to zero. Consequently, r is given by
1 / h(L)\L'(L)=-102 11+-1. 1.> L (3.71)
h C L)     S. ( 1. J
It can easily  be  seen  that  i · is bounded and decreasing. The upper bound is reached for  L   1   I.
and can easily be determined numerically in concrete situations; the lower bound (reached for
L -* x) is given by (0 - 8/2)-1 log( 1 + (0 - 8/2)/r).                                                  0
Using the results of Theorem 3.4.5 and the discussion on  r we visualize the behavior of the mov-
ing horizon fiscal control trajectory in Figure 3.6. Recall that the difference between the steady
state value of the fiscal control and its target value always exceeds Al·t'20/·t for all L  2  L -and for
increasing L this difference decreases. However. the difference between the initial value of the
fiscal control and its target value is increasing for increasing  L.   Thus  we  see  that  the  fi seal player
benefits in the short run in the moving horizon solution in the sense that the difference between
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his primary fiscal deficits and the target value of this deficits is smaller than for instance in the
open-loop Nash equilibrium. The smaller the moving horizon length, the smaller this difference
becomes. In the long run the situation is exactly the other way around. the shorter the horizon
length. the larger the difference between the steady state value of the fiscal deficits and the target
value becomesz. But clearly, the moving horizon solution concept has not been introduced for the
players to benefit from it in the long run.
Next, we determine the moving horizon monetary control trajectory, which will be denoted by
mv"(t:L). Since  BZ  =   - 81, the moving horizon strategies of the fiscal and monetary player
differ by a multiplicative constant, equal to  -A· 2/A· i.  Thus the moving horizon monetary control
trajectory can be obtained from the moving horizon fiscal control trajectory. Indeed, we have
In·vHN. L)= m- -1 (./..11/1(/:L)-f).   L> i. (3.72)
hi
Let itio(L) := ni·i,HCO: L), nt»CL ) :=lilll,_, . ittlilt(t: L)and
h..1
„1-:= 777 + -1(1·.i·to + .1·go)· (3.73)
h
then the following theorem can be derived directly from Theorem 3.4.5.
Theorem 3.4.8 Consider the government debt stabilization game from Theorem 3.4.4.  Let all
the assumptions made in this theorem be fullflled.  Furthermore, the notations introduced  in  the
Theorems  3.4.4  and  3.4.5  are  also  used  here.   The  moving  horizon  monetary  control  trajectory
1.11 MH lt: L) which corresponds to tile moving horizon strategy of the monetary player is given
by  0.12).    Let  the  value   ni be dejined by (3.73) and assume that  C  >  0.  Then,  the  trajectory
111\1 H (t .  1.)  is constant for  L  =  L-  (the constant value is nf  ) and strictly decreasing for  L  >  L- .
For any  horizon lengths  L, and Ll with  L-   <   L t   <   L 2  we  have
K2
In-   <   7710( L i)  <  ,110( L.L) < lim mo(L)=,71 + -((n- 6/2) (3.74)
L -' x                                                         K
and
*   hzm  - -41 lim ,„.(L) < 171*(LZ) < 111 ·(Li) < 1,1.. (3.75)
h'                     1.-0  ,
Finally, there is a unique number t > 0 satisfying n,A 1 H lt . L,j = mil H (t: L.ij·
Remark 3.4.9 The limit of m..  for L»x can also be written as m +  · 2.i·20/  1. This shows that
the difference between the steady state value of the monetary moving horizon control trajectory
and its target value always exceeds A.Z./·20  1.                                                                        0
2This can also be interpreted as follows: for a large value of the moving horizon length. the players put more
effort on their initial control actions leading to better stability in the long run.
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We visualize the behavior of the moving horizon monetary control trajectories in Figure 3.7 in
a similar manner as we have done for the fiscal player in figure 3.6. Clearly also the monetary
player benefits from the moving horizon solution concept in the short run in the same sense as the
fiscal player does; see the discussion following Remark 3.4.7.
m- + 9<(0 - 6/2
AAN-- L = I.-L =Li--1. 4,
-L-#x
I »
Figure 3.7: Moving Horizon Monetary Control Trajectories (L t<L 2)·
3.5 Concluding Remarks
A new solution concept based on moving horizon control has been introduced in the area of time-
invariant differential games. In this concept, the players determine at any point in time an open-
loop Nash equilibrium for a finite planning horizon, and only play the initial equilibrium strate-
gies. This is repeated continuously in time and in this way strategies defined on an infinite horizon
with feedback information results.  lt is important to realize that the moving horizon solution con-
cept is not an equilibrium concept.  It is a method to control the system, which may be more in
line with the paradigm of bounded rationality than the existing equilibrium concepts on finite or
infinite horizons.
The moving horizon solution concept has been further analyzed in linear quadratic games.  It was
shown that if the moving horizon solution exists, it is unique. The open-loop control functions
corresponding to the moving horizon solution converge in general to an open-loop Nash equi-
librium of the infinite horizon game as the moving horizon length approaches infinity. Special
attention has been paid to the scalar case. In this case the moving horizon solution could be de-
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termined analytically.  It was shown that the rate of convergence of the optimal state increases for
increasing values of the moving horizon length L. Moreover, for small values of L the closed-loop
system can become unstable. The moving horizon length can be considered as an exogenous or as
an endogenous parameten In the latter case, a length L can be determined in such a way that the
distance between the moving horizon solution and the closest feedback Nash equilibrium for the
infinite horizon game is minimized. Additionally, this minimization process induces a selection
criterion for a feedback Nash equilibrium in case of multiple equilibria.
The open-loop information structure of the finite-horizon game was chosen in order to make the
resulting concept analytically tractable.  From a conceptual point of view one could of course
also choose the feedback Nash equilibrium as a solution concept for the local game. A first de-
velopment in this direction can be found in [73]; in particular the issue of closed-loop stability is
addressed in this reference.
Further concluding remarks can be found in Section 8.1.1. Preliminary versions  of this chapter
havebeenpresented atthe Eighth International Symposium on Dynamic Games and Applications
(Maastricht, The Netherlands, 1998) and at the Fifth  International Conference  of the Society for
Computational Economics (Boston, USA, 1999). The final version will appear in the Journal Of




In Chapter 2 we have introduced the notion of an input-output differential game.  In such a game
the players are influencing a dynamical system by choosing a certain input function and each
player has his own output function. In general, this output function does not represent a cost func-
tion, it is a vector-valued function which depends on the state vector and the input functions of
all the players. Given an initial state, the output function is a time trajectory in a certain function
space. One could of course associate costs to this output trajectory by taking its norm; see for
instance Chapter 6 of the present thesis.
In the one-player case control design objectives are sometimes directly linked to the output rather
than to a cost function. In a model with a disturbance term the design objective could for instance
be to decouple the output from the disturbance. and additionally to internally stabilize the closed-
loop system. Inputs establishing such goals are usually not unique. It seems that in dynamic game
theory decoupling problems have not received much attention so far.  In this chapter, we consider a
dynamic game version ofthe well-known disturbance decoupling problem [15.118,1251 fortime-
invariant linear systems.  With the practical significance of feedback Nash equilibria in mind, we
assume that the information structure of the players is a linear time-invariant feedback pattern.
For simplicity reasons we consider the situation where the output of each player is not directly
influenced by the input of the other players, but only indirectly through the state variable.
We consider several solution concepts depending on whether the players do or do not cooperate
and depending on the information that the players have about each other's strategies. The co-
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operative case immediately reduces to a one-player problem and can therefore easily be solved
using standard results from geometric control theory. In the noncooperative case we distinguish
between uniform and universal solvability of what we shall call the noncooperative disturbance
decoupling problem (NDDP); a formal definition will be given in Section 4.3.  In the uniform
case the decoupling player is not aware of the other players' strategies. In Section 4.4 we derive
necessary and sufficient conditions on the system parameters under which this player can find a
feedback strategy achieving his decoupling purpose whatever the strategies of the other players
are; under these condition we say that the NDDP has a uniform solution (the decoupling strategy
is independent of the strategies of the other players).  In the universal case the strategies of the
other players are accessible to the decoupling player and he can use this information for his de-
coupling purposes. In Section 4.5 we derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which the
decoupling player can always choose a decoupling strategy which depends on the strategies of the
other players, i.e. under these conditions a pointwise solution of the NDDP exists universally.
4.2 Preliminaries
The NDDP will be formulated in the context of .\-player deterministically disturbed linear time-
invariant input-output differential games with the information structure of each player a linear
time-invariant feedback pattern; see Section  2.3  for the terminology and notation. We assume
that the matrices D„ are zero. The equations of such a differential game are
/X\
i.=   C .1  +
r B,F,/1 ·r + Elt·.   .r(0)=.ro:1=1
St - ('i.r.
It is a standing assumption that E  TE 0. The output of player i can be written as
2,(t) = C.,f 'CA+E,=t B.F.).to +   T,(t - T)it·(T)d·r.
0
where  Ti (t) : = ( 'i f t{ .4+E,1 'B.F. )E i s the closed-loop impulse response from the disturbance to                            '
the output of player i.  The system is said to be disturbance decoupled for player i if T,(t) = 0
for all /20
Next, we briefly review some concepts from geometric control theory [15,118] which are used in
this chapter.  Let l3 and C be subspaces of #r. A subspace W is said to be an (.4. B )-controlled
invariant if .-1 W C  W t B . The maximal (.4. B )-controlled invariant contained in C i s denoted by
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max V (.-1. B. C).  It is well-known that in the one-player case the system is disturbance decoupled
(for player 1) if and only if
ini E C  niax V(.1. ini BI. ker('1 )·
In Section 4.5 we use the concept of robust controlled invariance;  see  [ 14]  or [15, Section 6.5].
This geometric concept has originally been introduced in order to deal with robustness with re-
spect to sudden changes in the parameters; sometimes referred to as hyper-robustness. A robust
controlled invariant is defined as follows.   Let  .1  and B depend  on a parameter q   E   Q   C   R.
A subspace W is called a robust C.·1(q). B(q))-controlled invariant relative to Q if .1(q)W  C
W + B(q) for all q  €  Q. The maximal robust (.4(q). B(q))-controlled invariant contained in C
is denoted by max VRC . -1(q) ,B C q) .C) .  For the computation of this space the following algorithm
is available.  In this algorithm we denote by f» ( Yo) the inverse image of a set Yo  c Y under J.
where f is a map with image contained in Y
Algorithm 4.2.1  [36] The subspace iiiax FR(.4(q). B{q). C) coincides with the last term of the
sequence
Zo:= C.
zi :=en  A -4(q)+-(2,-1 + B(q)) . i=l .....k.
\9€Q
where the value of k is determined by the condition Zk  =  36-1 ·I t can be shown that k·  V  „ .    El
The concept of a robust controlled invariant can be used to solve the hyper-robust disturbance
localization problem I15, Section 6.5.1].   Let  .,1  and  Hi  depend on  the  parameter q.   Then,  in a
one-player context the hyper-robust localization problem is known as the problem of finding for
each q  f   Q a feedback map  Fi C q)  such that the system is disturbance decoupled (for player  1).
This problem is said to be solvable if such a feedback map exists for each q E Q Necessary and
sufficient conditions are presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2.2   [15. Theorem 6.5- 11 The hyper-robust disturbance localization problem is solv-
able  if and only  if
ilil E C  iliax VR(.-1(q). ini Bi(9). ker Cl ).
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4.3   Problem Formulations
In game theory one usually distinguishes between cooperative and noncooperative solutions. The
cooperative version of the \-player disturbance decoupling problem is to find feedback maps /,
such that the system is disturbance decoupled for all the players. It follows immediately that this
cooperative problem is solvable if and only if
C -r  \
im E C max V <.-1. Z iin 19,. fl ker ( ',  .'=1 ,=1
In the rest of this chapter we consider with noncooperative versions of the .\-player disturbance
decoupling problem.
In the noncooperative setting, different problems can be posed depending on whether or not play-
ers choose their feedback policies in a certain order and are aware of each other's decisions.  We
shall fix one player and consider the situations in which this player is or is not aware of the other
players' chosen feedback policies. This decoupling player faces the problem of finding a feed-
back control law such that his output is decoupled from the disturbance even in the presence of
other noncooperative players. We shall refer to this problem as the noncooperative disturbance
decoupling problem (NDDP).To be precise. weconsiderthe following two solution concepts.  We
say that the NDDP is uniformly solvable for player, if there exists a feedback matrix  /·I  such that
the system is disturbance decoupled for player i for all F„.1  96  i. This notion of solvability will be
studied in Section 4.4. In contrast to this, we say that the NDDP is universally solvable for player
i if for each { 1, . /' 1-1.  ,1'1 +1 · · . /·'I ) there exists an /·, such that the system is disturbance
decoupled for player t.  This notion of solvability will be studied in Section 4.5. The distinction
we make here is in line with studying different types of information structure. as is usually done
in dynamic game theory.
Without loss of generality we take .\  = 2 and consider solvability of the NDDP for player 1.
4.4 Uniform Solvability of the NDDP
The decoupling problem of this section can be formally defined as follows.
Problem 4.4.1 Find a feedback map /·I such that the system
.i=CA+ Bt/·'1 + / ,/''21.1. + Ell•,   01 =('1.1 (4.1)
is disturbance decoupled for player I for all feedback maps /  .                                             0
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As pointed out in the previous section we say that the NDDP is unifonnly solvable for player 1 if
Problem 4.4.1 has a solution. The aim here is to find necessary and sufficient conditions on the
system parameters for this type of solvability.
Assume that j··t solves Problem 4.4.1.  We then have that 7 1{1) =0 for all  /·6. or, equivalently
('t (.1 + 81 /,1 + B,f,)kE = 0. for all /·'. and for all I· 2 O (4.2)
By taking F, = (1. it follows that
ini E C illax VC. 1. ini Ht. ker ('i ). (4.3)
Obviously, this is a necessary condition for solvability of Problem 4.4.1. In Lemma 4.4.3 we
present a second necessary condition. For this we need the following result.
Lemma 4.4.2  Let .lt and.\'z be i, x 11 matrices, thenfor each k  E  IN,
k- 1
EX, + X2)k = -\.i. + I .\. .\12(Xt + X2) '-t-J. (4.4)
J =(j
Proof We prove this lemma by induction. For k = 1 the claim is obvious. Assume that (4.4)
holds for a certain number A·, then
1      6-1
c.\,  + A.,)k·+1  =  1.\,2. + E .\.k -i2( -4  + .i2)k-1-'t   c.\.1  +.\12) =\ 1 =0
6-1
= x:+1  + .\.;.\.2 + E .\.i.\.2 -rl + x2lk-J  =
./ =ti
A-
=  X +'  +  Xi'.\.2(Xi  + .\.2 k-J.
/ =l)
El
Lemma 4.4.3 If there exists an  1, for which (4.2) holds. then
( 21 A + B, F ,1 Bz = 0. for all l 2 0. (4.5)
70                                                                                                             4.4.  Uniform Solvability  of the NDDP
Proof We prove this lemma by induction. Setting k  =   l  in (4.2), we  find ( '1( .1  +  81 /.1  +
82 1.6)E= O for all/·.2. Taking /4. = 0 yields ( '1( . 1+ Hi l·'i ) E = 0 so that we have ( 't 82 i.2/:' - 11
for all /6. Since E 0 0 this gives us C '1 /32  = 0, i.e. (4.5) holds for / = 0.  Now, fix an 4  2 0
and assume that (4.5) holds for all i  = 0.. . 4.  Take k·  =  /„ + 2 and /2  =  O in (4.2) to get
( .1 (.1 + 81 /.,1 )4+2 A.  =  0.  Usethisand the formula (which follows from (4.4) with .4   -  .4 + Ht /1
and .r2 = H2/·'A
1 -1 + Hit't + /fl/., )10 +2 =(.1 + Hi /·'t )to+2 +
10+1
+  X C ..1 +  Blfi Y Hz El{.1 +  /#1 /'.1  +  UJ /·.2)1'-+1-·'
/=0
to see that (4.2) (with A· = to + 2) implies
11(iC.1-1- Ui/'i )' 82/-A.lt Bi/·I  + 82/3)1"+1-i' A. = 11.  forall /2.
%=/1
Using the induction assumption we see that this reduces to ( 'i ( .1 +  Hi 6 )4+1 82 FiE  - O for all
/· .  Since A' 96 0 it follows that ( 'i ( .1 + H! 1.'1 }to+luz  = 0, which completes the proof.                IT
So the feedback mapping /·I that solves Problem 4.4. I also satisfies (4.5).  As a consequence the
system matrices must satisfy
ini /:1, C niax V( .1. im Hi. ker('1 )·
In the following theorem it is stated that the two necessary conditions (4.3) and (4.5) are also
sufficient for the uniform solvability of the NDDP for player I.
Theorem 4.4.4  The NDDP  is uniformly solvable for player  J  if and only  if
in} 1/12  El C i,iaxl/(.1. itii/81.kei·('1 1 (4.6)
Proof The necessity has already been proven.  For the sufficiency. it suffices to consider the
control input of player 2 as an extra disturbance. Indeed. assume that (4.6) holds and write 1,1' : =
tiiax V C .1. i 111 Bi . ker ( 'i ) . Since 14'  is  an  C . 1. ini  /41 )-controlled invariant. there exists an  /·I  such
that ),1/ is a n.1+B i /·'i -invariant, so that
C.-1 +  Hi Fi  +  Hz /·;)14/ c 1/V + int 82 c 14'.
Together with (4.6) this shows that the closed-loop system is disturbance decoupled for player 1.
El
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Formula (4.6) provides a compact necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a lin-
ear state feedback control for the decoupling player that achieves disturbance decoupling for him
whatever the other player will do. Under this condition, a decoupling feedback can be found by
standard techniques from geometric control theory (see also the proof of the sufficiency part of
Theorem 4.4.4).
4.5 Universal Solvability of the NDDP
The decoupling problem of this section can be formally defined as follows.
Problem 4.5.1 For a given feedback matrix /'6, find a feedback matrix /·'t such that the system
(4.1) is disturbance decoupled for player 1.                                                                                          0
As pointed out in Section 4.3 we say that the NDDP is universally solvable for player  1 if Problem
4.5.1  has a solution for each  /·&. The aim of the present section is to find necessary and sufficient
conditions for this type of solvability. Individual solutions of Problem 4.5.1  (if they exist) can be
found by standard techniques from geometric control theory.
If the NDDP is universally solvable for player L he is able to respond to any control of the other
player in such a way that he can decouple his output from the disturbance. In particular, if the
other player chooses  Fz  = 0. player  1 can decouple if and only if
im E C max V(.1. ini Bi. ker ( 'i ) (4.7)
Obviously, this condition is a necessary condition for the universal solvability of the NDDP for
player  1.
For a given feedback matrix Fz the system equations are
.i·  -  ( .4  +  B.2 Fi ).r t  Bi ll i  +  Ell'.
St = ('/ 1
Although /'6 is not manipulable for the decoupling player. it is accessible for his decoupling pur-
poses. We recognize this problem as a particular case of the hyper-robust disturbance localization
problem. According to Theorem 4.2.2 the problem for the decoupling player is solvable if and
only if
illi E C mar VR{.-1 + 82..im Hi. ker ('i ). (4.8)
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i.e. the maximal robust  C.-1  +  /t..im Ht )-controlled invariant relative to  # "'- ' ' contained in
ker ('1 (we write a dot instead of an  /·'z in order to indicate that the robustness needs to be in-
terpreted with respect to this parameter). According to Algorithm 4.2.1 this space coincides with
the last term of the sequence
Zo:=  ker ('i.
Z. :=ket·('in (n{.1+H·2,„*(3.-1+i11) ui)) .  i= i..  .i·.\Fi
Now,  assume that Problem 4.5.1  has a solution for each  /2. Then, since  A'  4   0 and according
to(4.8), there exists an .2·0  96  0 in the space (.1 + 8,/6 J"-1 2, + ini Bi ) forall /·, and for all
i  =  0.1.      ..  Equivalently,{.-1+13,1·6).t·u  f  2,+imtit forall /·6 and forall,  - 0.1.. Because
this holds for all /·6 and because .1·0 9,6 0, we have .-1.1·0 + 6,  E  Z, + im Hi  for all 4  E itn 82 and
fur alli = 0.1.2.    ..But this implies that
im 131  C  Z, + illl Bt . 1=0.1. . (4.9)
We have now shown that universal solvability of the NDDP for player 1 implies (4.7) and (4.9).
The latter condition is however not yet in terms of the system matrices.  We will remedy this after
the following lemma.
Lemma 4.5.2 Consider the sequence V„ defined by
Vo := k,i·('i.
V,   :-  kc,i·('1  17.-14-(V,-1  +  i t i t  Hi).        i  =   1. -  .      . 1·.
Then we have the inclusion 2,  C V, for all  i.
Remark 4.5.3  The last term of the sequence 14 equals the maximal C.1. ini 4 )-controlled invari-
ant contained in ket· C 3.                                                                                                                             0
Proof of Lemma 4.5.2 We prove the lemma by induction. Clearly, the statement holds for i  =
0.  Assume that 3,  C  V, for a certain i. According to the definition of the subspaces Z, we have
3,+1  c ker( 'i and 3,+1  c (.1 + 112 Fi )'-C Z, t im 8, ) for all 6. so in particular for /1 - 0.
This results in
..12,+1 C Z, + ini 81 C V, + illl Hi
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and hence. 3,+1 C .1»(V, + illi Hi l n ker ( '1 = F,+i. which completes the proof.                0
Applying this lemma to (4.9) shows thati,ii/   C  V, + il,1 81 foralliand by taking the last term in
this sequence (as noted in Remark 4.5.3) we arrive at a necessary condition in terms of the system
matrices. In the following theorem we claim that this condition together with condition (4.7) is
actually also sufficient for universal solvability of the NDDP for player 1.
Theorem 4.5.4 The NDDP is  universally solvable for player J  if and only  if
ilit l:' C liax VC.-1. itil Ifi. ker('1 )· (4.10)
ini /4 C iiiax V(.1. lin 81. ket·( i ) + illi Hi. (4.11)
Proof The necessity has already been proven. The sufficiency can be concluded by consider-
ing the input of player 2 as an accessible disturbance (cf. [125, Exercise 4.10],  [15, page 225]).
Specifically, let /·'2 E M.4X and write 1/V := max V(.4. illi Bl· kc,i· ( 'i ). According to (4.11), we
have ini j:'  c  1'V  c  ker ( 't . Furthermore, since 14,' is an C .-1, i m Hl )-controlled invariant and be-
cause of (4.11), we also have ( .4 + /32 15 ) W  C  W titii Bl, so that W is also an ( .-It /4 /.,2. i 11181 )-
controlled invariant; hence there exists a mapping  I·i  such that  W  is  an  (.1  +  11 /1  +  Hifi)-
invariant.                                                                                                                 0
Formula (4.10) and (4.11) provide compact necessary and sufficient conditions for the decoupling
player to be able to respond to the action of the other player always in such a way that his output
is decoupled from the disturbance.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
The aim of this chapter has been to define some disturbance decoupling problems in the context
of differential games. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the solvability of these problems
in terms of the system data have been derived; consequently, one can easily verify whether the
considered problems are solvable for a given system.
The idea of considering games in which the players follow certain control objectives that are not
necessarily given by cost functions can be carried further in many ways.  In the context of de-
coupling, extensions can for instance be made in the direction of incorporating stability and to
the case where the players are not able to completely observe the state and/or each other's ac-
tions. The notion of equilibrium could be incorporated to a greater extent by considering games
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in which the players know that the other players willlook for a decoupling feedback but are not
informed about each other's decisions.  The two noncooperative problems considered in this chap-
ter provide necessary and sufficient conditions respectively for a decoupling solution to exist in
this situation.
Further concluding remarks can be found in Section 8.1.2. This chapter has been published in the
journal Systems & Control Letters [27].
Chapter 5
Infinite-Horizon Feedback Nash Equilibria
5.1     Introduction
Due to its practical significance, the feedback Nash equilibrium concept is a popular solution con-
cept in the field of dynamic games [ 10.127 1, application fields are for instance macro-economic
policy coordination problems  [3,93. 115]. resource games [35.105]. environmental economics
[86,100],and duopoly theory [49, 120]. Considering the work of BaFar and Olsder [ 101 as the
main basic reference in the field of dynamic game theory, [10, Definition 6.61 is the best defi-
nition for the feedback Nash equilibrium concept in the context of a finite-horizon differential
game where the information structure of the players is a memoryless perfect state pattern or a
closed-loop perfect state pattern'.  In this definition a set of strategies is called a feedback Nash
equilibrium solution if there exists a set of value functions satisfying the usual relations. This def-
inition has the advantage that the information nonuniqueness problem [7] is eliminated and that
equilibrium strategies are strongly time consistent [8]. Furthermore. feedback Nash equilibrium
strategies only depend on the time variable  and the state at time 1, hence, the concept can also
be used for games with a feedback information structure.  In a linear-quadratic game with non-
negative state and control weighting matrices, one feedback Nash equilibrium is generated by a
set of matrix valued functions which is a solution of a system of coupled matrix Riccati differ-
ential equations provided that this solution exists and that each matrix valued function is positive
semi-definite [ 10, Corollary 6.51.
A definition of a feedback Nash equilibrium concept for infinite-horizon differential games is not
presented by Baw and 01sder. Nevertheless, for a linear-quadratic game with nonnegative state
' This information pattern consists at time /  of the complete state history from time 0 to time t.
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and control weighting matrices, they show that any solution of a system of coupled algebraic Ric-
cati equations that satisfies certain stabilizability and detectability conditions, generates a Nash
equilibrium [10. Proposition 6.81. In this equilibrium the strategies are linear time-invariant state
feedback strategies and the resulting closed-loop matrix is stable. As noted by the authors, a dis-
advantage of this proposition is that the stabilizability and detectability conditions are indirect.
Furthermore, the question whether all equilibria of this form, i.e. linear time-invariant state feed-
back strategies, are obtained from this system of coupled algebraic Riccati equations is not an-
swered by this proposition.  In the present chapter we remedy these disadvantages by showing
that all equilibria in the class of linear time-invariant state feedback strategies yielding a stable
closed-loop system. are obtained from the system of coupled algebraic Riccati equations.  No de-
tectability or stabilizability conditions are required for this statement. Furthermore, the state and
cross control weighting matrices are not necessarily required to be positive semi-definite.
In the context of an .\-player infinite-horizon linear-quadratic differential game we shall define
a deterministic feedback Nash equilibrium as an \-tuple of linear time-invariant state feedback
strategies stabilizing the closed-loop system such that if each player implements this strategy no
player has the incentive to unilaterally deviate within this class of stabilizing feedback strategies
(Definition 5.3.1 in Section 5.3). The corresponding equilibrium feedback matrices are required
to be independent of the initial state which is in line with a feedback information pattern.  The main
result of this chapter is that all the deterministic feedback Nash equilibria are characterized by the
solutions of the system of coupled algebraic Riccati equations which satisfy a stability condition
(Theorem 5.3.2). This result is a straightforward generalization from a corresponding one-player
equivalence statement, which can be formulated as follows. A linear, initial-state independent,
time-invariant, internally stabilizing state feedback law which minimizes a quadratic cost func-
tional exists if and only if it is generated by the stabilizing solution of the corresponding algebraic
Riccati equation (Corollary 5.2.5 of Section 5.2). The minimization problem differs with respect
to most of the linear-quadratic literature in that the state weighting matrix is not required to be
positive semi-definite.  For this reason the problem is sometimes referred to as the indefinite zero-
endpoint linear-quadratic control problem.  In a zero-endpoint problem it is explicitly required that
the state converges to zero as time tends to infinity. This in contrast to a free-endpoint problem
where this requirement is dropped [117]. The control weighting matrix in the quadratic criterion
is assumed to be positive definite. Forthis reason the minimization problem is called regulan This
in contrast to singular problems, where this matrix is not positive definite [33,59.124]. The reg-
ular indefinite zero-endpoint problem has been studied by several authors [92,112,119,123]. In
Section 5.2 we start with a short review of an important result from this literature (Theorem 5.2.2).
Next, the equivalence statement is derived of which especially the necessity part is innovative in
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the linear-quadratic literature.
The optimal state feedback law which minimizes a quadratic infinite-horizon cost function sub-
ject to a deterministic linear constraint also minimizes the expected value of the average cost per
time unit subject to a stochastic linear constraint [39. Theorem 5.4.41. This result is based on the
certainty equivalence principle, first stated in [111.116] and generally formulated in [121]. The
optimal state feedback law, which is obtained from the stabilizing solution of an algebraic Riccati
equation, is in particular independent of the variance of the stochastic process. Using the equiva-
lence statement of Section 5.2 we show in Section 5.4 that the converse statement is also true. i.e.
if there exists a linear variance-independent state feedback law minimizing the expected value of
the average cost per time unit, then it must be generated by the stabilizing solution of the same
algebraic Riccati equation. This result can straightforwardly be extended to the .\ -player case,
i.e.  in Section 5.5 the concept of a stochastic variance-independent feedback Nash equilibrium is
defined in the context of stochastic differential games. Based on the certainty equivalence princi-
ple we conclude in Theorem 5.5.2 that the set of deterministic feedback Nash equilibria coincides
with the set of stochastic variance-independent feedback Nash equilibria.
In the stochastic LQ literature it is usually assumed that the state and control weighting matrices in
the criterion are positive semi-definite and positive definite, respectively. The material in Sections
5.4 and 5.5 is presented without assuming that the state weighting matrix is positive semi-definite.
However, the control weighting matrix is assumed to be positive definite. Stochastic problems
with this matrix indefinite have obtained quite some attention lately [31,80,103,104] due to a
finding [31] that a class of stochastic LQ problems with an indefinite control matrix is well-posed.
This in contrast to a deterministic LQ problem, which is ill-posed if this matrix is not positive
semi-definite.
The chapter ends in Section 5.6 with an analysis of the two-player scalar case with zero cross
control weights.  It is geometrically shown that if both players have a negative state weight in
their cost functional, there exist situations in which no feedback Nash equilibrium exists.  If one
of the players has a positive state weight. an equilibrium always exists. Geometric examples of
situations with zero, one, two, or three equilibria are presented and it is indicated how the number
of equilibria depends on the parameters.
5.2   An Equivalence Result in LQ Control Theory
In this section we study the following problem.
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Problem 5.2.1 Consider the linear system
.i' =.1.1' + Blt.   .401 4 (5.1)
with (.4. B) stabilizable, and a quadratic cost functional ./  : F ...  #r  -+ R. defined by
.JCF. 10) =  (STQs + uT
Rujdt (5.2)
0
where the state .t follows from (5.1)  with  1,   =   I.'.r. The state weighting matrix  Q is symmetric
and the control weighting matrix R is positive definite. Determine, if it exists, for each initial state
.rc„ a feedback matrix P' f F such that .1 C F..ro ) 5 .JC F..ro) for all F' E F.                           0
This problem is closely related to the regular indefinite zero-endpoint linear quadratic problem
[119,123], which can be formulated as follows. In addition to the infinite-horizon cost functional
(5.2).  consider for each  T>O the finite-horizon cost functional.,4      LT.1.:(0·x)x   #r'   -+  iR,
defined by
1'
JT<u.xuj -   (irr Q.r + UI Hu)(It (5.3)
0
where  .t·  is the solution of (5.1). The matrices (2  and  R  are as in Problem 5.2.1. Define for each
initial state the control class
1/(.t·,1) = <11 E L  01...(0. x) It klt ./TC
u..ro) exists in RU{-x.x}.
lini .t·(t)=0.  with .r the solution of (5.1)          (5.4)1»x
The regular indefinite zero-endpoint linear quadratic control problem is the problem of minimiz-
ing  limr=..4( u..rn)  over the class of control functions U(.t·o ). The optimal value  of the  cost
functional is denoted by .1(.ro), i.e.
.1(.t·o) :=    itif    litii  .4( 11..ro). (5.5)
tift/(ro ) T-+ x
It is not guaranteed that this infimum exists. The following theorem provides conditions for this to
hold and moreover, it provides a solution for the regular indefinite zero-endpoint linear quadratic
problem under these conditions. This theorem was proven by Willems [123] (see also [119, The-
orem 8.8.2]).
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Theorem 5.2.2   Let (A. B j becontrollable anddefine  H  :=  BR-1 BT . Then-J(.ro) isfiniteforall
.ro E  IR"  if and only if there exists a real symmetric solution X  of the algebraic Riccati equation
Q + .41 -\' + .\'.1- .\'.9.r =0. (5.6)
Assume that this condition holds. Then the smallest and largest real symmetric solution of (5.6)
exist. Denote them by X-  and X+, respectively. Then,
(i)  Jt.ro) = rIX+.roforall.roe lir:
(ii)  for all.ro  e  IIi"  there exists an optimal control functionli,  i.e.  a control function for which
131117'-0.. ·JTC"ff. .t·o) = 7(.t·o), if and only if X+ - X- > 0;
(iii)   if  X+   -   X-    >   0,  then  for  each  ro  there  exists  a  unique  optimal  control flinction 3  and
moreover,  this control function can  be written as  the linear state feedback control  law-It  =
R-t BT.\,+.r.
From this theorem we deduce  that the feedback matrix  -R-1 BTX+  is a solution for Problem
5.2.1   if  (.4.  B) is controllable  and  if the algebraic Riccati equation  (5.6)  has  a real symmetric
solution and the difference between its largest and smallest solution is positive definite.  Note that
this feedback matrix is indeed an element of F, since the control functions in the control class
U(.ro) are by definition such that the corresponding state converges to zero as time tends to infinity.
Thus .\'+ is the stabilizing solution of the algebraic Riccati equation (5.6). Furthermore, note that
the solution  - R-1 BT.\'+ of Problem 5.2.1 is independent of the initial state .ro.  In the following
analysis  it is shown that an initial state-independent solution of Problem 5.2.1  exists  if and only
if the algebraic Riccati equation has a stabilizing solution.  This is done without assuming that
(.1, B) is controllable.
Let X be a real symmetric n x n matrix, then
-          d    d .1
.IC F..ro) =    .r I. C Q + 11:'TRF).r + -.rT.\'.r - -.2·' .X.r  di =a          a0
X
=.t'(  x.rot f (·r TC Q +  .4.r X  +  X .1 ).1.  +  .rT FT RF.r  + 2.1·T FT HT X.i·) dt .
0
which holds because, due to the stability of.4 + BF,.t·C t)  -*  0 for t»  x.  Thus the completion
of the square
.rIP'TRF.r + 2.t·Ttl'THT.\..r = |(F +R-1 BT-11: ).r|ft - .1·T.\...4.\..r
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with S : = BR-1 BT, yields
1,   \
.11 ( /·'..To ) = .1·4.r .t·t, +      .r T ' (2 + ..1 / .r  +  .\' .·1 -  .\. S. -\.1.i· +  I C F +  R- 1 H I .\. ).1.1 -  1 di .R
i)
Hence, if .\' satisfies the algebraic Riccati equation
(2 + -9.\' +.\'.1 - -rk-\. =0. (5.7)
then
./(F..i·o) = .i· X.rot«   |(F+ R-'BrX).z.12 clt. (5.8)R
0
This formula shows that the feedback matrix - R-' B T.\. minimizes ./ C F. .ro).  It is not guaranteed
that this feedback matrix is an element of f. However, if X is the stabilizing solution of the
algebraic Riccati equation (5.7), this is ensured. We arrive at the following result (which follows
in the controllable case from Willems [123]; see Theorem 5.2.2).
Theorem 5.23  Consider  Problem 5.2.1.  Define  S  :=  B R-' BT.  If the algebraic Riccati equa-
tion (5.71 has a stabilizing solution X, the feedback matrix F := - R-i Br X minimizes .1 C F. 10)
for each initial state .ro.
The converse statement of Theorem 5.2.3  is also true.  This is formulated in the next theorem.
Theorem 5.2.4  Consider Problem 5.2.1.  Def ne S :=  B lf- 1 BI- .  Ifthere exists anT  EY which
minimizes  .3 C F..rt,1  tiniformly in  .ro. i.e.  .J ( F..1·01  56  .1 1 2..r„j for all  F   €  F  and for all  .ro  e   IR",
the algebraic Riccati equation (5.7) has a stabilizing solution.
Proof This theorem is shown by means of a differentiation argument applied to ./. See Section
2.1 for details concerning matrix differentiation. Note that since eigenvalues depend continuously
on the corresponding matrix elements [61. Appendix D]. the set.F is an open set.  Define 4 : Y »
R.Y. by  4    F »+ P. where P is the unique solution of the Lyapunov equation
C.4 + Bl·' jIP + PlA + BF) = -Q- FT RF.
Then ./( i'..0)  =  .tip< F Pp. The smoothness of the coefficients in a Lyapunov equation is pre-
served by the solution of this equation 176, Section 5.4], which implies that ./ is differentiable
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with respect to  F. By assumption,  ./ C /·'. .t·o ) attains its minimal value at  F   for each .ro.  Thus  [81.
Section 7.4, Theorem  1]  <91.1 C /· . .t·o: _1 /·' ) =0  for each increment JP'  and for each .2.0. Since
61·1(77..to: _Ji')  =  .1·6 67-(77: JF).1·ti, it follows that 3*-(77: 1/ )  =  0 for all increments _1 F.
Hence
0.,2( P.) = 0. (5.9)
Define the transformation * : .F x IN . . . » R"»"by
* ( 1·'.  /' )=  C .-1 + BFjTP+P A+BF)+Q+FTRF
By definition, we have  *( /·'. 4( F) ) = ( } for all  t·'  E .F. Taking the derivative of this equality and
applying the chain rule yields
Oi*( F. 9( F) ) + 2)20( F. 4( F ) )OF( F) = 0 for all F E .F.
By substituting F  =F i n this equality, and using (5.9), it follows that 01 *CT. 73(T))  =  0. Or.
equivalently,
cil*Cl·'. 7-C t'): 11·')= 0 for all_JF. (5.10)
The differential of * with respect to its first argument with increment A F can easily be computed.
Indeed,
di*(F. P: JF)=lim 0(1·' + c,JF. P) - 0(F. P)
i -40                                             0
= lilli                                                              =0JFT (RF + BT P ) + al f.1 R + PB )Jt' + 0.1.11 'TRJF
'140                                                                                0
= JFT<BT P + RF) + (PB + FT R)11·'.
Consequently, using (5.10),
1/77-(Br.,2(77) + RT) + (42(77)8 + 777 R)-11:' = 0 for all JF.
Thus, it follows that HT (77) + RT = 0. or, equivalently, T = -R-1 BT,p{77). Substituting this
in *(F. 4(F))= 0 yields
62 + .-tr':CT) + 75(F).-1 - 75(73),4'72(77) = O.
Furthermore, since t' E Y. the matrix .1 - .K,:( F) is stable. Hence, 7=( F) is the stabilizing solu-
tion of the algebraic Riccati equation (5.7).                                                                                                      0
Theorems 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 are combined in the following corollary.
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Corollary 5.2.5 Consider Problem 5.2.1. Deftne S := B R--1 B  . There exists an-F E F such
that J<F..ro)  1 .JC F..ro) for each initial state.ro andfor each F  eY if and only ifthe algebraic
Riccati equation (5.1) has a stabilizing solution X .  U this condition holds, then T = - R-1 BT X
and .1(F..i·o) = .roT.\'.ro.
Remark 5.2.6  If the algebraic Riccati equation (5.7) has no stabilizing solution two situation can
occur. (i) The algebraic Riccati equation has a real symmetric solution X such that .1 - .5'X has
an eigenvalue on the imaginary axis.  Then [123, Theorem 7],  if C.1, B } is controllable,  J C FI .ro)
has a minimum if and only if.ro belongs to the spectral subspace of.1 - .h'.r corresponding to the
eigenvalues in the open left-half plane.  (ii) The algebraic Riccati equation has no real symmetric
solution.  In that case,  it is to be expected (see Theorem 5.2.2) that the infimum of .IC F..ro)  over
1.'   E  Y equals - 00 for all initial states .ro.  As an illustration, consider the scalar case,  i.e.   let
.-1  =  a, .f  =  :, and Q  =  q for some a. s. q  E  #i' with s  >  0, then the stabilizing solution
of the algebraic Riccati equation (5.7) exists if and only if a2 + sq  >  0.  It is easily seen that
../(F..ro) = (.ri}/s)(C + 2a + (a2 + sq)/4) with 4 = -(.1 + BF), which (i) hasaminimum if
a2 + sq > 0, (ii) has an infimum (attained in the limit < 1 0),ifaz + sq = 0, and (iii) is unbounded
from below ifag + Sq < 0.                                                                            0
5.3 Deterministic Feedback Nash Equilibria
Consider an .\ -player infinite-horizon stable linear time-invariant differential game, where the
information structure of each player is a feedback pattern and where they are restricted to linear
time-invariant strategies; see Section 2.3 for the terminology and corresponding notations. The
cost function of player i is the functional .1, : Fi  x  #t"  -4 #t, defined by
1/X
J/Fl·· . Fx. .1.0 )
.f   .'T    \7,  +  r  FT  R, 1 F.>1
..lt (5.11)
0                                   .Fl
where Q, and R are symmetric matrices of appropriate dimensions, and R„  >  0 for all i  =
1. .   .  ..r. Consider the following definition of an equilibrium concept.
Definition 5.3.1  An .\'-tuple T =  CY'i....  . Tz )  E Y.;  is called a deterministic feedback Nash
equilibrium if for all i  -  1.   . -  ..\' the following inequalities hold:
1, C F..ro )   31   .1,{F_, C F, }..ro ) (5.12)
forall initial states .1·t, and for all f', f R"' '," such that F_,C F,} 6 5-1.                                 0
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The following theorem is a natural extension of Corollary 5.2.5 in the context of an .\-player
differential game.
Theorem 5.3.2 Consider an  N -player injinite-horizon stable linear time-inzariant differential
game, where  the information  structure  cd each player  is  afeedback pattern and where they are
restricted to linear time-invariant strategies.  Letthe cost functionof player i  be defined by (5.11)
Assume that the niatrices (2, and  11,, are symmetric and that  lt„  >  Ofor all 2  -  1......\.  Define
34, ·.=  Bi RT,  8;  and w,, ·.=  11,R-I.  11,,H-I  Bj for all i. j - 1..    .Nwith i  f j. Then there
exists adeterministicfeedback Nash  equilibrium if and only  if there exist  X  real symmetric n  x  1
matrices  X ,  such that
X                             X
9, +.1.1 .\, +.\.,1 -E(\,·S .r,  +.r,.SX,) - x'.5.'.\.t + E.\.,.....,t\J  = 0: (5.13)
itt 1*i
\
21  - E N,X,  is stable. (5.14)
/= 1
If this condition holds. the  X -tuple  offeedback matrices  (F,.....F r) with
F,  := _ /t_' 81.X, (5.15)
is a deterministic feedback Nash equilibrium and
·12(Ft , ,   . . 77\ ..t'o) -.t't . ,.t'o. (5.16)
Proof Assume that 7   -   Cli . . . 7 1· )E   .Fr  is a deterministic feedback Nash equilibrium.
Then by definition
./,(F,.10) 5  ./,(F-,(/'',)..ro)
for all feedback matrices 7, €  /9m. .. such  that  F_, C 1·I )   E   .F, ,  for all initial states  .10,  and  for
all i  =  1... ..\'. Hence, according to Corollary 5.2.5, for each i  =  1. . . . ..\ there exists a real
symmetric 12 x n matrix .r, satisfying
.T
1 4.1 / \ \
9, + Ed,R„T, +  ..1 + E H.,77,   .\., +.\,  .1 + E B,77,  _.\'i.SX, = 0 (5.17)/41 1*i j=ti
such that the matrix
.\
.-1 + S 8,731 -•h.'.r, (5.18)
1*i
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is stable. Corollary 5.2.5 implies moreover that 7,   =   _ R- 1 Hi X,  and  ./, C T..t·t) 1   -   ·rt< .\, ·1·„
for all, =  1.... ..\ . Replacing T., in (5.17) by -R-'13,1.\., forall., 0 1 shows that the .\-
tuple C Xt. . -\' z } of real symmetric it  , i+ matrices satisfies the coupled set of algebraic Riccati
equations (5.13). Furthermore, replacing T, in (5.18) by - H-,1  H,r .\.,  forall j  t   ishows  that the
matrix.1-E\=1  .k, X, is stable. This proves the "only if" part of the theorem.  The "if" part can
be seen in a similar way.                                                                                                     0
The system of coupled algebraic Riccati equations (5.13) together with the stability requirement
is briefly discussed in the text following Theorem 5.5.2.  The same system of Riccati equations
also appears in the context of feedback Nash equilibria for linear quadratic .\"-player differential
games on the finite horizon [O. T} as T  -* x. Indeed, if the limit of a feedback Nash equilibrium
corresponding to the solution of a system of.\ coupled matrix Riccati differential equations exists
for l»x,i t necessarily corresponds to a solution of the algebraic Riccati equations (5.13).  In
fact. if the matrices Q, and li „ are positive semi-definite. it can be shown that any solution of
(5.13) satisfying certain stabilizability and detectability conditions defines a Nash equilibrium in
which the closed-loop system is stable [10, Corollary 6.5 and Proposition 6.81. More details about
the limiting behavior of feedback Nash equilibria in the context of finite-horizon linear quadratic
differential games can be found in [99. 122]. In [99] one also finds a geometric formulation of
the coupled algebraic Riccati equations (5.17).
In the framework of the present section. the restriction that feedback matrices belong to the set
.F, is essential. Indeed, Mageirou [841 (see also [10. Example 6.6]) has shown by means of an
example that there exist feedback Nash equilibria in which a player can improve unilaterally by
choosing a feedback matrix for which the closed-loop system is unstable.
5.4 Stochastic Interpretation
In this section the analysis of Section 5.2 is put into a stochastic framework.
Problem 5.4.1 Consider a linear noisy system
.i·  =  . 1.1+  Hit  +  E Ir (5.19)
where u· is a stationary white Gaussian noise with zero mean and covariance I·. (ti·{ i "ri :-11 j  =
Od{ /-r). The cost functional /.   F» #/is defined by
i
/.C /·' 1 = litii r 1·.1(.i·'(2,· + u'//,1 ),/t.   11 = /·'.,·. (5.20)
1 - ·I-  r    It
{1
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The matrices (2, (2 and R are symmetric and (2 2 0, H > 0. Determine. if it exists, a feedback
matrix  /·'  E  Y such that  L C I·')  5  l. C /') for all  V  E  F.                                                                                 E
This problem is a standard infinite-horizon LQG problem. It differs from the usual setup in that the
matrix (2 is not necessarily positive semi-definite; see for instance [6, Section 8.2] for a standard
setting.  It is well-known [39, Theorem 5.4.41 that if Q is positive semi-definite, a solution of
Problem 5.4.1 is given by  -R-' H t .\'  with  .\' the unique positive semi-definite solution of the
algebraic Riccati equation
(2 +.1<r + 1.1-xxx = O.   .1.= BR-' U: (5.21)
which exists under the extra condition  that  { Q..1) is detectable.   Note that the feedback matrix
-//- 1 HI .\. is independent  of the matrices  E  and 0.   Here it is shown that this feedback matrix
is also a solution of Problem 5.4.1  if (2  is not positive semi-definite.  In this case the matrix  .\'  is
characterized as the stabilizing solution of (5.21). Using the results of the previous section it is
moreover shown that the existence of this stabilizing solution is necessary for the existence of a
solution of Problem 5.4.1 independent of the matrices E and 0.
The analysis starts with the derivation of an algebraic expression  for the costs  L ( P' ).  For this the
following result is useful. This proposition can for instance be found in [6, Appendix B.13].
Proposition 5.4.2 Consider Problem 5.4.1. Let 1·' e F and set u = F.r in (5.19). Then
ES' Mt A= H (5.22)
with \\'  the unique solution  of the  Lyapunov equation
11 '(.1 + 81·')7 + (.4 + 19/.,)11. =-/:'0/:'I. (5.23)
The following result is now straightforward.
Lemma 5.4.3  Let FeY and let P be the unique solution of the Lyapunov equation
( .1  +   8 1·'1'  P  +  /' C ..1  +  B 12)  =   - (2  -   /·' I Ri'. (5.24)
Then  1.11· )=Htl· QKT P.'  .
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Proof From Proposition 5.4.2 it follows  that
T                         T
E jf.rT{ 9 + t'rRF}.rcit = E < tr (.rT((2 + P'TRF).r) dt  = T tr (((2 + FT RF )11-)
0
with the matrix il determined by (5.23). Hence
L(F) = tr (C (2 + FTRF)11')  = tr (-(.1 + BF)Tpll. - 1,(.1 + BF)11')  =
= 1 r (-11'(.1 +  BF) TP - C .1 + BF)JIP)  = tr (EOET P)
0
According to the discussion following Problem 5.4.1 the following theorem provides a solution
for Problem 5.4.1.
Theorem 5.4.4 Consider  Problem  5.4.1.  Assume  that the algebraic  Riccati equation (5.21) has
a stabilizing solution  X.  Dejine the matrix-F  :- - R-1 81  X.  Then Lt Fj  S  LIT)for all  F  EY
and L(F) = tr (I:'0 ETX) .
Proof   It can easily be seen that
Q + FI.RF = 62 - X,EX - /·'TBIX - .\.BF + (F' - 13)1.R(F - F) =
= -(.·1 + Ht')r.\' -.\'(.-1 + BF) + C F - 7')TR(F - T).
From the proof of Lemma 5.4.3 it is immediately clear that L(F) = tr (((2 +  FT RF )11) where
11   follows from (5.23). Thus
L(1·') = ti·(-(.-1 + B/·'}rXIt' - -\'(.1 + BF)11') + ti· ((F- F}TR(/.. - F.}it.) =
= tr (EOET.\.)  + ti· (C F - F)IRC F - F)11-) .
Since 0 is positive semi-definite. i l   i s also positive semi-definite. Hence  L C Y)  5  L{ F)  for all
F E Yand L(F) =ti·(/:OET-\·).                                            0
Consider the parameter set {.4. B. Q. R) and the criterion.1  :  F x IR"  »  #t as defined by Problem
5.2.1.  In the proof of Theorem 5.2.4 it has been noted that ../( F. ro)  = .rif·,s(F).ro where ¥:,
F»Iii i . ri is defined by p     F  »  P with P the solution of the Lyapunov equation (5.24).
Consider for the same parameter set and the matrices E and 0 the criterion L f » R as
defined by Problem 5.4.1. In Lemma 5.4.3 it has been shown that./C F) = tr ( EQFT¥t F)). A
useful relation between the criteria.J and L is formulated in the next lemma. This relation leads
to the conclusion that the existence of the stabilizing solution of (5.21) is also necessary for the
existence  of a solution of Problem 5.4.1 independent of the matrices  E  and 0.
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Lemma 5.4.5 Denote the set of all positive semi-defnite q  x  4 matrices  by St.  The following
statements are equivalent:
(i) BTE YV/:' E M"'1 VOES., V/·' C Y:  /.CF) S /-{/),
(ii) BF e F V.10€ M" Vt' EY .AT .t'o )  S  ./ C F..ro).
Proof Assume that statement (i) holds.  Let .1·0  f #t". Choose 0  -  / and  E  =  I.t·0   0· · · C)1
Then 20/:'1  - .1'll.t· '. and thus
./(F. .t·,i) = tr (.t·o.t·or4(17)) = ti' (/:'(2/·ft-72(T)) = L(-F) 5 /.C/·') = ./( f.: .ro)
Conversely, assume that statement (ii) holds. Let A e  #f' *7 and 0 E St. Since l:'OET is positive
semi-definite. there exists amatrix 1" e  #f *" forsomeve  l\' such that A'OET  = P. .I. Denote
the i-th column of 3   by x.  Then
I                                           "
L(/·') = ti· (} 1.TH-(F)) = tr (1 4( /·')1 T) = E Y fC /.,)9, =    J C b'· ft, ).
i=1 i=I
Since .1( I·'. 9,) 5 ./CF. y,} forall i = l.... .1,,it follows that
,                                                                              I
L(77) = E ACT..U,) 5 X ./(/....0)= L(P').
i=1 ,= i
EJ
In Corollary 5.2.5 necessary and sufficient conditions are formulated for condition (ii) in Lemma
5.4.5 to hold. Furthermore. from the proof of this lemma it is clear that the feedback matrix Y' E
F satisfies statement (i) if and only if it satisfies statement (iii). These observations lead to the
following result.
Theorem 5.4.6 Consider  Problem  5.4.1.   There  exists  an  E'   CY.  independent  of the  matrices
E  and  (2,  such  that  Ll i·' j   S   l.l I'' j for  all  1·'   e   F  if and  only  if the  algebraic  Riccati  equation
(5.21) hasa stabilizing solution X. if this condition holds, thenT = -li-'BT X and 1.(F) =
tr< FO E.'1 -\-).
Note that Theorem 5.4.4. which has been shown independently of results from the previous sec-
tion, is precisely the "if" part of Theorem 5.4.6.
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5.5 Stochastic Variance-Independent Feedback Nash Equilib-
ria
A brief survey of stochastic differential games can be found in [ 10, Section 6.71.  In this reference
a finite-horizon framework is considered. Here a linear quadratic infinite-horizon framework is
the starting point.
Consider an .\ -player infinite-horizon stable stochastically disturbed linear time-invariant differ-
ential game. where the information structure of each player is a feedback pattern and where they
are restricted to linear time-invariant strategies: see Section 2.3 for the terminology and corre-
sponding notation. Assume that the stochastic process is a standard white noise process. The
cost function of player t is the expected value of the averaged cost per time unit, i.e.  the func-
tional  /.,     5-1  -+ #f, defined by
L, C /.i..../.\) =  lim  1. E  i .t·T  (2, + 6  1..,1-Ri, /.5 j .i·d/                                     (5.25)
X
T-+. 1 i \ #=l
where (2, and R„ are symmetric matrices of appropriate dimensions. and R„  >  0 for all i  =
1...     ..\".  Consider the following definition of an equilibrium concept.
Definition 5.5.1  An .\ -tuple 1·' =  C Fl. . 1·' 1 ) E .Fx· is called a stochastic variance-indepen-
dent feedback Nash equilibrium if for all i  =  1..      .r the following inequality holds:
/., C /·' 1 5 L, C /·'_, C /·I)) (5.26)
for all matrices A' and 0. and for all /·I f #f such that /·'_,C /'', ) E Y,·.                          0
The following theorem, which is a straightforward generalization of Theorem 5.4.6, characterizes
all stochastic variance-independent feedback Nash equilibria.
Theorem 5.5.2 Consider an  N -player linear time-invariant inf,nite-horizon stable stochastically
disturbed  differential  game, where  the  information structure  of each  player  is afeedback pattern
and where they are restricted to linear time-invariant strategies. Assume that the stochastic pro-
cess is a standard ,#·hite noise process.  Let the cost ftinction Of player i  be defned by (5.25). As-
sume  tliat  the,natrices  (2, and  li „  are  symmetric  and that  Ii„  30 for  al!  i=L....X.  Define
s, := 13, RT,1 Bl and S, , := Ii, Ii-  H, 1 R-  11,. for all i . j = 1. . X  with  i   f  j.  Then there
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exists a stochastic variance-independent feedback Nash equilibrium  if and only  if there exist .\
real symmetric ii x n matrices X, such that
\'                                                                                   .\
9, + .iT.r,  +  .\.,.1 - E(.\.,.K'.r,  + A.'.t, X, ) - .r,.S.r,  + E X, 3."XJ  =  0.             (5.27)
1*i Jti
.\
1 - r ....'.\., is stable. (5.28)
Fl
U this condition holds, the  N -tuple  offeedback matrices  (F,..       .Tv) with
F,:=  -  R.,BI X, (5.29)
is a stochastic variance-independent feedback Nash equilibrium and
L,(71.....Tx)=tr (EOET.\'i) . (5.30)
For a given parameter set  C.-1. Bi. Qi. R,J ),  the set of stochastic variance-independent feedback
Nash equilibria coincides with the set of deterministic feedback Nash equilibria (see Section 5.3).
Such equilibria are completely characterized by all the real symmetric solutions (Xi, rx)
of the system of coupled algebraic Riccati equations (5.27) which satisfy the condition that .-1  -
El 1  .45.r, is stable. The system of coupled algebraic Riccati equations  can be considered  as
a system of .1 matrix equations in .\ matrix unknowns. Alternatively, since the equations are
symmetric and since the solutions are required to be real symmetric. this system can be considered
as a system of X„( 11  +  1) /2 quadratic scalar equations in  .\ n C n  t  1 }/2 real scalar unknowns.
This makes the problem well-posed and one expects at most C.\ 11 ( 11 + 1 )/2)2 generically different
solutions. Clearly, the stability condition needs to be verified for each of these solutions.  The
following observation can be used if.-1 - E,\= 1  .45 X,  has all its eigenvalues in the open right-hal f
plane.
Remark 5.5.3  It is easily seen that if (.\'i . . . . . .\' , )  is a real symmetric solution of the system
of algebraic Riccati equations corresponding  to the parameters  C.1. B,. 9, .R„ )  such  that  .1-
El ,  .45.r'  has all its eigenvalues in the open right-half plane, then -(.\'i . . . .  . X.X )i s a real sym-
metric solution of the algebraic Riccati equations corresponding the parameters C -. 1. H,Q, R,tj
such that -.1 - E,\=, S.,X, is stable.                                                                      0
In the following section the system of coupled algebraic Riccati equation together with the sta-
bility requirement is studied for a simplified case.
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5.6 The Two-Player Scalar Case
Consider the system of coupled algebraic Riccati equations (5.13) (or (5.27)) for scalar param-
eters. Assume that .\  = 2 and ,912 = R21 = 0. Let .-1 = ci, 6, = Bi. 9, = (2„ r, = R„.
and s, : = 6,2/1·,  2  O fori  = 1.2. Recall from Theorem 5.3.2 and Theorem 5.5.2 that a pair
(.t'l ..1'2) E #12 defines adeterministic feedback Nash equilibrium {-4.1·1/ri·-61·t.2/1'2) ora
stochastic variance-independent feedback Nash equilibrium C  -61 ·t 1/ i  b  - bi .1 2 /1'2), respectively,
if and only if
91 + 2(11'1 - 31.1'f - 2.02.1'1 1'2 = 0. (5.31)
92 + 2,1.1.2 - 2stri.1'2 - 32·1'j = 0. (5.32)
a - St.11 - ·'23·2< 0· (5.33)
The analysis in the present section is concerned with the solvability of these three conditions.  En-
gwerda  [46] and Weeren et.  al. [122] studied the solvability of these conditions in the first quad-
rant of the  (Et. (2 1-plane in case qi  2  0 and 92   2 0. Under this condition a solution C 61. 42 )  of
(5.31) and (5.32) in this area automatically satisfies (5.33); see e.g. [10, Proposition 6.8]. Weeren
showed that the set of equations (5.31) and (5.32) has either one or three such solutions.  Engw-
erda found necessary and sufficient conditions under which these different situations occur Here
explicit solutions of the system (5.31)-(5.33) are derived in the special cases st = 0 and qi = 0.
Next, this system is interpreted geometrically for arbitrary values of the parameters.
The following theorem provides a complete solution of (5.31)-(5.33) if.: i  = 0.
Theorem 5.6.1 Assume that .:1  =  0·  If..2  4 0, there exists a sohition (.ri..1·2)  E  #/L of (5.31)-
(5.33)  if and only  if (il  t  :2(12  >  0.  U tliis condition  holds the solution is  unique and  equal to
1 0 a + 4a 2 +  292 (5.34)
(24„2 + .4272        ·:2
if:2  - 0. there exists asolution (.rt..ri)  E  #f' Of (5.31)-(5.33) if and only if a  <  0.  Ifthis
condition holds. the solution is unique and equal to 1 - qi I t . - 41 I.la j.
Proof Consider the case .:2 4 0. The equation (5.32) has the real solutions
a 32 Jal + 42(12
1'2 (5.35)
/2
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Figure 5.1: Principal axes and asymptotes of Ci  and (2.
if and only if a 2 + .:242 2  0· In this case a - 82.1·2  = + 4<,2 + 3292· This shows that (5.33) holds if
and only if the plus sign is chosen in (5.35) and <,2 + 3242  ) 0. Finally, substituting the expression
(5.35) with a plus sign in (5.31) yields .rl - qi/24a2 +.:242. The second claim of the theorem
is trivial.                                                                                                        E
A similar result can straightforwardly be derived for the case s2  - 0. Assume further that .21  4 0
and  t,2  96  0,  i.e. that these numbers are positive. Introduce new variables  6: =  8,4 and define
(T,   .=   ·5 1 4, · Then it is directly seen that the system (5.31)-(5.33) is equivalent to
01 + 2a41 - CA- 24142 =0. (5.36)
0*2 + 206  - 241 62  - 44  - 0. (5.37)
a -61 -6 <0. (5.38)
The following theorem provides a complete solution if al  - 0.
Theorem 5.6.2 Assume that a  = 0. The system (5.36)-(5.38) has the solution
CO. a
+ 4.,  + „4 (5.39)
if and only  if (12  + al  >  0.  Furthermore,  this system has  the solution
1  Ja - 2 /02 + 12a - 302. a + 4(12 + ila - '3(72 (5.40)
3                                       
          ,
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ifand only if a > 0 and lit - al < (Tl S la + aill. Finally, it has the solution
11  ·la + 2, (12 + 12,i - :30. c' -  (,2 + 12ct - 3(71  
(5.41)
.,
if and only if a > 0 and 02 S Act + (11 13. or (, S U and al < .1(1 - al.
Proof Equation (5.36) allows for a distinction between two cases. i.e.  6  = 0 and 61  =  2ct - 262·
Consider the case 6, = 0. Then (5.37) has the solution
6 = a /2 \11«,  +  (1 2 (5.42)
if and only if c,2 + 02  2  0.  In this case a-8 2  = F  (12 -1'-01· Hence, (5.38) holds if and only
if the  plus sign is chosen  in  (5.42) and <,2  +  02  >  0. This shows the first part of the theorem.  To
prove the second and third part. consider the case 6  - 2<t - 2 ,. Then (5.38) holds if and only if
6, < a. Furthermore. (5.37) has the solutions
1(  1
(2 -   (a f Val + 12a -:102, 
(5.43)
ifand only if c,2 + 12,1 - :102  2 0· Consider the case with a plus sign in (5.43).  Then the condition
6  <  u can only hold if a  >  0.  In this case. this condition is equivalent to the condition ry·,  >
la - ill . This proves the second part of the theorem.  Finally, consider the case with a minus sign
in (5.43).  Then the condition  :  < ct holds if a  >  0.  If a  5  0, this condition is equivalent to the
condition 02 <  10 - az, which ensures that 02 5  la + a./.1.                                                 0
A similar result can straightforwardly be derived in the case 02 - 0.
In the rest of the present section the conditions (5.36)-(5.38) are interpreted geometrically for ar-
bitrary real numbers u. rri. and cr,·
Let ('1 be the curve described by equation (5.36). This equation can be rewritten as
[c 1             [c 1                    [1  11
Ifi  61 -11|<(I| +2[-,t  01 |4 11-'Ti =0.   .11:= 1 1 (5.44)
L,21               [#21                       [1  01
The  matrix  .·li  has a negative eigenvalue  -A,  and a positive eigenvalue AJ  with
XI :=  (,/3 - 1) . 0.6 8.    12 := 1 (v'lit 1) 0
1.tilt'. (5.45)
Remark 5.6.3 The numbers At and A, are known as the golden ratio. They satisfy some nice
properties; for instance Al = A, -1 = 1/Az.                                                                 0
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The curve Cl is thus a hyperbola, which degenerates in a pair of lines if 01  =  0. The principal
axes and the asymptotes of this hyperbola can be found by transforming equation (5.44) in the
following way. The matrix  .-11  can be diagonalized as
[-At 01
.-1  1      =     S' 1       1
1 1.       T   .-  1  . 1, .,21 (5.46)
L  o    A.,] .1.   .1. - 1- 32  .31]
with
31  :=  1/1 _ _1  45 . 0.526,      j., :=  ' -1  + 145 . 0.8.51. (5.47)
V 2 10 -    V 2   10
Note that these numbers satisfy
JI + .lf = 1.   .12 = A2·11·   ·11" At·12· (5.48)
Introducing the new coordinates iii and 1/2 by
[wl _ ..1 k,1
1 1- .01  1 1. (5.49)
[112] [S]
the  equation (5.44) transforms  into
-Atilt + A"g - 2a 11'11 - 2a.J2112 - al= 0,
which can be rewritten using (5.48) as
-At('11 ta.12)2 + Al('12 - (1·31)2 -  at  =  0 (5.50)
This is the equation of Cl on principal axes. This equation shows that the principal axes in the
{ 41·  12 )-plane are described by the equations 111  =  -a.32 and 1/2  =  a.11·  It is easily seen by trans-
forming these lines back to the C 61, 6 )-plane that the equations of the principal axis in the original
coordinates are 62   -   Ai (i  -1-  a  and  6   -   - 124 1  -1- a, respectively. The asymptotes  of Ci  in  the
(41, 112 )-plane are parameterized by ,11 = -a.32 + t, 92 = a,31 3: Ait, t e IR. Transforming
this  parametrization  with  the  plus  sign  back  to  the  C & · 6 )-plane shows  that the corresponding
asymptote is described  by 6   -  -41/2 + a in the original coordinates. Similarly, the parametriza-
tion with the minus sign corresponds to the asymptote described by the equation 6  - 0 in the
original coordinates.    If 01     2 0, the asymptote Cl intersects the principal  axis   111     = -a.3 2   a t
C -a 31. a f.v :12 V AI-37)  in the C 1/1.1/2 )-plane.  Thus, if 01  2  0, the asymptote Cl intersects the prin-
cipal axis 6 = Al(1 + a atthe points (0.ct) zi: VJ,631(1. At) inthe original coordinates. In
a similar way, it can be seen that if 0  9  0, Cl intersects the other principal axis at the points
CO. u ) 32 4-'11 12'71 {-1. Al)·
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/1 \ ..\ 1-
»1. -'...                              *                         NX
1
1 ::
Fig. 5.2: 01 > 0.02 > 0; Fig. 5.3: 01 > 0,02 >0;
1 intersection point if a < 0: 1 intersection point if a  < 0:





Fig. 5.4: 01 > 0,02 < 0; Fig. 5.5: 01 < 0, a2 > 0;
1 intersection point if a  < 0; 1 intersection point if a < 0;
3 intersection points if a > 0. 1 intersection point if a > 0.
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7
Fig. 5.6: al < 0. 02 < 0; Fig. 5.7: 01 < 0, 02 < 0:
no intersection points if a  < 0; 1 intersection point if a < 0;
2 intersection points if a  > 0. 1 intersection point if ci > 0.
il                                 ....      ,
f» - \\
Fig. 5.8: 01 < 0,02 < 0. Fig. 5.9: Gi < 0, 02 < 0;
2 intersection points if a  < 0: 1 intersection point if a < 0;
2 intersection points if a  > 0. 3 intersection points if a  > 0.
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Let C  be the curve described by equation (5.37). Since the describing equations for Cl  and C,
are essentially identical. the characteristics of Cz can be determined in a similar way as they were
determined for Cl · For instance.  it is easily  seen  that Cz  is  also a hyperbola. The precise results
are  summarized in Tables  5.1  and 5.2; further details concerning the derivation of the results  in
these tables are omitted.
hyperbola Cl hyperbola C2
centre (0. a) (a. 0)
principal axis 1    62 - Aift ta     62 - 12(fi - a)
principal axis 2 62=-12£1 ta   (2=-Al(41- a)
asymptote 1 6=0 6   0
asymptote 2 62=- 41 + Cl 6 - -2(41 -(1)
Table 5.1: Characteristic properties of the hyperbolas Ci  and C .
al, 02  2 0 al. 02  5 0
principal axis 1 of Ci     CO. a) zE v/3I-3101"(1. Al )
principal axis  2 of Ci (0.(1) rt V'-·31·32'71(-1. 12)
principal axis  1  of C.2       {c t.0) rE ( At.1)
principal axis  2 of C2 (Ct. 0) rt  -.il·12(72(-A·2•1)
Table 5.2: Intersection points of Cl  and CJ with principal axes.
The position of the principal axes and asymptotes is independent of the numbers at  and 02·  They
only depend on the number a. In Figure 5. 1,  page 91, the principal axes and asymptotes  of both
hyperbolas are drawn  for a positive a.   The  41.,-axes  are  the two black lines; the green lines  are
the principal axes of Ct ; the green dashed lines are the asymptotes of Cl; the blue lines are the
principal axes of C,; the blue dashed lines are the asymptotes of (32.  Note that the first asymptote
of Ct  coincides with the 6-axis ; similarly the first asymptote of C2 coincides with the 6-axis.  The
red line separates the open half-planes 6 >  -61 + a (the right side of this line) and 6 < -£1 + a
(the left side of this line).  Now, a point (6· 6)  C  # 2  is a solution of (5.36)-(5.38) if and only
if it  is an intersection point of Ci  and  C   in  the open half-plane 42   >   -El t a. Furthermore,  it
is easily  seen  that if C 6. 6 )  is an intersection point of the two hyperbolas in the open hal f-plane
6 < -61 + a. then  { -41 · -6) isa solution of (5.36)-(5.38) with a replaced by  -a  (see also
Remark 5.5.3). Geometrically, these observations mean the following. Let the red line in Figure
5.1  correspond to the equation 6  -  L t (, forsome      2  0. An intersection point ( 6 · 61 ofel  and
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(2 situated at the right side ofthe red line corresponds to the case a=0 2 0.A n intersection point
situated at the left side of this line corresponds to the case a  =  -0  < 0. Hence the intersection
points of the hyperbolas can conveniently be studied in one picture for all a e IIi.
According to Table 5.2, the characteristic position of the branches of the hyperbolas depends on
the signs of 0-1 and cr2. Furthermore, this table shows that the distance between the intersection
points  of the hyperbola C,  with the principal  axes  and its centre increases  if the number  la, I  in-
creases. In Figures 5.2-9, pages 94 and 95, the hyperbolas are drawn for eight different situations.
It seems that the position of the red line is not the same in all these figures. However, this is only
due to a different scaling in the &  and 6 direction in each of the figures.  They are all drawn for
the same value of a.
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 are typical for a positive value of both al and 02.  It is clear that for a  <  0
there exists a unique intersection point  for all positive values of crl  and 02·   If a   >   0,  the  num-
ber of intersection points depends on the ratio between al and e.  If this ratio differs relatively
much from one, there exists one intersection point; if it is relatively close to one, three intersection
points exist. Engwerda [46] found precise conditions under which either one or three intersection
points exist in this case. Figure 5.2 shows an example with a >0 and one equilibrium. In this
case the value of a, is much larger than the value ofal·  Note that the equilibrium costs of player
2 are also much larger than the equilibrium costs of player 1. Figure 5.3 shows an example with
a < 0 and three equilibria. From the equilibrium costs, it is clear that both players have a favorite
equilibrium; player 1 prefers the equilibrium close to the 6-axis and player 2 prefers the equilib-
rium close  to the 6-axis. The third equilibrium lies  in the middle and could be interpreted as a
compromise equilibrium.  In this sense this situation resembles the famous game of the battle of
the sexes.
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 display the situation if one of the numbers at  or 02 is positive and the other is
negative.  If a  < 0, there is a unique intersection point and it is geometrically clear that this holds
for all such values of 01 and ob  If a  > 0, there exists either a unique intersection point or three
intersection points exist, which depends on the ratio between  crl   and  02. For instance,  if in Figure
5.4, 02 is kept fixed and al increases, the situation for a > 0 changes at a critical point from three
to one intersection points for a  > 0. Similarly, if in Figure 5.5,01 is kept fixed and 02 decreases.
the situation for a>0 changes at a critical point from one to three intersection points.
Figures 5.6-9 are typical for a negative value of both crt and 02. Four different situations can
occur. Figure 5.6 shows a situation with no intersection points if a  <  0 and two intersection
points if a  > 0. By keeping the value of 01 fixed and increasing the value of lay I the intersection
point in the second quadrant moves at a critical point to the other side of the red line.  In that case
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the situation shown in Figure 5.7 occurs: one intersection point for both cases a < 0 and a > 0.
Alternatively. starting from the situation shown in Figure 5.6 and keeping 0 fixed and decreasing
a/|. two extra intersection points appear at a critical point. First. the situation shown in Figure 5.8
occurs: two intersection points for both cases,t  < 0 and a  > 0. By further decreasing the value
of |02|,the distance between the two middle intersection points increases.  At a critical point the
situation changes to the situation shown in Figure 5.9: one intersection point if a  <  0 and three
intersection points if a  > 0.
0< 0 a > ()
(71>0, 0 >0 1 1 or 3
01>0,02<0 1 1 or 3
at < I. (72 >0 1 1 or 3
al  < 0,02 < 0    0.1, or 2     1.2. or 3
Table 5.3: Number of intersection points of Ct and C .
Summarizing, the possible number of intersection points is shown in Table 5.3. It is geometri-
cally clear that no other situations can occur generically (situations in which the hyperbolas Cl
and C2 touch are excluded). The fact that there exist situations with no intersection points is not
surprising. Indeed, also in the scalar one-player case the cost function is not bounded from below
if q is negative and its absolute value is sufficiently large (see Remark 5.2.6).  In the scalar two-
player case however. if only one player has a negative state weight. a deterministic (or stochastic
variance-independent) feedback Nash equilibrium always exists.  If both players have a negative
state weight there exist situations in which no equilibrium exists.
5.7 Concluding Remarks
Section 8.1.3 contains concluding remarks about the feedback Nash equilibrium concept intro-
duced in Section 5.3 and the corresponding analysis of the two-player scalar case. The relation
between the stochastic variance-independent feedback Nash equilibrium concept and other robust
equilibria concepts introduced in this thesis is brielly mentioned in Section 8.1.4. Concluding re-
marks about Section 5.2 are given in Section 8.2.1. A preliminary version of this chapter has been
presented at the Ninth International Symposium on Dynamic Games and Applications [261. Sec-
tions 5.2-5.5 have been submitted for publication [25].
Chapter 6
Robust Equilibria with Bounded
Disturbances
6.1 Introduction
In many well-developed areas in control theory uncertainty is expressed through an unknown
function. the disturbance. influencing the system; sometimes people refer to this as signal un-
certainty. Examples of such areas are: (i) decoupling theory [15, 118. 94], (ii) 1/2 0 timal control
theory [118, 128], and (iii) H optimal control theory [9,42,50,53,57,118,128]. The design
objective in these areas is: (i) to decouple the output from the disturbance, (ii) to minimize the
//2  (Or (iii)  H z) norm of the transfer function from disturbance to output.  The  //2  and  H»  mini-
mization problems have the interpretation of minimizing the worst-case effect of the disturbance,
measured in a specific way. Modeling uncertainty as such does not seem to have received much
attention so far in the context of nonzero-sum dynamic games.  In this thesis, a dynamic game ver-
sion of a decoupling problem has been considered in Chapter 4. The theory of H Optimal control
problems, essentially identical to LQG control, has been studied in a nonzero-sum dynamic game
setting in the previous chapter.  The H. optimal control problem is strongly related to the soft-
constrained differential game [9]. A nonzero-sum dynamic game setting with soft-constrained
criteria will be developed in the next chapter.  In the present chapter we assume that the distur-
banceisan  /.2(0. x 1 function, the  norm of which is bounded by a given number. A dynamic
game setting in which it is the objective of the players to minimize the worst-case effect of such
a disturbance is developed in Section 6.4. First the zero-player and one-player cases are studied
in Sections 6.2 and 6.3. respectively.
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In Section 6.2 we study the problem of maximizing the L 2-norm of the output of a stable linear
time-invariant closed-loop system, over all Lz-disturbances with norm bounded by a given num-
ber. This maximization problem can conveniently be generally reformulated in a Hilbert space
context: given two Hilbert spaces.2' and 3, a bounded linear operator 7' from .1' to y. a fixed
element yo  E  Y. and a number,·  > 0, maximize 11.1/0 + T.r H subject to ||.r |1  5  1..  Both an analysis
explicitly in terms of the system matrices (Subsection 6.2.1) and an analysis in the context of the
general Hilbert space formulation (Subsection 6.2.2) are included. Under a weak condition, we
show that a unique maximizing disturbance exists. By means of an example it is shown that when
this condition is violated. such a disturbance may not exist.
The one-player case is studied in Section 6.3. The purpose of that section is to find a linear time-
invariant internally stabilizing feedback map that minimizes the supremum of the Li-norm of the
output of a linear time-invariant system.  Here the supremum is taken over all 1.2-disturbances
with norm bounded by a given number. For .t·o = 0. this minmax problem reduces to the state
feedback H. control problem for linear systems. For nonzero unknown initial state, the corre-
sponding maxmin problem has been studied by Chen [32]. Here we study the minmax problem
with known .t·c, 96 0, i.e. we study the worst-case disturbance attenuation problem with known
nonzero initial state. The solution of this problem for zero initial state can be found from the cor-
responding infinite-horizon soft-constrained differential game in which both the controller and
disturbance have a closed-loop perfect state information pattern; see Babar and Bernhard [9. Sec-
tion 4.4]. They consider the soft-constrained differential game without taking .1·0 = (}. and show
that a saddle-point equilibrium for such a game exists under certain conditions. The solution of
the disturbance attenuation problem with zero initial state is found from this equilibrium by as-
suming .ro = 0. In Section 6.3 we consider the corresponding soft-constrained differential game
with a memoryless perfect state information pattern for the controller and an open-loop informa-
tion pattern for the disturbance. It will be shown that also under such an information structure a
saddle-point equilibrium exists and that this solution can be used to solve the disturbance attenu-
ation problem with nonzero initial state.
An extension of the disturbance attenuation problem to systems with an unknown nonzero initial
state has already been developed by Khargonekar et al.  [66] (see also [9, Section 4.5.2]). They
model the initial-state uncertainty in the performance criterion. In contrast. we assume that the
initial state is known to the controller designer. Therefore. a feedback map solving the problem
under consideration depends in general on .ro. In applications where initial states may deviate
substantially from zero. such feedback controllers could be interesting, since they specifically take
this initial state into account. One could also replace the parameter.t·u in the feedback map by the
current state .t· C / ). producing a nonlinear state feedback controller.
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The general .\ -player case is studied in Section 6.4. Since the one-player solution from Section
6.3 depends on the initial state, we shall consider dynamic games where the information structure
of the players is a memoryless perfect state pattern. Instead of one uniform bound on the distur-
bance, the players are allowed to use different bounds. i.e. each player can model his own belief
about the size of the disturbance. We shall call these bounds risk-sensitivity parameters. Given
an .\"-tuple of feedback matrices and an initial state, player i's cost function is the supremum of
the /.2-norm of his output, where the supremum is taken over all disturbances less than or equal
to his risk-sensitivity parameter. We shall call an .\-tuple of feedback matrices a risk-sensitive
memoryless perfect state Nash equilibrium if the usual equilibrium inequalities with respect to
these costs are met. We derive a set of sufficient conditions in terms of a system of coupled sym-
metric algebraic Riccati equations, which involves endogenously determined parameters. These
parameters need to be determined from a set of nonlinear equations. The two-player scalar case.
which we work out in more detail, shows the difficulties of the set of sufficient conditions.
6.2 Bounded Worst-Case Disturbances
In a risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium. which will be defined in Section 6.4, the players deal with
the uncertainty by minimizing the worst-case effect of bounded disturbances.  In this equilibrium
the player's strategies are required to stabilize the closed-loop system. In this section we study
the existence and uniqueness of bounded worst-case disturbances for a given stable closed-loop
system. More precisely, we consider a linear time-invariant system
i' = .1.r + 11'te.   .r(0) =.ro.   1 -(.r (6.1)
with .1 stable.  The norm of the disturbance u· C Lj(0. x) is assumed to be bounded by a given
number r  >  (1.  We are interested in disturbances that maximize the norm of the output, i.e.  we
will study the following problem.
Problem 6.2.1  Let ,· > 0. Determine
sUP 112112 (6.2)
11.'.115'.
If this supremum is a maximum. determine the disturbances attaining this maximum.  Such dis-
turbances are called bounded worst-case disturbances.                                                         C
We  introduce the following notations.  For each  .ro  E  #f". let 1,0 E L (0. x) be defined by
1,·, Al) = ('', 1.1.0. (6.3)
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The operator G : LIC O. x) » I.3'(0. x) is defined by
((;11·)(1 }=(' e (1--)-4/':11·(T)dT. (6.4)
0
This is a convolution operator with kernel function ( 2 'A E for .:  >  0, and 0 for.:  <  0.  In [54, Sec-
tion XII. 1] it is shown that such an operator is a well-defined bounded linear operator if the kernel
function is integrable on the real line. Since.-1 is stable, the kernel function here is clearly inte-
grable on the real line. Hence. the operator G is a bounded linear operator. The adjoint operator
of 9 is denoted by 9-. Furthermore, let
liet<.11
1- : =  Iloll =
Sup -TI-"
. (6.5)
'010.4. ..00 11 U.
./ ( tt·..rt,    : =   11 2112. (6.6)
H,· := {il' f LZ(0. X)| 111(·|1 5 r}.   1 > 0. (6.7)
With these notations the output i f Lt'(0. oc) can equivalently be written as the affine image
I   =4+  G 11'. (6.8)
Note that the boundedness of 9 ensures that Problem 6.2.1 is well-defined. i.e. the supremum
(6.2) exists for each positive number,·.
Remark 6.2.2 Closely related to Problem 6.2.1  is the problem of minimizing liz liz subject to the
constraint  || it· 11  5  1.. This problem has been studied by Bellman [18, Chapter 9]; see also [19,
Chapter4]. He showed that if 9-2,.  916  (} this minimization problem has a solution, i.e. a minimiz-
ing function exists. This in contrast to the maximization problem. Indeed. at the end of Section
6.2.2 we present an example, i.e. Example 6.2.24, in which a bounded worst-case disturbance
does not exist.                                                                                                                   0
Remark 6.2.3 Problem 6.2.1 has also been studied by Chen [32, Section II]. His analysis serves
as preliminary work to investigate a related maxmin problem (see also the introduction of the
present chapter). His analysis of the maximization problem consists of (i) a formulation of the
corresponding finite-horizon version of the problem in a Hilbert space context, (ii) the solution
of this problem in terms of the finite-horizon equivalents of the operator G, its adjoint 9-, and
the vector 4. (Lemma  1), and (iii) the remark that this lemma also holds for the infinite-horizon
version of the problem (as formulated here) under the condition that.-1 is stable. We shall present
a similar result as Chen's Lemma 1 in more general terms in Theorem 6.2.18.                           0
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Remark 6.2.4 Problem 6.2.1  includes the problem of the determination of the  H.   norm of the
system (6.1) Indeed. for.ro = 0 and r =  1. the supremum (6.2) equals  ,-2, i.e. the square of the
Li-induced operator norm of 9: see (6.5).  It is well-known that this norm equals the H.:  norm
of the system (6.1). There exist good methods to determine -5 - numerically; see e.g. [22, Section
5.6.3].
Problem 6.2.1  can be interpreted as follows. Determine the maximal norm of all the outputs that
are contained  in the image of B, under the affine transformation  ti'  »  2,·   +  6; u·.  It is to be ex-
pected that bounded worst-case disturbances have norm equal to,·.  This is true under the condition
that G is not the zero operator, as shown by the next lemma.
Lemma 6.2.5 Assume that 9 96 0.  Let r  >  (}, .ru  E  # ". and IF E  /3, .  lf.1 C u·..t·o)  5  ./CIF. .rojfor
all   ie   e   13., then 11  11   =   1.
Proof Consider for each u·  f  Lt( 0. x ),the quadratic function *:„.  :  IR -* #/ defined by
 „.(A) = .1(All'..t'u) = Ilgtt'll.2· 2 + 2<git·. 40) A + ||-,0112.
Suppose GIF = 0. Let u· C Ll(0. x) \ {0}.  Since ./Crt:.ro)  5  ./(TF..ro) if Ilit·11  5  r. we
have 9'72. (A)  <  .1(Ti:.1·0)  =    2412 for all A  E  [-r/Ilit·11.,·/I w  ], or, equivalently, 11(;it·112Ag +
2<Git·.2„,> A 5 0 for all A E  -r/||tr||. r/||tr 111. SinCe |3Gw|12 2 0. this is only possible if
9 u   =  0.  Hence, we obtain g  = 0, which is an excluded case. Without loss of generality we may
therefore assume that QTF 4 0.  Then also -ff' 4 0. Onthe one hand, since ./C ic..ro)  5  .1(IF..ro)
for all  u·  C   B., we know that  AF< A 1 restricted to the interval  [-r/  Ii'll. r/11IF 11}  attains  its  maxi-
mal value at A  =  1.  On the other hand, due to the quadratic structure of A-CA)  and the fact that
QTF  96   0. the maximal value  of »C A ) restricted  to the interval  [-,·/ 11IFII.,·/ 11IFIll is attained  at
either A = -r/11. 11 or A = r/IlIFII Hence, 1 = :Er/11"F 11. Obviously, the minus sign is not
possible, so Ilfll = 1., which completes the proof.                                                                 0
Excluding the trivial case G - 0, this lemma states that if a bounded worst-case disturbance ex-
ists, its norm is equal to 1· and hence, Problem 6.2.1 is a maximization problem under an equality
constraint. Such a problem can be solved by introducing a Lagrange multiplier. For the problem
under consideration. this yields a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a bounded worst-
case disturbance to exist. These conditions are formulated in the next theorem.
Theorem 6.2.6 Consider Problem 6.2.1.  Let 9  4 0.  Then,-[r  E  11 is a bounded worst-case
disturbance  if and  only  if (i)  \\TF\\  =   r  and (ii) there  exists  a  number  X   S  -7-2  such  that -[l
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maximizes  the functional
J.,Cit'..ru) = ./(,i·..ro) + Al|u.|12 (6.9)
in the unconstrained  space  L'1(0. x j.
Proof The sufficiency is easily seen. Indeed, let u· e  B  then
.1(11'..1'0) = ·A(tt·..t·01 - Alltt' 112   5  ./\( Ti'..ro)  -  A 1.2  =  ./ C iF..ru )
Next, we prove the necessity.   For that purpose,  let 7    E B, maximize  ./( tr. .ro) under the  con-
straint u· E H,„. Since 9 96 0, it follows immediately from Lemma 6.2.5 that MI= r. The
Lagrange multiplier rule (see for instance [81, Theorem 2, Section 7.7]) guarantees the existence
of a number A  e   IR such that the functional  ./  C zi·. .t·o) is stationary at  t,·  =  ic+. This statement
holds under the conditions that the functionals u·  »  ./ C a·. .ro ) and tr  e  11 11· 112 are continuous and
Frdchet differentiable. These conditions clearly hold. Furthermore, the derivative of u·  »+  1  u· 112
must be nonzero at w. In fact, it is easily seen that this derivative is nonzero at all points u· 9, 0, so
in particular for all points with norm equal to r. Since TF is a stationary point of ./.4 C tr..t·o ), we have
di./1 (Te..r,): _Ju·)  =  0 for all increments J w (for the notation see Section 2.1). This differential
can easily be computed. Indeed,
./#(U' + O..111'..ro)- ./#(11'..1'0 )
61·1\( tt'. .ro, Jit') = lilli = 2 (9-1,« + g-git· + All'. 111').
„-40                                   0
Hence, Ti' satisfies the equation
{g..4 + A)  = -9.2,„
Thus a completion of the square shows that .% C it·. .t·c,) can be rewritten as
J.,(tr..ro) = (ti'-IF. (9-9 + A)(11' - TF)> + <TF. 9- -,o) + < -,w :'.0 > 0 (6.10)
Now.  suppose  that  A   >   - -,.-2.   From the definition of -, - it follows that there exists  an open  set
11 c Lj(0. x I such that -A < 11(lit·112/lili·112 forall it· E Q. Equivalently,
(it·.(G-9 + A)u') > 0 for all 11· e f Z.
Thus also
(61 u·. ( 61- g + ,\ )1,1 r) > 0 for all it· E c) and for all 11 4 0.
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Together with (6.10) this shows that
./7(71' + itit'..,·o)> ./,(TF..t·,11 for all w TE  1 2 and for all t,  96 0
Since  f j  is open, there exists  a  ,(·0   e  fl  with  <it·o. IF)   9,6 1). Consequently, due to the quadratic
structure of
||Ti'+ paw' = 1.2 + 2it (Ii'. tt·t,) + 4,412
there exists a Fic, 76 0 such that Illi' + 1101(·c,||L = 1·2 Hence wehave found a tri E L 3(0. x ). i.e.
u.1  := 7,  + liou·o, With l|lt·111 =  1' such that .1,(tri ..t·tol  >  ./.,(TF. 1·0). Since also |Iii'||  =  r. this
is equivalent to .11 zo ..t·t, )  >  .j{ IF..1·0 ). This clearly contradicts the assumption that Yii maximizes
./(w..t·o) under the constraint ti· f H.. Hence A  5  - 1 -2 There remains tobe shown that 77'
maximizes J,C w..ro ) in the unconstrained space /.1(0. x).This follows from (6.10) by observing
that the inequality A 5 -- -2 implies that the operator 9-9 + A is negative semi-definite.         0
Motivated by this result we tackle Problem 6.2. I  in the following way.  With a small abuse of
notation, define the functional
·4(u:.1'0) = ./(tr..ro) - -1 21| tt' 1
2
(6.11)
For each 1   2  7 -, we look for disturbances F.. which maximize ./. C u·. .t·o)  in the unconstrained
space L#(0. x ). Next, we investigate whether a number 7  2 0
-
exists such that Iliall = r. Nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for ./., C tr. .ro) to have a maximum are formulated in the following
lemma.
Lemma 6.2.7   Let .1 0  E #3". The criterion .J.,lit'..ro) has a maximum if anct only if 7  -2 7- and
9-Z,.0 € 1111(9.9 - 12).
Proof The criterion  .J. C u·. .ro)  can be written  as
./.,(It·..ro) = Ils'.0 + GU' 12 - 1.211lt·112 =
<:,1, + gu.. 3,0 + elt') - 0 - < 't'. lt'f =
= <11'. (99 - 32)tt'l + 2 <11·. 9-1,·o> + <·:4, 60>
According to Theorem 2.1.1, this quadratic expression has a maximum if and only if the operator
7-7.        . .
- -  - 4   9  is positive semi-definite and G-z,,   E  i iii( g-g - .. 2 ).  Furthermore, S. 2  - G-C  is positive
semi-definite if and only if (G-Gu·. w> 5 12 (tr. 11') for all w E L#CO. x ). This holds if and only
if 1   2  1:                                                                                                                                                                                                 0
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At this point, the analysis can be carried out further in two ways. The criterion ./-, C t<: .t·u) can be
formulated explicitly in terms of the matrices .L ( ', E. and the initial state .t·i,. Using manipu-
lations in terms of this data, one can determine a unique maximizing disturbance of the criterion
J., ( lt'. .r U J for each i  > 7.. Under a certain condition it can be shown that i can always be chosen
such as to make the norm of this maximizing disturbance equal to 1. This approach is worked out
in the next subsection. i.e. in Subsection 6.2.1.
Alternatively, Problem 6.2.1 can be formulated in more general geometrical terms.  With this gen-
eral formulation the existence of a disturbance maximizing the criterion .4 4 < .t·o) can be studied
more conveniently than with the approach of the next subsection. This existence problem is useful
to obtain more precise results about the existence and uniqueness of bounded worst-case distur-
bances. This approach is worked out in Subsection 6.2.2, which can be read independently from
the next subsection.
6.2.1   A Matrix Approach
In the analysis preceding this subsection it has been shown that a disturbance is a bounded worst-
case disturbance if and only if it has norm equal to ,· and if it maximizes the functional .1., C w. .t·o i
for some  -   2  ...  In the first part of the present subsection (until Remark 6.2.10) we determine
for each 7  >  7 - a disturbance u·. which maximizes ./. C it·. .t·c, } uniquely. The second part of this
subsection (after Remark 6.2.10) addresses the question whether a -,  > 1- can be chosen such as
to make the norm of ir. equal to i·.
We have
./.,(/1...to 1 - 1  (.1.1 (.T(..1. - -1.211'T lt·)
(it. (6.12)
0
where .r follows from .i· = ..1.1· + /·.'tr..r(0) = .ro. The maximal value of ./.Cir. .ro) can bedeter-
mined by adding and subtracting the term -it·rT-\.r  to the integrand and subsequently. a comple-
tion of the squares.  Here .\ denotes an arbitrary symmetric 11  : 11 matrix. Thus
''         d
../. ct'...1.t,) = J. <.1.7'(•rc, - .,2,1.rl'. + Ji·'I.i.1 - <,ft.t.\..i· dt =
(1
= .t·,C .\·.,·0 +  jlf (.,·11(·I-(· + ._1'-\. + -r..1).t· + 2,1·TE' -r.i· - -,·2(t,Ti,·) d/. (6.13)
0
which holds because .,·C / ) »0 for 1  »  x (for details see Lemma 2.1.2). Completing the squares
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in the expression  - 0 - 11' r tt' + 2 ti·' A' I .\· ., yields
--, 2„,I u. + 2tt·TET.\..r = - -, 2 1 „. - 1 -2 /.:t.\..1.11 + 3 -2.1·7. \. EEI \ 21
Substituting this in (6.13) produces
·A ( it'..ru)  =  .rif .\'.ro  +
1.,\
= '1    .rT((.I ( . + AIX  + X.·1 + -t -2.\. /1./...f.\, ).1.--,21 11.-1-2/....<\..t.1-) ,/1.
0
Hence, if .\' satisfies the algebraic Riccati equation
( / ( ' + .4 1 -r + 1.-1 + S.-1-\. E/:'T.\.  = l). (6.14)
then
., 1.1 1 . T .




It's ( / ) : = 1-2 ETA·ft(.-It-,-211.El X  .1'0 (6.16)
A sufficient condition for ir-, to be in 1.1((1. x ) is stability of the matrix .I t 1.-2 EA'I .\.. This
condition is satisfied if X  is the stabilizing solution of the algebraic Riccati equation (6.14).  The
following result gives a necessary and sufficient condition for this stabilizing solution to exist.
Lemma 6.2.8  [128, Corollary  13.24 (Bounded Real Lemma)] The stabilizing solution of the al-
gebraic  Riccati equation (6.14) exists  if and only if -t  is  greater than  the  H.:   norm of the  system
.i· = .1.t· + /:'11'. 2 = ('.1·, i.e. if and only  if -t  >  f.
The following theorem is now straightforward.
Theorem 6.2.9 Consider the linear system (6.\) H itli  . 1 stable, and denote  irs  11»  norm  by -
For  each  7   >   -T,  the  criterion  J..l tr..i·,)).  as  defined  by (6.1 \),  is  imiquely  maximized  by  the
disturbance w., as deflned by (6.16). where X  is the stabilizing solution of the algebraic Riccati
equation (6.14). Furthermore J.,111'.,..ru) = .rl X .r,1.
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Proof Since  -    > - - ,i t follows  from the bounded real lemma  that the stabilizing solution  of
(6.14) exists. Hence, (6.15) holds and  tt'-., as defined by (6.16),is in  /. 3 CO. x).  Now. (6.15) shows
that ./., C u·..rt, 1  5  ·i·cf.\'.1'0 for all w.  Furthermore, if.1-, C it·..t'o )  =  .1'1.\'.ru, (6.15) implies  w  =
3.-LET-\ 1·. Thus.6 = (.1 + 7-21:'1:'r.\. 1.r. or,.l·(t) = r t( .lt-,-2 El:.rx) .i·(j.  Consequently, tt·  =  u   .
which completes the proof.                                                                                                 0
Remark 6.2.10 Lemma 6.2.8 shows that the stabilizing solution of the algebraic Riccati equation
does not exist if -   =   7
- Therefore, the method by which Theorem  6.2.9 has been derived fails
in this case. However, Lemma 6.2.7 shows that .1.,4 w..ro ) may have a maximum, depending on
whether or not 9- 1„  E  i i,11 G'G - -, - 2 ).  This is not further investigated in this subsection.  More
details about this case can be found in Subsection 6.2.2.                                                       0
Next, we investigate the existence of a number -,  >  -s- such that 11,1...11  =  r. The following lemma
states that Il it·-ll decreases if o increases.
Lemma 6,2,11 Let-- < -1 < 32· Then 11 UL,11  2  1| tt'-k
Proof   Recall from Theorem 6.2.9 that
.1.,(ti'..1·0) 5 ./..c ll'....1·0) forall it· f LICO. x land foralll > 7 (6.17)
Consecutively substituting ir =  it'..,, -,  = 3 1  and ti· = w 7, 3 = 7 2 yields
114.„ + GU'..2112 - 3 111 11'52112  5  liZ.'." + (;U·..1   2  -  11 11 U...1 Ill . (6.18)
liz,·c. + Qu...1 112 - ..f 11,1'- , „  +  i  lt...2 li Z  -  3 f 11,1.-,2 112. (6.19)
respectively. By adding these two inequalities we obtain
-iiI|tt·,-112 - -,221 lt'-,1|12 36 -Dillt'.-, 1112 - ..jll/1...,Il ,
or, equivalently,
<-,1  - lf   11'1'., Il' -'jur.2 112) 5 0.
Now. since 7, < -3 2, this clearly implies that litt'.111 2 1|ir.,-||.                                            0
Remark 6.2.12 Recall from Theorem 6.2.9 that the inequality (6.17) is strict if w  4  lt·..  This
implies that (6.18) and (6.19) are strict if it·.,  4 u.,2. Hence. if i » 11·-, is injective. 7 0 1| lt: 11
is also injective.                                                                                                3
6. Robust EquiJibria with Bounded Disturbances 109
The norm 1111·.11 decreases to zero as - tends to infinity. Indeed, due to the stability of .4. we
see  from the algebraic Riccati equation  (6.14)  that its stabilizing  solution .\' converges  to  /'  as
7  -+  x, where P is the unique solution of the Lyapunov equation
ATplpA=_('TC
Consequently,  -, 2 tt·.,(t)   -*  E t  Pf '«'.ro  for o   » x. Hence,  1 1 tr-, 1 1  1  0  for  i   »  x.
The behavior of II ie., 11  for 7  1  7 -  is more complicated. The stabilizing solution .\'  of the algebraic
Riccati equation (6.14) does not exist if 7   =  7 : The definition of the stabilizing solution (see
Section 2.2) states that itii [/   .\'1 1 equals the spectral subspace corresponding to the eigenvalues
in the open left-half plane of the Hamiltonian matrix
F   .-1      1 -2,5£.7-1H-: ==    i
L-(,7.(1  - 17, 1
If 7  =  7 -, two things can go wrong. Either the spectral subspace corresponding to the eigenvalues
of Hs.  in the open left-half plane is not complementary to the subspace itii 10  1]T, or H.. has
eigenvalues on the imaginary axis.  In the first case the spectral radius of .\ tends to infinity for
)  1  0 -,  and in the second case at least one of the eigenvalues of.1 +  7-2 EET.\' approaches the
imaginary axis for 7  1  7 -.  In both cases  it  is to be expected that  11411  »  x  typically. We shall
not go into the problem of finding exact conditions under which this happens.
We have derived the following theorem, which solves Problem 6.2.1  under a certain condition.
Theorem 6.2.13  Consider the linear system (6.1) with .1 stable and denote its  H» norm by -#-.
Consider Problem 6,2.1.  Dejine ti'.  e L'1(0. x j by
iC,(/) = --21 '1,-\.-,e 'C.-'t-,-2EET.r. ).r„
where  X,  is  the stabilizing  solution of the algebraic  Riccati  equation
/4' » ATX + .\.A + 7 -2.\' El:'7 X = 0.
Foreach positive number ,· <  liiiL,1-• liu:11. a number i  > 1
-
exists such that flic·.11  = r.  The
disturbance lt'., is a bounded worst-case disturbance and the supremum (6.2) equals  .d.r..ro  +
- 2 1,2
Remark 6.2.14  If Il,t·- 11 tends to infinity for -,  1  7 -, Theorem 6.2.13 gives a solution of Problem
6.2.1 for all ,·  >  0.  However. if this norm is bounded for 7  1  7 - and if r is larger than this
bound, the situation is unclear. In this case, solutions can possibly be obtained from disturbances
maximizing .L. C u·..ro 1,  see also Remark 6.2.10. More attention is paid to this situation in the
next subsection.                                                                                                        0
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6.2.2 An Operator Approach
Problem 6.2.1 can be put in a more general framework in the following way.
Problem 6.2.15 Given two real Hilbert spaces X and y, a bounded nonzero linear operator T
from X to Y. an element yu e Y, and a positive real number r, maximize 0 + T.i·|| subject to
 .1·\\  St'.  Eachi   e  X  maximizing  this criterion is called a solution  of this  problem.
In this subsection we first analyze this more general problem, the results of which are summarized
in Theorem 6.2.18. The analysis following this theorem concerns the implications of these results
on the specific Problem 6.2.1.
Motivated by the analysis preceding Section 6.2.1, we define for each v E  #t the functional 4,
.l' » R by
1 '„ ( .r )  =||yo  +  T .r | 12  -  it 2 11.r 1 1 2.
It is easily seen that the results of Theorem 6.2.6 also hold for Problem 6.2.15.  Thus we have that
7 E X isa solution of Problem 6.2.15 if and only if
(i) ||Y|| = r;
(ii)  3 /1 21|1'|| V.r E .1'    L·„(.r) 5 l.„(i).
The following lemma provides a necessary and sufficient condition for each it  2  11 T 11 under which
an element 7 E .1' maximizes r li ·
Lemma 6.2.16 We have
V .r E .1' l'In{·r) 5 L.'ITII(i)    4*     ( 11' 12 - 1'-T) i = T-go.
Furthermore,  (fit  >  liT 11. then
\-1
V.r E .1' 1.'„(.r) 5 1.'„(71    4    7 -(/1- - T-T)    T-vo
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Proof The functional  t.'t,  can be written as
2'„ C.t·) = <.r. (T<T - Pg).r +2(.r. 7'-No>.
Hence according to Theorem 2.1.1.4, has a maximum if and only if -1'-7' + /1 2 is positive semi-
definite and 7'-vo E Ii,ICT-7' - pz). If it 2 117'11. then the operator - T-1  + 11 2 is positive semi-
definite. Theorem 2.1.1 also shows that 7 maximizes i ·t,  if and only if
<112 - 1.-I'):F = T-go.
The first statement of the lemma follows by taking 7  -   11 /11. The second statement follows from
the observation that i,2  -  T- T is invertible if 1,  >     / .                                                                              0
We deduce that an element y e  .1' is a solution of Problem 6.2.15 if and only if 11711=  i. and
(117'112 - 1.T) 7 - T..uu (6.20)
or
\-1
T = .2.v:= fi,2 - 1'-1') 1'-yo for some F > Ill'll. (6.21)
The results formulated in the next lemma are useful for studying whether or not an element T E  .1'
with 11,11 = r exists that satisfies either (6.20) or (6.21).
Lemma 6.2.17 The following properties hold:
(i)   HYHZ  is either an eigenvalue of '1'-'1'. or it belongs  to the continuous  spectrunt  of  f ...1..
(ii) If T= yu 9 0, the norm
11.1.t,ll
strictly decreases to zero as B increases from Ill'll to injinity.
(iii)   4.411  is  unboundedfor p l 117.11, then 7'"yo ¢ itii ( 117'112 - 7'-T).
Proof Clearly, T- T is a bounded self-adjoint linear operator with norm 17'liz. According to [72,
Theorems 9.2-1 and 9.2-3], the maximal value of the spectrum of such an operator equals 11 7'112.
Since the residual spectrum of such an operator is empty [72. Theorem 9.2-41.11 7, )12 must either
be an eigenvalue of T- 7' or it belongs to the continuous spectrum of T-T.
' The continuous spectrum  of a linear operator  N       P   -4   .3. with domain P a subset  of the complex nonzero
normed space 3, is defined as the set e,(.h')  C  (1' such that for each A e (re ( S), the operator C.h' - A ) - 1 exists. is
defined on a set which is dense in 3. and is unbounded. See for instance [72. Definition 7.2-1 ].
112 6.2. Bounded Worst-Case Disturbances
Toprove the second statement, let p  > 117'11. Since lip-21.-1.11 = /1-Jill'-/11  = (lillI//t}2 <  1,
the inverse of t,2 - 7- /' can be written as [72. Theorem 7.3- 11





'1.   t,  ......,-1 ... \
Ii.1.„11 2
= < (t'' - 1.-1.)-  1 ..,11'. 4--1  1 1    1  y"f =
= P-' <11  (t'-21'.1.)' 1.-,t,t. S (P-,1-7,)' T7M> =\j=0 .#=()
.  51 - *  <1'- !1„. T = ifto  +  11-"  < I'l'- y„.  1'1'- yo')  +  it-'  Cl'- TT- ,/0. 1'=  1'1-- y,0  + ·
+ /1 -" < 7.1.-vo. 7.7...ut,> + 51 -M (1'-1'1'-yu. 1'-7'7'-go> +
+ 0* Cl'-1'1'-i „. 1'-n'-9,  + ·
= it - ' 117 '- vc, 112 + 4,-" 11 7- T- yo l l 2 + .41 -8 11 T = 7' 7 ' - f,u l l i + · ·
Clearly.  11,·„ 112  can be expressed  as a Laurent series. which is c o n v e rg e n t fo r i t  >   11 T 11.  Th e  c o -
efficients of this Laurent series are positive if /'- 0,  4 |1· implying that 11.1·„ 11 is strictly decreasing
in it if 7'-glt 4 0. itismoreoverclear that |·t·„1110 forit - x.
For the third statement, assume that 7 -40 E  itii C 11 /'112 - 1'-T ) and let v  >  117'11. Then. there exists
anelement.t·of .1' such thatill'/'11·' - T-I').i·c, = 7.-No. Thus
1
11
NA| = ||(t,z- 1-1') ' (Ull' - IT-t').i  =114+ 1111'lit -41 (p' - T-T)- .,·c, 1 5
5 11.1.11 + (/1£ -117'112) Il(/11 - 7.-7.)-'ll 1 .1.(111
According to (6.22), we have
lit 2   -1....1-111                                    -1
11 (/,  -1  /3   11   61-2 X(117'11/11)4- (/,2 -111.112)J=(}
Hence 11.1·„Il  5211.1'11 11. showing that  Ir„ 11 is bounded; in particular in the limit it 111 fiT.             0
If 7'-t/t,  =  0, then .2·„  =  0 for all /1  >  Ill'91.  Thus  in this case solutions of Problem 6.2.15 cannot
beobtained from (6.21). However. if /-Ntt = 0. then clearly /'-t/o E iiii { 11 1.113 - T-T). Hence,
(6.20) may have nonzero solutions.  If 11 7'11 2  is an eigenvalue of 7'-7'. the space  ker( 11 1'11 2  - 1'.1' 1
contains a nonzero element. which can be chosen such that its norm is equal to ,·.  If 11 1.112 belongs
to the continuous spectrum of /'- 7'. the only solution of (6.20) is 7  = C). Hence, in this case,
Problem 6.2.15 has no solution.
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If /'-tto 9, 11. the existence of a solution of Problem 6.2.15 that can be obtained from (6.21) de-
pends on the behavior of 11.r„ 11  for it   1   117'11.   If  11.i·„ 11 tends to infinity for 7   1   11 /  11.  it strictly
decreases from x t o O:i s p increases  from  11 7 H  to x. Hence.  in  this  case.  for each  1·   >   O a
unique number /i  >  111'11 such that 11.1.„11  = 1 exists. However. if 11.,·„ 11 is bounded for it 1 IT H
a number it  >  117 11 for which  11.t·„ 11  =  ,·can be found if and only if t· is smaller than or equal to
this bound.
If T- 40 4 0, and if 11.1·p ll isbounded for/, 1 1 7' 1, and ,· > litii„1117'11111·„11. solutions of Problem
6.2.15 can only be obtained from (6.20). Whether indeed (6.20) provides solutions depends on
whether or not ,· belongs to the set
fl := { 117111 -7 satisfies (6.20)} (6.23)
We summarize the results in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.2.18 Consider Problem 6.2.15.  Let T be the adjoint operator of  l .  Let for each
it > 117'11, the element .t·„ € .1.'be de ned by (6.21). Then:
(i) Suppose that T=y„ = 0.  If \\1'112 is an eigenvalue of the operator 1'- 1. the solutions Of
Problem 6.2.15 aregiven by the e/ements 7  E  ker{ 117'112 -  7.-T) with    i    =  1·.  if 117'112 is
an element of the continuous spectrum of 1'- I', Problem 6.2.15 has no solution.
(ii) Suppose that T-yo + 0 and r > lini„*11Tll 11.1 „11. ifr e fl. where flis defined by (6.23), the
solutions of Problem 6.2.15 are given by the solutionsi' of (6.20) with 117· 11 = r. lfr ¢ fl.
Problem 6.2.15 has no solution.
(iii)  Suppose that T= yo  4 0 and r S tilll„LI17'11 11·1.5,11. Then there exists a unique number it  2  11 1,\\
such that \\.r i,\\  =  r:.ri,isa solution of Problem 6.2.15.  1.f t.  i  fl.  this  is the  unique solution
of this problem.
The  rest of this section deals  with the implications of this theorem on Problem 6.2.1, which  fits
inthe formulation of Problem 6.2.15 by setting .1' =  Lt,CO. x F. Y = /.3(O. x L l' = 4. and
,/0  -  s, . „ . The variable F will further be replaced by the variable -,.  Note that t. '. C .t)=  .1. { u'..t't, )
and lilli = 7-.
Remark 6.2.19 Because of uniqueness. it can immediately be concluded from Theorem 6.2.9
that .i·..  = w., for each -  >  , - with tr-, as defined in this theorem. Thus we have
1('.  =  A l    - 9  9 1     9  Z.,·0.      3,  >-t·
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Nevertheless, the following analysis contains a complete derivation of this result.  This is done for
two reasons. Firstly, the design of the present chapter is such as to make the Sections 6.2.1  and
6.2.2 readable independently from each other. Secondly, the analysis contains useful elements to
decide whether or not bounded worst-case disturbances exist  if a number f, cannot be determined
from the equation  11.r. 11  =  ,·;  see for instance Example 6.2.24.                                                                          0
We first determine an expression for g-z, ,. The adjoint operator 9- can be determined as follows.
Let u· E Ll((1. x) and z E L5(0. x ). then
( 1.9 u . > = ., . : C / ) T C G u. ) ( / ) dl = -11'f jll . : ( t ) T I 'i ( t - ' I .·1 E u · { T } d r dt =
0                         00
. .
=  .   .  =Ct )T('elt-'101 # ic·(T ),lt,IT =    irll-)1 Er   » ell-,AT ('1' ul,1 jdtd·r.
0-                                                                                     0                                r
In the third step of this computation the order of integration has been interchanged, which is al-
lowed because .-1 is stable. We obtain
<G-T){1)= A·7  f
A--t).41(·T2(Tfc/T. (6.24)
Consequently, using (6.3),
1 9- 2,·o)(1) = t.'I,-1.17' .i Cr Ar( .1( .trAdt.ro - Et-1 41//Ct).ro.
where we introduced the notation
Hlt)·.= C -I<t ('1 ('CT.AdT = C (st/)Ar(,T(,f (st/)·1(/.4 = e t.-47 prt..1 (6.25)
1                            0U
Here P is the unique solution of the Lyapunov equation
-17·/7 + /'.1 = -('T(. (6.26)
Hence,
(g.2,"G){11 = 11'rpfu.t'u. (6.27)
We proceed by analyzing the operator -, 2 - 9-G in more detail. It will turn out that the operator
I - 7-29.9 is a Wiener-Hopf integral operator.  Such an operator is defined as follows.
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Definition 6.2.20 154, Section XII.2] A linear operator 'T      Lt{ O. x }   -*   /.1{O,  x ) is called a
Wiener-Hopf operator if T  =  I  - K, where k' is an integral operator given by
(*4)(1)= « f L.(t - .:)4(.:)d.:.   ,-C LJ((1. x) (6.28)
0
The kernel L· is a q .q matrix function which is integrable on the real line. Furthermore, the q x q
matrix function It  defined by
11.(.N)=/- ,.  . ('.' 1'.l t   lt. (6.29)
-'
is called the svmbo/ of the Wiener-Hopf operator T.                                                                                                0
Define
A..:-   1 -29-9 (6.30)
for 1   >  7..  We have
(k .,11·)(1) = 1.-2.A.T. .(fr-11."1('t(Gtt·}(T)dr =
\ T
= 7-,ET .1 j c t--,1.11 (•TE•,c.-i)-liu,C.:)cl.:dT =
0
=  -1 - 2 ET.Cit,Hj, 1--t).lt ( .1.(,c c .-'1'1.1 Eui .. )(ird, =
= 3-LFT  f-'Ar Hlt)   E-»AF.11·(s)(1.+ f-tAT   Hts)(-'AE,rts)d: 0                                 t
Recall that H is defined by (6.25), which shows that
Ck'-,it·)(t) = 7-2/1.7.  /, jl, ((t-i).·IE.·(.Md.: +   (('-').4,
PEU'(.N)(l.« 
(6.31)
0                                                       1
Now, define the kernel k.,     #t -4  #/7 * 7  for 1  >  1 = by
A. (/) - < 7-2 A. I ,-,It' p t . f < 0:
(6.32)
-'-2 El.Pt'AE. 1 > 0.
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Then we have
C k'.,  11 ' ) (t)   =      k..  C 1   -   S ) it' C.. ) d...
0
Due to the stability of .1. the entries of k are integrable on the real line. Hence, according to
Definition 6.2.20, this shows that I - E,  is a Wiener-Hopf operator. Denote the symbol of this
Wiener-Hopf operator by  114.  From (6.29) we obtain
f Ftc"_Arldli, + 1'.S ''tt„+A)dt  E=
\\ .ls) =1_      5," k.,Ct),lt -1- 3-1 ET   
\- X                                      0
- 1 - 1-2 ET ((iis - ..17')-1 P - PC i.4 + .4)- ) E. (6.33)
1\
This symbol is a rational matrix function, i.e.  each of the entries of it 1  is a quotient of two poly-
nomials. This rationality enables us to use the following theorem.
Theorem 6.2.21   [54, Chapter XIII, Theorem 7.1] Let T be a Wiener-Hopf operator on l.3(0.  xI
with a rational symbol 11   given in realized form, i.e.
11'Cs)-lt.\C.: -L)-1.1/.   ., f # (6.34)
for some matrices  L.  M, and  X .  Let v  be the size of L. and deftne  L*   .-  L -  .\I N .  Then T  is
invertible if and only if L'  has no real eigenvalues and
4'" = im*-Lket·*X. (6.35)
where * and ** are the Riesz projections of L and I.*. respectively. corresponding to the eigen-
values  in the  upper  half plane.  If these  conditions  hold. then
CT- l')(t) = t.'(/) -·1-   E(t..9)6·(.:)ds.    1 20. (6.36)
0
with
'     i.\. e - "L  '  11( ' :L ..1/ U< , <t<X:
ACL 4-'                                                                                                 (6.37)
-i.\'(-i,L'(I- Il)("L '.ll     O f t< . > <X.
Here 11 is the projection of 4 ' along im * onto ker *' .
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We apply this theorem to the Wiener-Hopf operator 'T  =I-  A.  and in particular we use (6.36)
with t· = 9-0, inorder todetermine
.t·..   =  { 1 2  -  S;.(,7 } - 161-Z,..       D   >  1.-
Since -3   > 3-the invertibility of I -  A . is ensured, which implies that the two conditions for
invertibility. as described in the theorem, do not need to be verified. In order to use expression
(6.36), a realized form of Ill,  has to be determined.  It is easily seen from (6.33) that  ll.  can be
written as
It-(s)   =   I   +   i - , -2£r i p       1 1 1 1 IE.L- i.1     0   1-1 [-,1
[   0     .9 + t.'iT]    L /, ]
Hence, a realization of 1 1 1  in the form (6.34) is given by
1  -   F't         0    1. -1- 17-'Er It'  11 ,   .11 -  -11 E. (6.38)
[ 0 -i.AT [p]
Let l.3, 0, and 11 be defined as in Theorem 6.2.21, with L. 11, and .\ given by (6.38).  From
(6.36), (6.37), and (6.27) we obtain
IT-1 i.)(t) = A'Tpft.-1.1'0 + i.YE 'IL. lf,1 -fl,- 11)}
 „L' .li KI' pc .,A d.:.t· o.
\O
Note that
  F.  IoII,-,-,) = .... C,L. I 1 + Iil--1}
...1-7 -ge,IL' .1/ET pi I:
yielding
1
7--1,·)(1 ) =Erp<,1.t'O  
+ i. 2.rf-'tt. '  i rl, i.,L '   /   , s.-1 It -CI-Il), „L' M ,..,1
..\
10.1 1,=«
01      5        .4 =L  -1         6.t 1
=F.T pit· .rot
+ 4:r€-"L'  f"L'  /  IN _ n     - hm(I- 11),"L' 1




= - i.,1 r ,_,tz..  C,1  1
1
C  I,1 + Aft'l"- It).1.L'  61 ...)
.ro. (6.39)
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The next aim is to investigate e -itLy II[/    0] T  and  (I- 1 1) c isL
X
in more detail. Recall from Theo-
rem 6.2.21 that H is the projection of 4,2. along im 0 onto ker 0 *, where * and *'  are the Riesz
projections of L  and  L *   -  L  - .11.\ respectively, corresponding to the eigenvalues in the upper
half plane.  Here,  L,.1/ and  .\ are defined by (6.38).  Due to the block-diagonal structure of L  and
the stability of .4, it is immediately clear that
int, = im Iil
(6.40)
Consequently. since  4 '2,   =  iiji 0 -2 ker*'. there exists an It   .: 11 matrix Z  such that
/




Since ker * '  is an L x -invariant subspace of 4'2'. the matrix representation of L * with respect to
the basis of 4'2" formed by the columns of
I  51
has an upper triangular structure. This representation produces the same structure for f - ,f L.     For
that reason  we now determine this matrix representation.  Due to the L' -invariance of ket 0 ;
there exists an n  :. 11 matrix 3 1 1  such that (using (6.41))
Ill   [11L ' 1 1=1 1 i iii (6.43)
[Z]   lz]
Next, define the n x i i matrices  )1 2  and  3 2.3  b y the relation
[01     [ 1   01 1.121 (6.44)
L' t,1     Z  I   'n
Then we have
L. 1, 01 - 16  1  '11 '1,21 .[z j]         22 J
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yielding the desired matrix representation of L *, i.e.
ix- IL 21 It ;I,1  [  1 i (6.45)'4 [-Z 4
This representation and (6.42) yields
'L... Fil   rt 01 ,_,„lt   *1 F i  01 [11
c    " 1(t] =  z /  11  .-"',fj [-Z t] [Z}
=11 '11.-"i,   , 1 Ill= [, 01 F,-1,3,1] = F ,-1,3,1 1 (646)   9  c -,t, 1 lo]  [Z ] [ O 1  Z,-'" ,
This result can be furtheranalyzed as follows. We determine l i t explicitly and determine an equa-
tion which Z satisfies.  For that purpose, we first compute the matrix L* . which immediately re-
sults in
[.1 + 1 -2EETP --2 E ElL x=i l 1             (6.47) --1-2PEET  P      -.47.-  -1 -LPEET
Hence, from (6.43) we obtain
111 - 1(.1 + 7-2 EET(P + Z}) (6.48)
and the fact that Z satisfies the equation
4TZ + Z.·1+ 7-2(p + Z}E/:'7'(P tz)= 0. (6.49)
We proceed by investigating (I - 11 ), h,L. in more detail.  Because 11 is the projection of  4'2"
along  im 0  onto  ker $ * . the operator I  -  11  is the projection of 4 along  ket· 0*  onto 1111 0.,·2,.
From this fact, (6.40), (6.41), and (6.45). we obtain
CI- Il)f "L'    (I- 11) Ft  01 Ff "1"    *l i t   01 -
[z /] [ O  ,"'k,] [-z l]
= 10 01 1,1.,11  * ]F t  Ill = 1-,1:'.2 Z       / t 33 22  j
' 1     (6.50)to I] 0  f "32'  [-Z /]  [
Recall from Theorem 6.2.21 that L '  has no real eigenvalues and that iin **  is the spectral sub-
space corresponding to the eigenvalues of L *  in the upper half plane.  Thus  ker * X  is the spectral
subspace corresponding to the eigenvalues of L *   in the bottom half plane. Consequently,  (6.41)
and (6.43) imply that all the eigenvalues of }1 1 are located in the bottom half plane. Hence, from
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(6.45) we obtain that all the eigenvalues of 3 2, are located in the upper half plane.  From this we
conclude that all the eigenvalues of i 1 22 are stable. Now, recall from (6.39) that we are interested
inthe behavior of (I- II}c"L. for.: --a x. Due to the fact that .-1 and A 12 are stable and from
(6.50) we obtain
'Itl:(I- Il)("L ' L  f,A =,1*11  -c,s ,Ikz  f„li,i]  b t  ] 1-111 24= 0.
Using this result, (6.46), (6.38), and (6.48) in this order, we obtain from (6.39)
CT-'l'}(1 J = -i-.2.\.6-,1/.'11 [i] 2  F f-' 11 1Lo}  0, = -"  -'  Lz,-'. jr, =
ET IP  /]
1 .1.,3 - A. 7 (p + 7 1, 1(.1+1-2 Elt:' C P+Z)).1.0. (6.51)r (-i,3.It - 
J tz,-,t,"-1
Next, by adding (6.26) and (6.49)we see that .\  : = P+Z satisfies the algebraic Riccati equation
('4  + .-g.\. +.\. 1 + 1 -z.\ A,E.f   = 0. (6.52)
Furthermore. recall that  l i t  has all its eigenvalues in the bottom half plane. Consequently,  the
matrix.It-t-JE/:' 7.\.  =  -i l i l  (see (6.48)) isa stable matrix. This means that X  is a stabilizing
solution of (6.52). which is a unique solution. We arrive at the following result.
Theorem 6.2.22 Consider the linear system (6.1) with.\stable and denote its H..  norm by -i-
Consider Problem 6.2.1.  Define for each -t  >  f.  1'-.  e  I.'1(0. x)  by
11.- (/ 1 = . -2/:,r.\.- co.-1+3-2././..7 r
. 1 LO.
where  X -  is the stabilizing solution c,f the algebraic Riccati equation
(.1.(' + ..17.-\. + .\'.4 + 7-2.rEETX = 0.
Let  P  be  the solution of the  Lyapunov equation  .\1  P  +  PA=-('T C, and let Qbe  the solution
ofthe Lyapunovequation .ATQ + Q.\ =-PE E.1  P. Assume tliat.rIQ.ro f O. Foreachpositive
nuniber i· < li,11-, 1..  liu·.Il. a unique number 5  > -1"  exists such that \\te-\\ = 1'. In this case, w.
is a bounded worst-case disturbance and the supremum (6.2) is e q ua l to . rt . r. 1 · 0 + 5 2,2 .  If 11 u ' ., | |
is  not  bounded for  -·  1  -1-,  then  it·-,  is a unique bounded worst-case  disturbance.
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Proof This theorem is based on Theorem 6.28. According to the analysis above we have ttl,, =
.t'-,  =  'T- 1 L·.  From the expression (6.27) it is easily seen that the condition 9- -,.  4  0 is equivalent
to the condition .rIT(1.t·t, A 0. The rest immediately follows from Theorem 6.28.                        0
Although this theorem gives more precise existence and uniqueness statements than Theorem
6.2.13, it does not answer the question whether or not a bounded worst-case disturbance exists
if r  >li ni,1- •  Il' '., 11· For small dimensions of the system data, one can study this question analyt-
ically. After the next theorem we present an example, which uses the result of the next theorem,
showing that bounded worst-case disturbances may not exist if r  >  lirm, 2.  liu·-, 1 .
Theorem 6.2.23 The solution of the  integral equation
tt·(t) = .y(t) +It jf  ·(t - r)it·(T}dr.   t > 0. (6.53)
0
with y(t) = ilt -It , 1,·(.4) = c-'1'1, and B. 4, a e JR, with a. p > 0, is given by
' 2an
- t- pl a  >  2/1.at P
u'(t)= . -2(11/tt .-1(1 tai). a  =  2/1.
lilli
--sinpt + .1(p cos pt + a sin pt ). a   <  27.
P
with p -4\a 2  -  2aki  ,  and .-1  an  arbitrary  constant.
Proof This integral equation can be solved using complex Fourier transforms and the Wiener-
Hopf technique [95]. Assume first that a  >  2it and define p = 4(t 2  -  2ail. We introduce  the
following notations:
9+(t) =   Yit).  t > 0.
0,     t < 0:
11'+ (t) = C u·(t).
1>0.
U'-(t)  =  <
f o.                     t > 0.
0. 1<0: l v fo™ k.(1 -7-)11·(T)dr.  /< 0.
The integral equation (6.53) can now be written as
11'+Ct) + tr_(t) =.t/+Ct) +1' ..Ilf A·(1 - T)it,+(T)dr.   -oc <1<x. (6.54)
-.
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We apply a complex Fourier transformation to this equation. The complex variable in the Fourier
domain will be denoted by 6  Let  A .  +, H + and 11 - denote the Fourier transforms of A·, 1/+, li'+
and N'_, respectively, i.e.
la
1<(<)=   A·(s}t.'<'ds= (2   C,2
.
i. +c <- )  =.11/, .1/+ (t )e '('di   =   -14
0
C tia
11.+ (<) = ..1111 tt.+ (t k 'C'dt.
()
0
11·'_(<-) -   u·_(/), '('dt.
Note that A ( <) is analytic for -a  < Im 4  <  ct, and that ¥+C <) is analytic for Im < >  -a. From the
theory of Fourier transforms it follows moreover that 1 1+ (C) is analytic for  Im C  >  at,and  that
it 1 (<) is analytic for Im (  <   4, for some numbers 01  and .31· These numbers will be determined
later. Let 0 -m ax{-a. Li }and j - mill{a..41 }· Assume that o <  3. We verify this condition
after the numbers 0 1 and  it have been determined. Applying complex Fourier transformation to
equation (6.54) yields
111(C) + 11.-(C) = 1 (C) + itj<(C)11+CE).     0 < Ini << .3. (6.55)
Note  that  all the appearing functions are analytic  in the strip  o   <   Im <   <   .1.  This  is a required                           I
condition for the Wiener-Hopf technique. A second condition for this technique is 1 - PA-(<)  96  0
in the same strip or in a 'sub'-strip. We have
1 -  i,A  (C) = (6.56)
<2   +P/
Cl  + Ciz
Apparently, the second condition for the Wiener-Hopf technique is satisfied if we redefine o  and
i by n  =  illax{-p.At } and 1 =  min{p..31} (note thatp  <  a). We still have tocheck the
condition o  < 1 after the determination of 01  and .it .  The next step in the Wiener-Hopftechnique
isa factorizationt - BACE) = A-+(C)/1<_(<), with A+(<) analytic and 4 0 for lin < > a and
A_ (C) analytic and 4 O for Inic  <   1. By inspection of (6.56) we see that such a factorization is
given by
4 + tp 4 - la
A'+CE) - -.   1<_CE) = -.
C + m 4 - 111
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Multiplying (6.55) by A_ C C) yields the equation
A-+(<)11.+CE) + A-_(6)11'_(6)- A-_(<)1 +(6)= 0.    0 <lin<'< j. (6.57)
The next step is adecomposition -A-(6)1+CE) = D+(<) + D_C<J, with D+(C) analytic for
lili<  >  n  and D_ (C) analytic for Im <  <   i.  We have
-144 - (111 -2,"cit//(,t + pl   til((i - p)/(a + p)-A"_(<)1 (<)= =C E  -  i p) (C  + ia) Ctia 4 - IP
Hence, a required decomposition is given by
-2ia,1/(a + p) 'WN- p)/(a + p)D+K)= . D_(C)-
C tia C -ip
Now, rewrite (6.57) as
A-+(<)11 +(C) + D+(C) = -A"_(C-)1·1'_(C) - D_(C).   0 < bnc < .1. (6.58)
Note  that the left-hand side is analytic for  hn < >o  and  that the right-hand side is analytic  for
Ini C  < 3. Moreover, left-hand side and right-hand side are equal in the strip intersection o  <
Iin C < . 1. Hence, left-hand side and right-hand side are each other's analytic continuation. This
implies that the function ./(C), defined by
,1(U -  
A-+C<)11.+CQ+1)+C<). Ini C  >  o.
(6.59)-A-_(<)11'_(C)-D_(C). IniC<.3.
is an entire function.   From the lemma of Riemann-Lebesgue we know that i t' +C< ) =  0( ] )  for
<1   -0   x.  1111(>o  (see for instance  [29]  for an explanation  of the o and 0 symbol). Since
A-+(<1 = 0(1) and D+(C) = OCE-1) forl<1 -* x, Inl (1: > 0, we have .1(<) = 0(<-4 L for
4-1  -9  x. Im <  >  o. and for some 61  > 0.  S imilar reasoning gives ./( C)  = O((-6, ), for 1<1  -+ x,
hn C  <  .3, and for some 62  > 0. Hence, from Liouville's theorem it follows that ./( C) = 0 for all
<  E  4.. This implies that
11.4-(<)... . Im< > 0. (6.60)
D+(<) lict 11 I ( (1  +  p j
A.+ (<) C + ip
Note  that 0 1   =   -p,  so  that o   =   -P.   One can also determine  1 1 1(4)  from (6.59).   From the
resulting expression it is then easily seen that. 4  = a, so that j = p. We see that since p > 0.
the condition n  <  j is indeed satisfied. The final step consists of determining u by taking the
inverse Fourier transform of J 1 '+ ( < ).  From (6.60), we have for t  > 0, and for cr >  -p,
. +r. .+ i.
1 i icill r f -'Ct
11'(t )  =  27,/         1 1 -+ C C k-'C'd<   =   - { a  +  p)        .11||1 7-,144 + /p
-.   + ' . -·..+t.
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This integral can easily be computed by closing the integration path by a semicircle with radius R
in the bottom half plane. The contribution of the semicircle converges to zero as  H  » x, which
follows from the lemma of Jordan.  From the residue theorem of Cauchy it then follows that
2(iil E-icl '1(19         _pt
uit) = ;(- -;; Itc'sc=_,p G--i;; = (.
Next. assume that <1 5 4,. Define p = 42 a - (12. Structurally, the derivation of the solution
consists of the same steps as in the previous case. A first difference appears in the expression for
1 -PAC E).  Indeed.  in the present case  we  have
,
4- - 1)-
1  - /1 A-(<) =   . ,  ,     . ' .
t-   it  (1 -
For the Wiener-Hopf technique to be successful, this function needs to be analytic and 4  0 in
a 'sub'-strip of o  < Itii< <  3. Note that l - /1/\(61 has two zeros (6 = rtp) onthe real axis.
Therefore, we redefine n as o  =  tliax{(}. (11 } and assume that n  < 1. Again, this condition needs
to be verified later. The factorization now takes the form:
-2          .2
A'+CE) = 4.- p ,   K_CE) = w- itt.4 + i,1
Note that  1  -BA'(<)  =  11+(C)/A _(C). that A+(6) is f  O and analytic forhii<  >  0, and that
A-_ C C )  is 96  0 and analytic for Im 4  <    i.  The next step is the decomposition -i l_ ( < )1+ ( < )  =
D+(<)  +  D_ C C ).  It is easily seen that a successful decomposition is given by
1(111
/)+ C <) = .   D_(C) = -,4
6 + ta
The function.1 { 6 1 is now defined by
' (2 - 1,1 '1(ill11'+Cl-)--. Im<>(i.
C + M 4 + M
./(<) = ,
.     - (C   -   'a  ) 1 1. -c C  1  + i,1. [111 C < 1.
Again  we have the result that J{ < )  i s a n entire function. The behavior of .IC < )a t infinity is
.i,<c  =  <  ('(C) + O(6-1 ).    XI  -0 x.     111}C  > n.O K-)+0(1).  141 -+ x. Im<< .i.
Hence, Liouville's theorem gives ./( < )  = .1-,with.1-an arbitrary constant. This implies that
11.+(C)=  ..2,1,1, +..1- f,+ "t'.   11-Cl.1 = 1, -...1..4- - 1)- 4 -   - 1)- 4 - 1(1
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Note that 11'+(<} isanalytic for h,1 4 > 0. so that ot = 0, and thus n = (}. Moreover. 11-(C) is
analytic for lin 4  < a, hence  li  =  a, and thus  i  = u. We conclude that the condition c,  <   1
is indeed satisfied. By inverse Fourier transformation we find (the integrals are calculated in the
same manner as in the previous case) for /  > 1) and n  > (},
/1  + J .
It'(1) = -'s   /  11+{l,-1,-"C,/C =-I .j
aq  ' + . _AC .      t'.'  C C + ,(11(-4-2 .1 i       «  tic=- 1)1 '16   t   -13 1 C. - 1,2- ->- +'. -  -'   + '.
(-'f C LE+ia}(-4
-'1(11}i C
Resc--,t + li('hc='.) c, - /,2 - t..1 (R,·AC=_" + Res£=" 1    42 _ „2
Obviously, we have to distinguish between the cases p > 0 and p = 0. Assume first that p > 0.
then the poles are simple and we find
1(iii   .fl·( 1 ) = - - si ll pt + .-1 ( /, ('„S 1,1 + ct Mi ll /,/ J .
P
with.1=- A-i/p an arbitrary real constant.  If p =0, the poles are double and we find
u'(1 ) = -2(till + .-1(1 + clt ).
with.1=-.-1-ian arbitrary real constant.                                                                                                        E
The following example shows the existence of a situation in which bounded worst-case distur-
bances do not exist.
Example 6.2.24 Let it = (i = P = 2 and
1 = F-1   I l.   E = (' = t.   .t·, = EV
[ 0 -21              ll]
The solution of the Lyapunov equation (6.26) is
[1   01
p =  IL   t]
Thus from Theorem 6.2.22 we obtain
cg-s..,)v) =  1,(f.,1 .
Li'   J
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The stabilizing solution of the algebraic Riccati equation (6.52) is
r. 2 CI - 41 - 7 -2)                 0
G   32 (2 - 41 - ,-4 
which exists if and only if  ,  > 1. Hence - -  -  1.  For 7  >  7 -  we have
11'.,(/1 =  




Il  t'. 244 - 1 -2
So in this example the norm of lr. is bounded for i  1- " .W e have
|illl|| tt'.,  12 = -2 + 1 Ji.
/1,/                                            6
Now. let r  >   -2 +  i 45.  Note that in this example maximizing disturbances can only be found
according to case (ii) of Theorem 6.2.18. which states that a maximizing disturbance exists if and
only if ,·  €  f 2. In order to determine the set Q. consider equation (6.20).  From (6.30) and (6.31)
we derive
r 1 t   .-1,-,1 1.|c.  d.,1            [t,·'1
{G-(Jit·  t} == LL Ful I_zi,-,|ft'2£.:}d.:1
. t' = 1  2.
Lu'
Hence, equation (6.20) with Te = [91 Tr ]T reduces to the two decoupled integral equations
F' 11)- 1.1 f -It-'17/,1(.«)d.: = 0.
0
TFY(/) - -1   c -211-,lux{.:)d.: = 1,-2,
(}
According to Theorem 6.2.23. the only solution of the first integral equation in  L 2( 0. x )  is the
trivial solution. i.e. TF' = 0. The second integral equation has the unique solution
Tri(/ 1 = 12 - v/i),-'vi
Since ||Ti,|12 =  IliFiliz  =  -2 + i v"3. we have  1 = {4-1 +  S 45} (this set is defined by (6.23)).6
Hence ,·  ¢   and thus. according to Theorem 6.2.18, the supremum in Problem 6.2.1 is not
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a maximum.  Note that the only solution of (6.20) in L f(0.  x)  has  norm  equal  to the number
linl-,4,• liu'.,11. In fact, wehave
li".1 #cl) = I 2 -  ), -2,/=F) = Mt)
El
6.3 Worst-Case Disturbance Attenuation with Nonzero Initial
State
In this section we study the situation with one player minimizing his cost function which is max-
imized by the bounded disturbance. He minimizes the I.2-norm of the output of a linear system
by choosing an appropriate linear time-invariant feedback matrix which internally stabilizes the
system. Having the H. theory in mind, we will study the existence of a saddle-point solution
instead of explicitly studying the minmax problem. Under certain conditions a saddle-point solu-
tion indeed exists and this solution serves as a starting point to study the .\'-player situation in the
next section. For the notations and terminology used in the present section we refer to Chapter 2.
The linear system is described by the equations
.i·=(.4 + BF).rt Eu·,    .t'(0)= .ro.    z =(('+DF).r. (6.61)
We  assume that (.4. B) is stabilizable and that  D is injective; the latter assumption is usually re-
ferred to as the regular case. The control feedback matrix F is assumed to be in the set F. By
definition, the stabilizability of C A. B) ensures that Y  4  0. The disturbance u' is assumed to be an
element of the Hilbert space LIC 0.00). Consequently, due to the stability of.1 +  B F, the output
2 is an element of the Hilbert space LW(0. x). The output for zero initial state depends linearly
on the disturbance, i.e.  it is the image of the linear operator QF :  LZ(0, x)  -+ LN(0.00), defined
for a fixed feedback matrix F e F by
C GF'lt')(t) =(C + DF )  <(t- r)(A+BF)Eit·(T)dr. (6.62)
0
Due to the stability of.1 + BF. this operator is a well-defined bounded linear operator: for more
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details see the text between (6.4) and (6.5). Next, let
-, , r-  i-  f|( Fll
(6.63)
.J(F. u·..rt,) := Hv.H2: (6.64)
8,:={it· €Ll(0. x)|liu·11 5 1}. 1>0. (6.65)
Note that the notation i -  was used in the previous section to denote the norm of the linear opera-
tor G (see (6.4) and (6.5)). In the present situation this operator depends on the feedback matrix
F and we use the notation  1 - to denote the minimal achievable norm, which is  in line with the
conventions in H: control theory. The optimization problem to be studied in the present section
can now be formulated as follows.
Problem 6.3.1   Let 1   >  0.  Determine, if it exists, a saddle-point solution for the two-person zero-
sum game
C F. B,...I(·....ro ) ) (6.66)
Furthermore. if such a saddle-point solution exists. determine the value of this game.                 0
See Section 2.1 for the definition of a two-person zero-sum game and a number of related aspects.
Problem 6.3.1 is related to the state feedback H_. control problem in the following way. If.ro = 0.
then
PJ ,'5 112112 ='2 kf, 119"ll, (6.67)
The norm of the operator Qi-· is known to be equal to the H.  norm of the closed-loop system
(6.61). Hence, the minimal achievable value of this norm, i.e. ,·-1 times the square root of (6.67),
equals the upper value of the two-person zero-sum game (6.66) with .1·0 = 0. Actually, a saddle-
point solution for this game, i.e.  for the game (6.66) with .t'u - C). does not exist [9, Section 1.4].
If there exists a saddle-point solution for.ro  4 0, upper and lower value are equal, and hence,
such a solution solves the state feedback H: control problem for nonzero initial state. Actually,
the term H: control problem is inappropriate here since the problem does not minimize an  H:
norm in case of nonzero initial state. A better terminology is: A saddle-point solution for the
game (6.66) solves a worst-case disturbance attenuation problem for linear systems with nonzero
initial state.
The game (6.66) is related to the corresponding soft-constrained dijlerential game \91, which is
the two-person zero-sum game
(F.  Ll{ O. X )../. ( · . · . .r o) ) (6.68)
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where the criterion.1.,: Y x Lj( 0. x) x #f" » #lis defined by
11.,(/: 11·..ro) =  ./( F. u:.ro) - 721'lt.112.     1  6 # . (6.69)
The relation between the games (6.66) and (6.68) that is useful for solving Problem 6.3.1 is made
precise in the following lemma.
Lemma 6.3.2 A saddle-point solution t F.-Ir j with  I Ili"' 1 1 = r for the game (6.68) is also a saddle-
point solittion for the game (6.66).
Proof   Let w E B,, then
·1(it'.73..ro) = .4(li'. F..1'0) + 721|tt'|12 5 .L. (Ii,0 77..ro) + 72„2 = 1(Ii'. F..1·0).
Next, let F C T. then
J(TF.F..ro) = ./.,(TF. F..ro) + 7211,(, 2 5 .1..( . F..ro) + 121'TFI'.2 = .1(TF. F..ro).
Hence, we obtain ./(w, F..i·o)  5 ./(IF. F..t·o}  5 .JCIF. F..1·0) for all lt· E  Br and for all FET.
which shows that  C F. Tr)  is a saddle-point solution for the game (6.66).                                                     El
Motivated by this lemma we approach Problem 6.3.1 as follows. Firstly, we look for saddle-point
solutions for the soft-constrained game (Y. L (0. x). i ( ·. ·..ro)) with i arbitrary. Secondly, we
investigate by varying -,. whether saddle-point solutions ( 1·'. IF) with Illi'll  = r exist.
Remark 6.3.3 A saddle-point solution for the soft-constrained game with a closed-loop informa-
tion pattern for both players is known to exist under some weak conditions [9, Chapter 4]. The
information structure for the maximizing player here is an open-loop pattern and the minimizing
player has a memoryless perfect state pattern.                                                                 0
A saddle-point solution for the soft-constrained game can be found by two completions of the
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square. In order to see this, let .\' be an arbitrary symmetric n  x n matrix. Then
./.( F. ir..ro) = 1 2 112  -  1 21| 11'|12
-i t
.    ·rT(C' + DF)T((4 + DF).r - 4,2u,Tit· + -flj.T.\..r - -f-,1.T.\ .r  dtdt           dt
..r A'.ro + i  ( .1-((C' + DF)1.(C' + DF) + C 1 -1- BF)TX+
+X(.4 + BF)).r + 2tt·TET-\'.r - 7211'Tu·) dt =
=  .roT.\'.ro  +   (
.1·7·(C,T(, + AT.11: + X..1 + FT  DTDF   +  '1 FT  DTO+
+2FTBTX )1.- 12lt,Tu· + 2u·TE.I.X:r) di (6.70)
The  third step holds because  .r (t)   -»   O  fort   -+   x ; see Lemma  2.1.2. The derived expression
shows how the two squares should be completed. Indeed, since D is injective,
·rT ( I-'T DI D F + 1 FT DT C .  + 2 FT BT X )  r =
= |D(F + (DTD)-1(DTC, + BTX)).r'2 - .1.T<(,TD + XB)(DTD)-1(DI'(-1 + BTX).r
and, assuming that 7 4 0,
-1211'Tu. + 2it·TET.\'.r = -12'u. - 7-2 ETX.r12 + 7-23'T.\'EET.X,t'.
Substituting these equalities in (6.70) yields
J. C F. 11'..t·o) = .rj'.r.t'o +  - (.rT((2 + ATX + x3 - x.4'x + 1 _2.X EET.\.)1.+
0
+ |DCI·' + (DTD)-1(DT(' + BT.\')).r12 - 72 |11' - 1-2ET-\',i,|  di. (6.71)
with
0 := ('ICI - DCDTD)-1DT)(-' (6.72)
A:= .4 - 8(DTD)-IDTC. (6.73)
9 := BCDTD)-1 HT. (6.74)
Hence. if.\' satisfies the algebraic Riccati equation
Q    TX + XA -.\'.4.X + 7-2.\.EETX = O. (6.75)
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then
./. C I.'. It...1.0) = 1 11I -\.,to + 1|  1/)( /·' + (DI D)-1 (DI ('-1- 81 .\.) 1.1.11 di +
t)
- 12.11 111.- ..4EI.\..rlid/. (6.76)
0
Obviously, the feedback matrix
1,,:=   -(DTD ) - 1 (Dr (.  +  1117' .\.) (6.77)
satisfies the maximization property of a saddle-point solution (property (6.82) below). It is how-
ever unclear whether this matrix is an element of F. This can be accomplished by further speci-
fying the matrix .\ according to the next lemma. This lemma can for instance be found in [128.
Lemma 16.61.
Lemma 6.3.4  Let.\' be a symmetric positive semi-definite  solution of the algebraic  Riccati equa-
tion (6.75) and assume that the matrix  A- SX  + 1-1 E El. X  is stable. Then the matrix  A- SX
is stable.
The  matrix .1  -  .K.\.  +  1 -2EEI .\'  is  stable if and only if .\'  is the stabilizing solution of the
algebraic Riccati equation (6.75).  Let this be the case in the sequel.  Then T  f  .F and (6.76)
yields
./.,(F. it'..,·0) = .toTX.rc, - 12.1/ Itt, - 7-2£,TX.i,12 di 5 .1. .\..1.0. (6.78)
0
forall w E /.3(0. x). Here..i· denotes the state generated by
.i· = (.1 + Ht').2 + Ew.   .2(0) =.ro. (6.79)
The result (6.78) implies thatif ./.,(F. 11'..rti) = .1·ti X.ro, then u. = 7-2ETX.i·. Substituting this
in (6.79) yields t,· = TF, where
TF(/) := 0-21,.7.\,f'(1+87+1-JEA.rx) ./.0. (6.80)
Equivalently. if  =  -3 -2 £·7'Xy. where i denotes the state corresponding to  /·'  =  7 and  it·  =  i,.
i.e. T is generated by
i -1.1+BF),+E . 7(01=.1·11. (6.81)
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Note that TF e L.1(0. x 1 since .-1 + HT + i -2 A'A'I .\. is stable. Weobtain
J. ( p. i .ro )  < .1.11.-\'.i·o for all u· 0 IF, and ./., C 77. TF..ro )  = .t·,f .\'.,·11. (6.82)
The next aim is to derive that Ti' satisfies the minimization property of a saddle-point solution, i.e.
to prove  that  ./.. U'. IF. .1·0)  -  .1. C /·'. IF. .ro ) is nonnegative  for each  P'  E   .F. Let.i· denote the state
corresponding to rt· = TF and an arbitrary feedback matrix F f Y, i.e. .i· is generated by
.F =(.1+ Ht').i· + Eli'.   .i'(0) =.t'o. (6.83)
Define furthermore
1,  :=  DC I·'  -  F )1:.
C   :-   m  -  7.- 2 E TX.i·.
Then, (6.76) implies that
X
.13(11·'. TF..t·tl) - J..(F. 71'..ro) =     1,/12(111 - 12  /.1(12(/1 =  111,liz - -,211<112 (6.84)-      4
Yet another completion of the square is required to show that this expression is nonnegative for
all feedback matrices F f Y. In preparation for that. let E := 7 - .i·. It is easily seen from (6.81)
and (6.83) that
6 = C..1 + H/·')-F- C.-1 + H/').i· = C.-1 + H/·'),5 + 119(F- /·').i·-
- C.1 + HT)6 + BCD'/))-1 nTt'. (6.85)
Furthermore. CCO) = 0 and C = 3 -LET-\.E. Hence
111.112 - 7211<112 = .  D' 1, - 7--E, AAE' .\.f)
dt. (6.86)T   
    »·       ·.
Since.i. i  E   L';(0. x ).  it also holds that &  e   Ll{(}. x).  So. 1,  f   /.'"10. x) and thus &   f
L3(0.x).From Lemma 2.1.2 it then follows that E{ 1 )  » 0 for f  » x. Together with &1 1) )  = 11.
this implies
if _1:1 -1.54= 0.
J   df
H
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Subtractingthis term from(6.86) and consecutively using (6.85), (6.77). (6.73). (6.74). and (6.75)
yields
111'Ill- 12114-112=
     ,T t,  -  1,-2 61  X  E E I  X t  -   -iI- tr  X  £   'll   =
=     (vi,-  21,  DC D I  /)1-1 13 t .\. £+
U
-El'(31..\. + .\.3- 2-\'N.\' + 7-2.\./:'/.,7..\.}E) dt =
- //-
D { D T D ) - 1 H T . \' C 1 -  +
0
-ET(17 -\. + .\.·A - .rs.r + i -2,A'A'TX)6) ,// =
- f (1,)
-
D(DTD)-1 BT.\.4.12 + El.(26 
d/. (6.87)
This expression is nonnegative if (2 is positive semi-definite. The matrix I -  D( Dl. D)-1 DT is a
projection, thus its spectrum is contained  in  the  set  {0,1} . This implies that  Q is positive  semi-
definite. Hence,
./. ( F, TF..t·0) 2 .1- C j '. IF,.,·0) for all F E F. (6.88)
This  inequality and the inequality  in (6.82)  show that  ( F. TF)  is a saddle-point solution  for the
game C.F. LICO. x ). .1 C ·. ·. .t'O)). Thus, from Lemma 6.3.2 we obtain the following result.
Theorem 6.3.5 Consider Problem 6.3.1.  Assume  that  D  is  injective.  Let the matrices  (2,  A, and
h be defined by (6.72),(6.73), and (6.74), respectively. Assume that the algebraic Riccati equa-
tion (6.75) has a stabilizing positive semi-definite solution X for some number, 4 0. Defne tile
feedback matrix  F  and the disturbance -iT·  by
73 = -(DTD)-1 (DT(' + BIX): (6.89)
171(t) = 1-2,1,'Tret(A--4.F+-,-1EETS).1'0 (6.90)
respectively.  Then T  f  F and Ii'  E  LM(0.  x ).  11/' 1 IF    =  1·.  then the pair <T.Te j is a saddle-point
solution for  the  game  CY.  Br·Jl.....ro))  and  the  value  of this  game  equals  .rl X.ru  +  -1 2 1,1.
The existence of a saddle-point solution C F. 17' 1 ensures that lower and upper value are equal. and
moreover that the lower and upper value are attained by 17 and /·: respectively. Hence. from The-
orem 6.3.5 we can immediately derive the following result.
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Corollary 6.3.6   Assume that the assumptions of Theorem 6.3.5 are hil,filled and let the feedback
matrix  F  and  the  disturbance Te  be  as  deftned  in  this  theorem.   Assume  that  \DY'   =  1·.  Then
max  liif .1(F. w. .ro) = miti .1(F.ir. .ToI = .rit X.ro + -;2,.2 (6.91).·€Br FEF FEY
min sup J ( 1•'. w..ro) = niax J( T. tr..ro) = .1· .\'.1·0 + 7 2,·' (6.92)
FEF,r·€B, ,CEB,
It is  well-known from  H x control theory that under the extra condition that  (.1.8. ( :DJ  has no
invariant zeros on the imaginary axis, the algebraic Riccati equation (6.75) has a positive semi-
definite stabilizing solution .\' if and only if there exists a feedback matrix 1·'  E  Y such that s  >
GE|| (see for instance [128, Theorem 16.4] or [119, Theorem 8.12.1]). Furthermore, if this holds.
one such feedback matrix is the matrix -(DID)-1 (( ' I D+HI X ). Using this standard H: result,
Theorem 6.3.5 can straightforwardly be further specified as follows.
Theorem 6.3.7 Consider Problem 6.3.1.  Assume that D is injective and that C.A. B.(: D ) has
no invariant zeros on the imaginary axis.  Let 7-  be deftned by (6.63), and let tlie matrices Q..\,
and K be defined by (6.72), (6.73), and (6.74), respectively. Then, the algebraic Riccati equation
(6.75) has a stabilizing positive semi-definite solution  if and only  if 7  >  3- .  Denote  this  solution
by  X..  Defnefor each n  >  -1-  the feedback matrix  F., and tile  disturbance  tr.. by
1,1, = -(DTD)-1(DTC, + BT-\1,): (6.93)
11'-,(t) = 1 -21:'1 -\., Ft'3-5.x..t-,-2EFI'X..) rt}. (6.94)
Then P: f Fundic·., e L)(0. x). 1[flitt•.,H - 1, then the pair C F.. zt'-,)  is a saddle-point solution
for  the  game  CY .  B...J V....ro) )  and  the  \·alue of this  game  equals  .rI X..r„  +  -1 2 ri.
Proof By definition  of 7 -,  we have  -    >   7 -  if an  only if there exists a state feedback matrix
FE  Y such that i -  5   1|91-11   <  7 · Hence, according to the statement following Corollary 6.3.6
the algebraic Riccati equation (6.75) has a positive semi-definite stabilizing solution if and only
if S  > 7 -. The rest of the theorem follows by applying Theorem 6.3.5 with /' =  I·I and TF = tt·..
0
Assume that the assumptions of Theorem 6.3.7 are fulfilled and let .\'.,  F-  and  w.  be as in this
theorem. We proceed by investigating whether a l   >  1
-
exists  such that  liu-11   =   1·.  The next
lemma states that    ti·-:   is decreasing in -1. This lemma is similar to Lemma 6.2.11 (or the second
statement of Lemma 6.2.17).  In that case it was shown that the norm of the worst-case disturbance
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is decreasing in 7 which also holds in the present case in the following sense. Given that the sys-
tem is controlled by the feedback matrix 1·1, the norm of the worst-case disturbance is decreasing
in 7.
Lemma  6.3.8   Leti"   <  71   <   7 2 Then I| tt'-,11121| lt'-,2 ||.
Proof    The pair C F., w. ) is a saddle-point solution for the soft-constrained game. Thus the fol-
lowing inequalities hold for all 11' E L 1( 0. x ) and for all F e .F:
.J( F.,. 11'..ro) - 721| 11'|12  5 ./(F... 11'.,..ro) - 721| u'., |12. (6.95)
J ( 1'4.  ll'.,. /0 )   5  .1 C  ·'.  lt,o . .ro )
Consecutively using the second inequality  with  7   -    11 'F=   t'.,<.  and the first inequality  with
7   =  12.  11' = u·,i yields
.J( F.1. ti·,1 ..t·o) 5 J( F,„ u·.„ ' 'ro) = .1(F..2. u:,..ro ) - -tf 1  u'.,1 112 + 722 11 u.,1112 5
5  j( F. , .  lt'.,2..ro )  -  7  | | U'.,Af  t  7 f 1 1 u,3 , 112. (6.96)
or, equivalently,
./( F..1 . u..,1, 'ro) - .1( 141,2 . u,-,2. .t·o}     722 (1| 11';1 |12 -   1 u...2  12) (6.97)
The assumption 71  <  72 has not yet been used, so the roles of 71  and 72 can be interchanged in
this inequality. Hence
1(F.,7. trp..ro) - .1(F.„. u'-,t..ro) 5 15 (1|le.,2 |12 -1'u.-„112) . (6.98)
Adding the inequalities (6.97) and (6.98) produces the inequality
1&  ||11'.,1  12 -Ilte...2112) 5 722 (liu'-,1|12 -1119.2|12) .
which can equivalently be written as
( -i t   -   122)    (lili,; 1112   -1 1 11'12|12)    5   0
Since  7 1   <   7 2, this inequality shows  that  1 1 tr-, ,  11   2   1| 21'.2 1 1.                                                                                                 El
Remark 6.3.9 Recall from (6.82) that the inequality (6.95) is strict if it· 4 u.. This implies that
(6.96) is strict if u'., ,  t  u'., . Hence, if 7  »-+  ti'., is injective, the monotonicity of 1% 11'., || is strict.  0
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Consider the limit i   » x. Since  {.1. B) is stabilizable  and  (.1. B. (: D)  has no invariant zeros
on the imaginary axis, the stabilizing solution of the algebraic Riccati equation
Q + 37X + .\3 - x.9x =0 (6.99)
exists. Denote this solution by .\'. .  Due to this existence, the stabilizing solution A'., of (6.75)
converges to X:   for i   -* x. Consequently,
1 - tt·.:   »  tt':.   for 1   -4 x. (6.100)
where w. is defined by
u'x(t) := AT-\,x (-1(-4-BIDTD)-1((.TD+BTX-)) / O. (6.101)
Note that u.»  €  Lj{ O. x ) since X-  is the stabilizing solution of (6.99). We obtain
lit·.1110 forl -0 x. (6.102)
Next,  consider the limit 7  1  7 :  It is well-known that 7 equals the infimum of all numbers 1  for
which the algebraic Riccati equation (6.75) has a positive semi-definite stabilizing solution [ 128,
Theorem  16.4].  So, ifi   =  1 -, either the stabilizing solution does not exist or it does exist but it is
not positive semi-definite. However, the latter situation is not possible because X.,  is a decreasing
function of - .   Hence.  if 3   =  7 : the stabilizing solution does not exist. By definition.  we know
that
l
illl 1 1 (6.103)
[-\.-]
equals the spectral subspace of the Hamiltonian matrix
H, :=  ile  -3 + 3.-2EET]-I                  ·                                                                                                                                     (6.104)-.1
corresponding to the eigenvalues in the open left-half plane. Using this observation it can be ar-
gued along the same lines as in the discussion preceding Theorem 6.2.13 that generically 11 ui, Il
diverges to infinity for s.  1  0 -· We shall not go into the problem of finding exact conditions under
which this happens. An illustrative example about the limiting behavior of the Hx suboptimal so-
lution can be found in [128, Section  16.9]. We summarize the main result of the present section
in the following theorem.
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Theorem 6.3.10 Consider Problem 6.3.1.  Assimle that the conditions of Theorem 6.3.7 are ful-
jilled and  let  X;  F.  and  w..  be  as  in  this  theorem.   Ur<  lim- t...  Hu'-.\\.  a number  t>   -t"  ex-
ists such that till'il  = 1·.  In this case, the pair  1 F.. w, j  is  a  saddle-point solution for the game
CY .  H...IC.... s„j)  and  the  value  of this  ga,ne  equals  .4 X 4.rl,  +  il 1.2 .
Due to the monotonic behavior of |  11'-, ||, it is in principle straightforward to construct a numerical
scheme producing the number i  (if it exists). Indeed, one starts with a sufficiently large value of -
and determines the corresponding positive semi-definite solution of the algebraic Riccati equation
(6.75).  Next,  1111'. 11 can be computed and depending on whether the result is smaller or larger than
1·2, the procedure is repeated with an updated value of o. The monotonicity of Ilit· il ensures that
the sequence of updated values of -, converges to f.
6.4   Risk-Sensitive Nash Equilibria
The theory developed in the previous sections is applicable to .\ -player infinite-horizon stable
deterministically disturbed linear time-invariant input-output differential games, where the infor-
mation structure of the players is a memoryless perfect state pattern and where they are restricted
to linear time-invariant strategies.  In this section we consider such a game where the cost function
of player i is represented by the I. 2-norm of his output. See Section 2.3 for the terminology and
the corresponding notations. We shall define a naturally corresponding equilibrium concept, and
derive a system of coupled equations generating such equilibria under certain assumptions.  This
system will be studied in more detail for the simplified scalar case.
The cost function of player i is the square of the L,-norm of his output, i.e. the functional ./,
F,·  3  Lj(0. x)  x #4"  -+ #t defined by
2./,(Fi- .... Fx. ir..1'0 ) = ||Zi|| (6.105)
The outputs s, are determined by the system equations
\\
.i. =  .1+ E B,F,   .i· + Alt·.
.l·CO)=.ro. (6.106)
F=/     J
4=Wit6)D„/· , .1.. i= t.
..\". (6.107)
  =t
We assume that each player has his own belief about how big the disturbance is and that he looks
for a strategy minimizing his cost function corrupted by a bounded worst-case disturbance, i.e.
138 6.4. Risk-Sensitive Nash Equilibria
player t aims to minimize
./,(/1·    ·. t'x. 4..ro) :=  Slip ./,c/·I, ./.'\. . 1(.. .1.11 L (6.108)
lin 115,·,
where the number 1·,   > 0 expresses player i's belief about the maximal  size of the disturbance.
This number is called the risk-sensitivity parameter of player i.  If 4 is small, player i has relatively
low costs but his criterion incorporates only disturbances with a small size, i.e. he is not risk-
averse. For larger values of,·„ player i is more risk-averse, which results in larger costs. Using
the functionals 1, as adjusted cost functions we define the following robust equilibrium concept
for the disturbed differential game under consideration.
Definition 6.4.1   An  .\-tuple  F   =   C I·' i . 1·' , }  e  ,F,· of feedback matrices is called a risk-
sensitive memoryless perfect state Nash equilibrium with respect to the risk-sensitivity parameters
,· t. . . , · , .  if for all  i the following inequality holds:
.11, (/·'.,·,..t'ti ) 5 .1,(t'_, { 1'; ). 1',..1'11 ) (6.109)
for all j·', E #fIll 11 such that  F_(/·I)  6  9-1..                                                                                                                 0
Remark 6.4.2 An .\"-tuple (F t. .      . F. )   E  .Fi  satisfying  (;  + Ell D„ F, =   0  forall  i   -
1. .      ,.1  is clearly a risk-sensitive memoryless perfect state Nash equilibrium with respect to any
set of risk-sensitivity parameters; each player has zero costs in this equilibrium. We shall refer to
such an equilibrium as a trivial equilibrium. If I)„ = 0 fora\\ 1 f j and D, := 1)„ is injective
for all t. then a trivial equilibrium exists if and only if (i) each column of (', is contained in ini D,
and (ii) the matrix
\
1 := .1 - X{ DTD,)-1 DT(., (6.110)
,-1
is stable. In that case. the trivial equilibrium is uniquely given by I ',  =   - ( I),1  l),  1- '  /),1. (.,.  This
situation can for example be excluded by assuming that the matrix .1 has at least one eigenvalue
in the open right-half plane, sometimes referred to as the nonminimum phase condition.            El
We shall apply Corollary 6.3.6 to obtain a system ofequations, from which risk-sensitive memory-
less perfect state Nash equilibria can be determined. To that end. let F'1..... /·'#_ t. /·',+t..       . /·' ;
be fixed feedback matrices for all the players except player i. Consider the situation where player
1 aims to minimize
1,{Fi....  .77,_,.F,.1,+i····  ·77\.'.'..1.1, ) (6.111)
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by choosing an appropriate feedback matrix  /·,  in the  set
\.
F:= Felli ." I "
l.-1 + E 8,771 + /1, F is stable  
. (6.112)
/36,
This minimization problem for player i is equivalent to the minmax problem
.
111111  sul)  ./,( /''I..    ./·,_1. r; r,+1. . P..\ 1 (6.113)
i..,€.F ..EB':
corresponding to the linear system
/    X
.i =1.4 + E /11 '' + 11, 11.;  .1. + /:.1,·.   .40)= .1.0.\ 't,
z, =  1 ('' + 'Er D„ F, + i)„/·.,  .tC ./0,
A solution of this problem can be obtained from Corollary 6.3.6; specifically from (6.92).  Indeed,
assume that D, := D" is injective and define the matrices
Q, 1. ('Ill- 1),l DiD,)-,DI)(·'. (6. 1  14)
3,:=  .1  -  8, C D,1- D; ) - ' l),1 C '; . (6.115)
St ..= B,(D,I 1),)-1 BI (6.116)
Furthermore, assume that there exists a positive semi-definite n xii matrix .\', and a number 1,  4 0
such that
i 7
4 1 C             \
1(., + S l)"F,   Cl- 1),(D,ID,)-'D; )  (., + ED„77,  +\ ./0, 1*i
/   X              X    \T
+  <3,+El, 77,-  8,(D,1/),)-ID,Ts/),17,      .\.,  +1*i /01
C    X                    \
+ .\.,  1 + Z /3,7-, - /3,( D,/ /), 1-1 D,r X /)„T,  +/ t i ,*
-  X,,K,.\'   +  -, ,- J .\., /:'/:. r X,   = 0, (6.117)
and
\                                        X
1, + E B, F, -  H,( ,0,1 l),1 -1 Df Z /), 17 , - .  .\.,  + D,-2 /: /: t .\., isstable. (6.118)
/96, /0,
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Now, define the feedback matrix F, and the disturbance Ti-, by




77,(/) := 1,-2ET.\., exi, <t  7, + E B,17, -
8,( 1)  D A-1 D i'11 D AT ,+
1*i .1 ti
-N,-r, + 7,-2 EET.\.,)) .1.u·     (6.120)
Note that 7-,  e Y. According to Corollary 6.3.6, if IliP, 11  =  1·, it follows that l, solves the minmax
problem (6.113) for player i.
The feedback matrix F, is a best reply matrix for player i against the given feedback matrices
F'.. , F<_1.1·''ti· . F 1  of the other players.  In this way. given that all the involved assump-
tions hold, a best reply matrix can be found for each player. Any intersection point of these best
reply matrices is a robust memoryless perfect state Nash equilibrium. To simplify matters. let us
further assume that D    =0 for all i 4 j.  Let the matrix J be defined by (6.110). Then, it is eas-t.j
ily verified that if the .r-tuple C.\'1 . . .     .  .\'\ 3 o f symmetric positive semi-definite 1,  x 1, matrices
and the .\--tuple of nonzero numbers 1-1. . · - , \ ) satisfy for all i = 1. . .\" the equation
\




1,   : =   .1  -  X  S.,X,  +  1,-2 E E ' .\",   is stable  for each  i  -1.            .  .1
'=1
and if 11 tr, 11 - ,·, with
't.,(1) := 3-2 EI.-\., *- 1.,t.1'1,
then the .\ -tuple C /·'t...FX) with
77, :- -CD,ID,)_' CD,7(', + ti,1 .\'' )
is an intersection point of best reply matrices. The condition 11 11·, ||  = 4 can equivalently be writ-
ten as the equation -5,- 1.roT P, So = l'f with /1 the solution of the Lyapunov equation .1,1 /1 + P'.1,  =
- .\'' /:' /1'7" .\.,. We formulate the obtained system of equations generating risk-sensitive memory-
less perfect state Nash equilibria in the following theorem.
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Theorem 6.4.3 Consider an  N -player injinite-horizon stable deterministically disturbed linear
time-invariant input-outptit dijferential  game. where the infor,nation strticture  of the players is a
memory/ess perfect state pattern and where tho. are restricted to linear time-inrariant strategies.
Let the cost hinction Of player  i  be the square of the  L ,-norm (,f his output.  Assume  that  t), ,  = 0
for all  i  f  .1, and that  I),  :-  D„ is injective forall  i  = 1. .\.   Let  ,·,  be the risk-sensitivity
parameter of player i. Let the matrices Q, and H, be dejined by (6.\14) and (6.116), respectively.
Furthermore,  define
\
i := .1 - Z H,(/),t /),)-1 D,t(.'. (6.121)
,= 1
Assz,me there exist X symmetric 1,  . u matrices X„ N symmetric it  . it matrices 11, a,id X
noniero real numbers -rt, such that
X, 20: (6.122)
\
9, + .PX, + .r,.1 - X C.\.'.N,.\.,+ .\.J.f'.\.,) - .\.'.v'.\., + 3,-1.\., A. ET.\., = 0:    (6.123)
jt'
\
1,  :-  .i -  Z .h'.\.,  +  1,-2/.../...1 .\·,  isstableforeach i  =  l..      . .\". (6.124)
/-1
./,r/1  +  /1.1,=  _-r, /:. F.,1 -7.,: (6.125)
- 4.1.1,     - 31, ·1(1 2·1'0-/r (6.126)
Then the  N -tuple of,feedback matrices C F,..      . lz \) with
F, :-_C I),1 1), )-IC I),1 (,a t H,1 .1.2 ) (6.127)
is a risk-sensitive memoryless perfect state Nash equilibrium with respect to the risk-sensitivity
parameters  i·,.....i·r and
7,(/i..         . 77 5. 4..,·11 )  =.4  r,.ro  +  i f,·f. (6.128)
Note that if /·.'  = 0, equation (6.123) is exactly the ,-th equation in the system of algebraic Ric-
cati equations (5.13), the stabilizing solutions of which characterize deterministic feedback Nash
equilibria (see Theorem 5.3.2). The matrix.1 in (5.13) has been replaced by the matrix -1 in
(6.123) which is due to the input-output structure considered in the present chapter. The posi-
tivity requirement (6.122) is not required in Theorem 5.3.2 since we considered indefinite cost
functions in the previous chapter. Here we consider positive cost criteria which results in the re-
quirement (6.122). As a result, closed-loop stability is automatically fulfilled. This in contrast
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to the indefinite case where closed-loop stability is an explicit requirement. Here we deal with
different type of stability requirements. i.e. the .\ conditions (6.124). These conditions ensure
that the Lyapunov equations (6.125) are uniquely solvable. The solvability of the last equations
(6.126) is however unclear: in the one-player case it was shown that the left-hand side of (6.126)
is decreasing in 7  for -,  > - - (Lemma 6.3.8). In the \ -player case, we deal with a coupled sys-
tem of \ nonlinear equations in the .\ unknowns -1. . . . . 1, which need to be solved in a set I ,
defined as the collection of .\ -tuples (7 1. . . . .1, }o f nonzero real numbers with the property that
there exists an .\ -tuple .\'  . . . . , . \ ' \· satisfying (6.122)-(6.124).
In the rest ofthis section we assume that l)„  = 0 for 1  4 .1 and that /),  :=  D„ is injective for all i
and we consider the simplified two-player scalar case in order to obtain insight in the solvability of
the system (6.122)-(6.126). This is a substantial simplification since the matrix (2, becomes zero
for each  i.  This  is due to the input-output structure considered in this chapten  This in contrast to
the "C. 1. B. (,1. R )" setting considered in Chapters 5 and 7. It shows that the input-output setting
is mathematically more structured.
The unknowns /', can immediately be eliminated from the system (6.122)-(6.126). Denote .i·,  : =
.\', . ci := .-1. .:, := .K„ and, = E, then this system reduces to
·1'1..1'22  0 (6.129)
/,2    \ .,
20.1· i-2.42·t' 1 1.2 +1  -I-·' 1  ).1.i  = C). (6.130)
CDt    /
//2    \
4.t·2 -2.i,t.1.,·2 + <= - .'2) .ri=
0: (6.131)
. f (p, - 4, 11'.1 1- 17 1, <
C). (6.132)
\ 31
,;  -  ..1 .r 1   +     -i  -  .' 2    ·1 2<
(1: (6.133)
:2
2          21·t   / .   ,   ( , "                             \    1                                                            (6.134)./. 1  - -
Ca
It a, -01    4 -"2·i.2   71
/ 1
122 1 - /,2 \ j (6.135)
.t'j = -  tr, - ·41.1'1 +  3 - ·01) .1.2  3.j.
Motivated by Remark 6.4.2 we exclude the existence of the trivial equilibrium by assuming that
b >0.
System (6.129)-(6.135) should be interpreted as follows. Conditions (6.129)-(6.133) define a re-
gion r C #/i of pairs (- 1.7 2 ) such that a solution {.1·1..,·z i of (6.129)-(6.133) exists if and only
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if C -,1· 12 1  E  I: By substituting such a solution in equations (6.134) and (6.135) a system of two
nonlinear equations in 71  and 72 results. A solution of this system in 1- defines a risk-sensitive
memoryless perfect state Nash equilibrium via (6.127). Instead of working with the variables
.t' 1 ·.t' 2 and   i . 72  it is more convenient to apply the decoupled coordinate transformations
6 :- ·.t·t'i (6.136)
(6.137):-', 1,
which are regular transformations if and only  if .:,  4 0. Under these transformations, the system
(6.129)-(6.135) changes into
fl· 6 20: (6.138)
2661  - 2£1 42 + 41 (j  = 0: 286 - 266 + 224 = 0. (6.139)
8 + 21<1 - (2<0: 0-6 + 296  < 0. (6.140)
 42+1)2 = p'(0 + +•1 1 - &b   <f(....2 + 1)2 = /,2{("1 - &+ 26) (6.141)
where we have defined the numbers
21.I€2
p, :=    J.   .   i = 1.2. (6.142)
Instead of determining the set 1' we shall determine the set fl which is defined in such a way that
a solution (6 1.6 2) o f (6.138)-(6.140) exists  if and  only  if C.et ...·2 )   E   Q.   From (6.137)  we  see
that fi should be contained in  the  set  {C .»,1, +'2 ) |21 . 42   >   -1} .   Note  that  in the limit case 41   =
22  - -1, which corresponds with -1 1   =  72  =x (the undisturbed case), equations (6.139) agree
with the hyperbola equations (5.36) and (5.37) in the degenerate case crl  = 02 - 0. In this case,
the hyperbolas are just a pair of lines, i.e. the asymptotes.  In the disturbed case 4,2  > -1  the
equations for the two pairs of lines are
61 -0.   6 - (wi/2)61 + i: (6.143)
6 -0.  61 = (2112)£2 + i. (6.144)
The first of the pair of lines described by (6.143) coincides with the 6-axis and the second inter-
sects the 6-axis at 62 =   under an angle between - arctati 1/2 and 3/2 depending on the value
of w,.  Similarly, the first of the pair of lines described by (6.144) coincides  with the <1 -axis and
the second intersects the 41 -axis at 41  = a under an angle between zero and arctan 1/2 + ir/2
depending on the value of wl.  We are interested in each intersection point of the two pairs satis-
fying (6.138) and (6.140). Furthermore, for each intersection point E' we want to determine the
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set (1' defined as the collection of points { -1.--A  with -·   >  -land such that <c' satisfies (6.138)
and (6.140).  The  set 9 1 is then the union of these sets t j,.  It is easily seen that zero. one or three
intersection points of the two pairs of lines satisfying (6.138) exist, i.e.
/      28\
6/= (11.- 3-) 44       4/<  0.
2 -  C- Va. 0) 4  +.1 <0:=I
28
C·' - 4=,2 +2.-»·1 +2) ** -·i«·2< 1.<-
1 -  2/ 22
The intersection points <0  and £-2 also satisfy the stability requirements (6.140) under the condi-
tions  4,   <   0  and  +·1    < (}, respectively. However, the third intersection point 6.2 satisfies these
stability requirements if and only if 41.2 <0. Under this condition the condition 41 -·2<lalso
holds. We conclude that
1 2'   ={{.i...'1 1   (E   #f2121   >   -1.        -1<  .22   <0} :
11« i. ((21·22) fE # 21-1 <21 <0.  -1 <22'
fl'= {(4.42) e /921-1< 41< 0.  -1 < 49<0}.
If only one of the numbers z is negative. the system (6.138)-(6.140) has one solution, if they
are both negative. this system has three different solutions. The next step is to substitute for each
C zi . 4, )  (E  fi' the corresponding solution <'  in (6.141) and tosolve the resulting equations in fl'.  It
is immediately clear that substituting 61  in the first equation of (6.141 ) results in an equation with
a zero left-hand side and a nonzero right-hand side for each C.»· i..»·,)  E  f )'. Hence the resulting
equation is unsolvable in !1 1. For similar reasons. substituting :- in the second equation of (6.141)
leads to an unsolvable equation in IP. Thus in the present case intersection point 61 is the only
possibility to obtain a risk-sensitive memoryless perfect state Nash equilibrium from Theorem
6.4.3.  Substituting E,t in the equations (6.141) results  in the following system of two equations:
1/1(wl + 1 )2(42 + 2) = 1,1.«·1(1 - -'i.«·21 M (6.145)
Whpt l pAi +2} = *,22&1-420· (6.146)
Equation (6.145) is linear in .c,. Thus from this equation «·2 can be determined as a function of
21. This function is a quotient of two quadratic polynomials. which can be substituted in equation
(6.146). This results in a fifth-order polynomial equation in +·i .  At this point analytic computa-
tions seem to end: of course one can proceed straightforwardly in concrete situations.
By considering the two-player scalar case. the complexity of the set of conditions given in The-
orem 6.4.3 has become clear. In general. numerical techniques are required to obtain solutions
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from this system. More theoretical research is required to obtain structural results about the solv-
ability of the nonlinear equations in the unknowns 79  in the set I'.  One can easily construct scalar
examples with three risk-sensitive memoryless perfect state Nash equilibria where the set of suf-
ficient conditions as given in Theorem 6.4.3 only describes one of them. This shows the need
of necessary and sufficient conditions characterizing all risk-sensitive memoryless perfect state
Nash equilibria. Such conditions have been found in the deterministic case in Chapter 5. It is a
challenge to see whether necessary and sufficient conditions can be found here along the same
lines.
6.5 Concluding Remarks
An overview of the problems studied and the results obtained in the Sections 6.2 and 6.3 can be
found in the Sections 8.2.2 and 8.2.3. Concluding remarks on risk-sensitive Nash equilibria are
contained in Section 8.1.4. This section also discusses the relation between these equilibria and
other robust equilibria introduced in this thesis. Section 6.3 has been presented at the Ninth Inter-
national Symposium on Dynamic Games and Applications [28]. A preliminary version of Section
6.4 has been presented at the same conference [26].
Chapter 7
Robust Equilibria with Unbounded
Disturbances
7.1     Introduction
The soft-constrained differential game ([9]. see also Section 6.3 of the present thesis) has been
introduced in the literature in order to solve the disturbance attenuation (or H.x control) problem
using zero-sum game theory. The criterion in the disturbance attenuation problem, i.e. the H:
norm, is in terms of a supremum taken over norm bounded disturbances. The soft-constrained
differential game criterion has an additional negatively weighted explicit quadratic disturbance
term and furthermore, the supremum is taken over all disturbances without requiring the norm to
be bounded. In Chapter 6 we studied the disturbance attenuation problem; in contrast with the ex-
isting literature, we studied this problem with known nonzero initial state. This setting has been
generalized to the .\--player case, i.e.  in 6.4 we introduced the concept of risk-sensitive memo-
ryless perfect state equilibria in the context of deterministically disturbed differential games  with
norm bounds on the disturbance. To make the picture complete, we study in the present chap-
ter deterministically disturbed differential games without norm bounds; instead we add negative
terms to the cost criteria of the players. Furthermore, the information structure of the players is
assumed to be a feedback pattern. Clearly, the soft-constrained differential game is the basis for
such a setting.
In Section 7.2 we consider the one-player case. i.e. we shall only be concerned with the soft-
constrained differential game. Instead of an input-output formulation as in Chapter 6, which leads
automatically to a positive semi-definite state weighting matrix in the cost functional, we consider
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here a cost criterion without assuming the state weighting matrix to be positive semi-definite, i.e.
we consider an indefinite soft-constrained differential game. In this respect, which is in line with
the indefinite setting of Chapter 5. we differ from approaches usually taken; see for instance [9.
50.128], [10, Section 6.6], or [76, Section 20.2].  For that reason the derivation of a saddle-point
solution in Section 7.2 is self-contained; links with the analysis in Section 6.3 are obvious.  A set of
sufficient conditions for the existence of this saddle-point solution involving an algebraic Riccati
equation and inequality will be found. The appearance of the Riccati matrix inequality is due to
the possible indefiniteness of the state weighting matrix. Section 7.2 ends with a study about the
necessity of the sufficient conditions. It turns out that under a restriction of the admissible set of
state feedback matrices. the algebraic Riccati equation is a necessary condition for the solvability
of the minmax problem.
In Section 7.3 the setting of an X-player deterministically disturbed differential game with soft-
constrained cost criteria is introduced. We shall define an equilibrium concept called the soft-
constrained feedback Nash equilibrium and the sufficiency result of Section 7.2 can immediately
be applied to formulate a set of sufficient conditions in terms of systems of algebraic Riccati equa-
tions and inequalities generating such equilibria. The two-player case is worked out in more de-
tail. Surprisingly, the algebraic Riccati inequalities are automatically satisfied in this case.
It is well-known that there is a connection between the H: control problem and the risk sensitive
LQG (or LEQG) control problem. (see for instance [62, 53] or 19. Section 4.7]) Consequently.
the soft-constrained feedback Nash equilibrium concept can easily be interpreted stochastically
by considering LEQG cost criteria. This connection will be made in Section 7.4 for which we
use the infinite horizon results from Runolfsson [107]. Games with exponential-of-integral cost
criteria are referred to as risk-sensitive dynamic games. Such games were recently studied in a
finite-horizon discrete-time linear-quadratic context in [68].
7.2 Indefinite Soft-Constrained Differential Games
In this section we study the one-player case, i.e. we consider a linear system
.i·= C.-1 + BF).r + E,t·. .t·(0)=.ro. (7.1)
with  ( .1. B} stabilizable. The control feedback matrix is assumed  to  be  in  the  set  F.    By  def-
inition. the stabilizability of {.1. 8 ) ensures  that Y  96   0. The disturbance  w is assumed  to be
an element of the Hilbert space L 4( 0. x ). The soft-constrained cost criterion is the functional
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./: f ./.1(0. x). R' » R, defined by
./ c /. lt...to)=
.1  (.1,7 ((2 + /.· I.R/.').1.- 11'1 1 "it')
dt. (7.2)
0
The matrices Q. R and 1 are symmetric. R > 0, and 1   >0. The soft-constrained differential
game is the situation where the controller designer is minimizing the criterion (7.2) by choosing
an appropriate F e Y-, while the uncertainty is maximizing the same criterion by choosing an
appropriate  ti·  €   l. 3(0.x). Since we do not assume the matrix Q to be positive semi-definite we
refer to this game as the indefnite soft-constrained di#erential game. Having the generalization
to the .\-player case in mind, we are interested in the upper value of this game.  To be precise, we
study the following problem.
Problem 7.2.1 Determine, if it exists, for each .1·0 *E  #i" the value
1llill    sul)    ./(/i. tt·..t·t) . (7.3)
1-EY 1, EL;((J.... )
Furthermore, if this value exists. determine a matrix 1·' C Y attaining this value.                          0
Remark 7.2.2  If (2 is positive semi-definite and if 1    -  72/ for some 7  4  C). (7.3) equals the
upper value of the soft-constrained differential game as considered by BaFar and Bernhard [9] with
a feedback information pattern for the minimizing player and an open-loop information pattern
for the maximizing player. Under the condition that (.1. Q i /2 ) has no unobservable modes on the
imaginary  axis  and  that both players  have a closed-loop perfect state information pattern,  they
have shown [9, Theorem 4.8'] that this upper value is finite if and only if 7 is sufficiently large.
Furthermore, in this case, the upper value is equal to the lower value. This common value equals
.15-rt'o where X  is the stabilizing solution of an algebraic Riccati equation.                                     0
The aim here is twofold. Firstly, the aim is to generalize the results of Ba ar and Bernhard to a
framework with a general symmetric matrix Q, i.e.  it will be shown (Theorem 7.2.4 and Corol-
lary 7.2.5 below) under an extra assumption that if the relevant algebraic Riccati equation has a
stabilizing solution satisfying an additional stability requirement, the value (7.3) can be obtained
from a saddle-point solution for the game C.F. L.ICO. x)../C ·....ro)). A second aim is to obtain a
converse statement. i.e.  to show that if the value (7.3) exists, the stabilizing solution of the rel-
evant algebraic Riccati equation also exists (Theorem 7.2.7 below).  For the second purpose, it
turns out that the set of linear stabilizing state feedback controls needs to be further restricted.
As a preliminary result the following lemma concerning the system (7.1) with the criterion (7.2)
is needed.
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Lemma 7.2.3 Let.h := BR-'H'.11' := l.'1.-    E '· .   Let  X   be  an  arbitrary  symmetric  11   ,   31
matrix, then
./( F. „·..ro) =.rl .\'.ro + 1  (.t.T((2 + .11.\. + .\..1 - .r.<.\. + .vii..\. ).1.+
0
+ |{ / + R-1 Bt .\.).1.11 - |11.- 1 -   /:'I .\'.1'11 ) (it.     (7.4)\.)
Proof According to Lemma 2.1.2..1·{ 1 1 - O for t » x. Thus
(1
./C F. "'··10) = .i "  .1.7{(2 + t. t Ri' ).,· - u. r i '11· + -.1·I .\'.1. - 12.'.1 \..r) di =1 1 dt j
i)
=.t',< X.t'i, +    .1'r((2 + .\..1 + .1,.\.).1. +.rt /..' R/·'.1· + 2.,·i /.,1 / 1 .rr+
0
-lt.1 1 u' + 2it·' I..'t'X.r) di.
Hence, the two completions of the squares
.t·7'/·'7'19/·' t. + 2.1.7 ,·THT.\..1. = 1{ 11·' + /1 -1 RT.\. 1.1.12  - .1.1..\.,4-r.1R
and
u.rt U, - 211,7 /.·I .\'.t' = Ill' -   -1 A.I .\..2.12  - .,1 XII.X.,·.1/
show that (7.4) holds.                                                                                                         0
This lemma shows that if.\' satisfies the algebraic Riccati equation (7.5). an optimal choice for the
minimizing player is -/t-1 IT.\.. which is an admissible choice if .\' is the stabilizing solution
of this equation.  If the maximizing player would be restricted to choose linear state feedback
matrices as well. his optimal choice would have been the state feedback matrix 1- ' /·.'I .\..  The
next theorem shows that under the open-loop information structure. the optimal choice for the
maximizing player, given that the minimizing player chooses - R-' Br.\.. can indeed be obtained
from the feedback law .i·  »  1-' A' T.\'.r. This theorem provides a set of sufficient conditions for
a saddle-point solution to exist. Consequently, it also generates the upper value of the indefinite
differential game, i.e. a solution of Problem 7.2.1.
Theorem 7.2.4 Consider the linear system (7.1) and  the quadratic costhinctional (7.2). Assitme
thatthematrices Hand\  are positive definite. Let K .-  Hli-'Bl,\\. :=  E.\ - 1·:'. Assume
that the algebraic Riccati equation
9  +  .1 I x  +  .\.. 1-  .\..K.\.  +  xiI  .\.  = 0 (7.5)
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has a stabilizing  solution  X.   Assume that  .4 -  K X  is  stable.   Furthermore.  assume  that there
exists a real symmetric i  . 11 matrix 3 " . that satisfies the matrix ineqi,ality
Q+.Irl + 1 .1- 3 .....1 20. (7.6)
Defne
F:=-R-, Lit.r. (7.7)
TF(t) := et(-1-NX+11'\')ru. (7.8)
Then t. f YandTF E  /.1(O. x),and the pairt 1·'.Ti' jisasaddle-pointsolutionforthe two-person
zero-sum ganle
C F. L 3(O.x) . .J C· . . . .r o) ) . (7.9)
The value of this game  is equal to .r61 X .r o.
Proof The matrices.·1-,<.\'  and .-1 - .v.\'  +  11'.\' are stable by assumption, which implies that
T E Y and ir E Ll{O. x ), respectively. According to Lemma 7.2.3 we have
.t(t:„...r,)=.,·  X,·st f (1(t·'-F).,1  -1.·- 1 -'ET.';.1.1:.j dl. (7.10)
(}
This shows that the feedback matrix F satisfies the maximization property of a saddle-point so-
lution. In fact, it follows that
./(F. it·..t·o) = .t· 'X.t'o -    |ti' - 1 '-1 Er.\..i.12 cit 5 .t·&.\'.ro.,
0
where .i· is generated by
.i. = (-1 + BT).i + Ew.   .i·CO) =.t·o.
Furthermore. if ./(il·'. u·..ro) = .t·Q .\'.t·t, then u· = if. Hence
./(F. w..t·u) < .t·tf.\'.ro forall 11· 96 u. and./(F.IF..ro) = .t· X.i·o. (7.11)
The next aim is to show that ./ C /·'. ir..t·o ) - ./C T. 7F..t·t, ) is nonnegative for all  j·'  E  Y.  Let the state
variables .i· and 7 be generated by
.i= C.it BF).i·+Eir.   .i·(01= .4.
Y =(.1 + B/·'17 + ETF.  1(0)=.ro·
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Define furthermore
//:
C F-  I·' ),i·,
C :=1-1.-'ET.\..i..
Then
./ C /·'. Ir..,0)   -  ./ C T. 9..t·o) = 1  ovlf, -  KIE) d'.
tj
This expression can be rewritten in the following way.  Let E: =r-  .i.  Then
5 - C.-1 + H/·'):F - (.1 + B/·').i· = (.1 + BF)6 + 19(F - /·').2 =
= C --1 + lf77)6 + Ht'. (7.12)
Furthermore. CCO) = 0 and C = 1 --i A'T.\.4. Hence





Since.i·. :Fe  LS'CO. x),it follows that< E  LWCO. x) and v E  L,"'CO.x).  So & e  L&' CO.x) and
thus Lemma 2.1.2 implies that EC / )  -4  0 for / »x. Together with 61 0 ) =0 this shows that
1 d ext,lt =0.




./C/·'. Te..i·t,) - ./(T. TF..ro) =    <1'I Rp - ET.\.11.-\-F - 1-ST.\'E  di =
-      (11.
0
=   (1,1 „t. -21'Ht.\.6 - 6,(.9.\. + A..1- 2.\'.<.\. + .vii..\' )6) dt =
0
-j (li.- A-1 H, .\.612 - '57-(.17'.\' + X.4 - .\'.f:X + .\'11-X )6  dt =\ R
0
= f (1" + 7.El« + s'Qs) .„-
i)
Next, define w :=  v +  /·'4.  Then (7.12) shows that E  =  .4 6+ /32. Since ((0)  =0 and ((t) - ,0
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Hence
.J (1".Te. suj - IJ (F.IF..rl,)= . .  1 114 + t'Qi + 11--tr 3.  Ilt =(It
=  . (...7 /A... + 2-·I. 19Tl .  + ET((J +  .ttl.  +  1  .1)6) dt  =
U
= i/   1-' + R-1871.'51  + Et ((2 + ..11 1. + )..1 - 3-3.1.1<'  (/1 2 0.
R
where the final inequality follows by assumption.                                                            0
The proof clearly shows that if Q  2  0, the claim of the theorem follows without the condition
(7.6).  Alternatively, note that if Q  2  0. this condition is in fact trivially satisfied by choosing
3    =  t). An immediate consequence of Theorem 7.2.4 is the following corollary, which provides
a solution for Problem 7.2.1 under the conditions of Theorem 7.2.4.
Corollary 7.2.5 Consider  Problem 7.2.1.  Let the assumptions  of Theorem 7.2.4  be ftilfilled and
let  X.T. and    be as  in this  theorem.  Then
Inill      Sup      .1(/·'. 11'..ro ) =     max     .1(/•'. lt·..t·o)  = .rl..\'.1'0. (7.13)
F€·F,t•€L O. x I it·EL.4, (0. x.)
max       inf  .1(/·'. it·..t·o)  =  nzin IICi'. ..1'01  =  .1· X.t·o. (7.14)
„·€L (0.2 hF€F F EF
The rest of this section is devoted to the derivation of a converse statement. i.e. showing that if
(7.13) holds for some  F  EY, then the algebraic Riccati equation (7.5) has a solution. It turns out
that the set of admissible state feedback matrices needs to be restricted in order to obtain such a
result. The following theorem is a preliminary result.
Theorem 7.2.6 Consider the system
.i· = .1.r + Eit·. (7.15)
with.\ stable and the costftinctional 9 : 1.3(0. x) ,  11 " » IR, defined by
7-(tt'..ro ) =
ul(.1'  (1.1' - U'rl  ft,)
(/t. (7.16)
with (2  -  Qr, \-  >  0, and .r is generated by (7.15) with initial state .ro.  Let \\   ..  E\"-1 ET .
The following conditions are equivalent:
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(i)  For each.ro  E #7" there existsa TFE  l.1(0. x)such that .,2(11·..rt,)  5  4(TF..ro).
(ii)  The  Hamiltonia,i matrix
F ..1      it.  1
H ,= 1-9 -ATJ
(7.17)
has no eigenvalues on the imaginary axis.
(iii) The algebraic Riccati equation
9 + All +.\.1 + Illx = 0 (7.18)
has a stabilizing solution.
Assume  that  these  statements  hold. Then the  maximum of pl ...ru)  is  uniquely attained  by
Ti,(1) .= 1 -1 £7 Xe'(.1+11.X).ro (7.19)
where X  is the stabilizing solution of 0.18). Furthermore 4(-ir. ro) = .rl X .ru.
Proof The equivalence between the statements (i). (ii), and (iii) is proven via the cycle (i) »
(ii) =*  (iii) » (i). The second part of the theorem is contained in the proof of (iii) 4  (i)
(i) » (ii): This implication is shown via the maximum principle for infinite horizon problems
[30,108]. Let.ro  E  #f" and IF be the element of LICO. x.) corresponding to statement (i). Denote
the state trajectory corresponding to IF by Y.  Then the maximum principle implies that there exists
a costate variable P such that
7 =.ly + EW.    40)=.rit.
b - -(27 -AT p
Tf'(1) = arg inax (3(t )1'(27(1) - 47 14 + 21,( t )1.-17(t) + 2p(t )TE.c) .
,€ Ry
A completion of the squares shows that
- 4 I j .2 + 2 /, ( t ) / t.,2 = - ( 4 - 1 - 1 E 1- /, ( 1 ) ) T 1 ( .e _   · - 1 E I P ( t ) ) - p ( t ) 1.11. p ( t ) .
Since 1   > 0, it follows that fi'(t} = 1.-1 ET/,Ct) Hence
Fil - F -1    tt' 1 F  ] .. H I11.  -'co) = .t·'.
Lid - L- 0 -..1Tj [1,]    [1'J
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Since F e  /.11(}.x) and .-1 is stable. 7 E  /.3(().xI. Thus Y e  l.;CO. x) and according to
Lemma 2.1.2. this implies that -1-Ct)»0 fort  »  x for all .rci E  #t". This shows that the spectral
subspace corresponding to the eigenvalues  in the open left-half plane has at least dimension  11.
Since // is an Hamiltonian matrix this implies that // has no eigenvalues on the imaginary axis.
(ii) »  (iii): This implication follows from 1128, Theorem 13.6]. which states that if //  has no
imaginary eigenvalues and 1 1'i s either positive semi-definite or negative semi-definite, then (iii)
holds ifand only if C.1.1 1' )i s stabilizable. Clearly. here 1 1'i s positive semi-definite and.lis stable
implying that (ii) * (iii) immediately follows.
(iii) » (i): Let u• E  /.1(0. x } and .1·0 6 #2". Let .1· be generated by (7.15). Since .1 is stable,
1. E Li'(C)· x). Thus .i· e L ((1. x) and according to Lemma 2.1.2. this implies that .1·(/1 -4 0
for all 1  -4 x. Hence a completion of the squares shows that




f I„·- /--'t'.'' X.,·IT 'ii.
IJ
Hence Y-(ti'..,·0)  5  .1.,i.\'.1.0 and equality holds if and only if u·  =  1- t ET.t·. Substituting this in
(7.15)  shows  that ,=C ·,.'·u ) is uniquely maximized by,i as defined by  (7.19).                                          0
Motivated by this result the set of admissible state feedback matrices is restricted in the following
way. Define for each /'' C F the Hamiltonian matrix
//, := 1 -   .1 +
HF
11'       1 (7.20)-Cj - FrRF -CA+BF)11
Furthermore, define the subset Y C Y o f state feedback matrices by
Y := {/·' E Fl//,has noeigenvalues onthe imaginary axis}. (7.21)
Within this set of feedback matrices a converse statement can be formulated as follows.
Theorem  7.2.7   Let  K  : = B Jr' HT. \r  :=  E \-1 E.1 . Assume there exists an 1·' E Y stick tliat
for each .1·„  E  IR"  the following holds:
Hlit Slll) ./ 1 /.'. tt...A) = iliax    ./C /·'. w..1·„). (7.22)
FET .€L3(0. r 1 "EL,fil}.-4
Then the algebraic Riccati eqi,ation
(2 +.lix +.\.1- X.N.\. +.\.11..\. = (1 (7.23)
hasastabilizing solution X.  Furthermore, the matrix.\-  NX  is stable.
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Proof   Let /·' e Y. Since H+· has no imaginary eigenvalues on the imaginary axis. the second
statement of Theorem 7.2.6 holds with .1, (2, and 4 { 11'..1'0) replaced by .1 + /3/·', (2 + f.'TRF.
and ./{ /·: tt·. .t·Ii ), respectively. Hence, according to this theorem.
7< i: .1'„1 :=     111aX    ./{ 11': tr..1'0 J = .t'I.l'( 1.' 1.t'i,.
'1€L;(o. x I
where  i:  F  -  #t „ W , is defined by  i· :F  e  .\'  with  .\' the stabilizing solution of the algebraic
Riccati equation
(2 + /·'' /(/·'+ (-1 + /3/.'11.\. + A. (.1+13/·') +.\'It .\' = 4.
Since eigenvalues depend continuously on the corresponding matrix elements [61, Appendix D],
the set Y is open. The subset Y is open for the same reason.  In [76, Section  11.3]  it has been
shown that the maximal solution of
.\ ('t)b{11).\ (il)- .\ (v ).-i(p,- .iT(/1).\Itt)- (.(11) = t) (7.24)
is a real-analytic function of k real variables F  E fi, where i 1 is an open connected set in #1 if
(i)  .i l i t) ,  ( 'C B M,  and  b{ it 1 depend in  the  same way on Et.  (ii )  /){ P ) is positive semi-definite.  (iii)
c.i c p) . b l i t) )i s stabilizable.  and (iv) the matrix
E-..11/1) bl/,)1
L (:(/1}  .ic/t)'.1
has no eigenvalues on the imaginary axis for all 11   E fi. Under the conditions (ii) and (iii),
the maximal solution of (7.24) coincides with the unique solution of (7.24) for which (7(.1(11) -
DC F ).\ C P ) )  lies  in the closed left-half plane [76, Theorem 7.9.3].  Note  that  -.\'  is the maximal
solution of (7.24) with .-1(#t) = .21 + BF, ('(it) = -(2 - 1.7 R/.'. b(it) = 11'. and 6, = vec· F.
Clearly, condition (i) and (ii) hold; condition (iii) follows from the stability of .·1 + B j·'. and con-
dition (iv) follows from the easily verifiable fact that the matrices //F and
F  -.1 - Ht 11. 1
1-(2 - /.,7. RF  (.1+ 8,77
have the same spectrum. Hence. i· is an analytic function of /· in any open connected subset
of .F.  In particular Y is differentiable with respect to /·' in such a set.  In the following a differ-
entiation argument is applied to 1, see Section 2.1 for details concerning matrix differentiation.
By assumption, 7 attains its minimum at F  f  F for each.rt,  E #<". Choose an arbitrary open
connected subset ci. of F containing F Since F is open. such a choice is possible.  Then [81,
7. Robust Equilibria with Unbounded Disturbances 157
Section 7.4, Theorem 11 47{ T  .t„: 1/1 = 0 forall increments 1 j·' and for all .1·0 e #t". Since
617{ T..1.„: A /·' )  =  .r  (i L 'C 73: J /" ).rt,. it follows that (i z. '{ /': J /·' 1  -  0  for all increments  A /·'.  or.
equivalently.
Ot.·{ 1.') = 0. (7.25)
Define the transformation \1 1:F    #i" ' " - e."  by
*(/....\.) = (2 + f.'TR/.' + (.1 + H/·.)tx +.\.(.1 + Hi') + .\.11..\..
By definition. we have  *C F. t. 1/'))=  0 for all  F E Y. Taking the derivative of this equality and
applying the chain rule yields
01*( F: t.'{ F)) + 232*( /·: t.·{/·') 1/7,-·{ 1.') = 0 forall /·' e CL
By substituting /·' = /·' and using (7.25) it follows that Rili,PCT. f..Cr) ) = c), or, equivalently,
(it * C F. 0 '{ F): 1/·') - 0 for all J / (7.26)
The differential of * with respect to its first argument with increment) F can easily be computed.
Indeed.
*C/·'+01/.'..\'}- 4,(/'..\)
di *C F..\': 1/·')  =  lini                                                       =
1 ,  -+ (-)                                                                              (1.
n J /• ' 7. ( R /.' + 8 7.-\, 1 + (  ( /., 7. R + B X ) _1 i' + n z _1 F T RJ j. '
= lilli                                                              =
" +0                                                                                 (-1
= AE.r(/11..\' + RF) + C.\'H + 1.'r/T,}JF.
Consequently. using (7.25),
-1/21'(81 2,(F) + RT) + (1.·(T)/f + Fr/7}J/·' = 0 for all J F.
Thus, it follows that url·< F) + RF = 0. or. equivalently, T = -/1-1137'L·( Fl. Substituting this
in * C F. i. 7 /·')) =Oyields
(2 + . iTL.(/) + i·(7'11.1 - 1,·(77).4.,·(77) + 1.·(73)11'l·(77) = 0.
This shows that  .·C /·') satisfies the equation (7.23) and furthermore. since it is the stabilizing so-
lution of the equation * (F. X 1  -  O it follows that.4  +  87- +  11. 6.CT)  - .1  _  .h<{ F)  +  iti.·1 11
is stable. Finally. since /·' e .F, the matrix .1 - .ki.·C /·' I is stable.                                        E
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7.3   Soft-Constrained Nash Equilibria
We apply the theory developed in the previous section to .\"-player infinite-horizon stable deter-
ministically disturbed linear time-invariant differential games. where the information structure of
the players is a feedback pattern and where they are restricted to linear time-invariant strategies.
The cost functions are of the soft-constrained type. Thus the differential equation is
\          \
.i. =  .it X B, Fijl.r + /:'it·. (7.27)
1=1
and the cost function of player i is the functional ./,  : F,  .  /.1 (IJ. x I  ,·  #r  -* R. defined by
71  1   r
·I,(F'i··    · j''x. 11'..i'o) = J  C .rt   (2, + E
F .f  li 1 1  1.'   .i·
-
il•1 \ .1 le   (It
. (7.28)
U\ ./ = 1
The matrices (2, and R„ are without loss of generality assumed to be symmetric and furthermore,
R„  >  u and l, >  (1 for all i  = 1. .\.   It is assumed  that each player looks  for a strategy
minimizing his cost function with a worst-case disturbance. i.e. player i aims to minimize the
adjusted cost function
I,(/i. ./.\..iii) := SUP .41 Fi..    . /'', . ir..r,1 (7.29)
„·E I.'11).    3
For large values of  1 J ,  , the negative disturbance term in the cost function of player i has a rela-
tively high weight. Since player i maximizes over all disturbances in his adjusted cost function,
worst-case disturbances have a relatively small size, i.e. he only incorporates disturbances with
a small size in his adjusted cost function. Hence. large values of Ill,11 express a risky behavior of
player t, and for smaller values of this quantity he is more risk-averse.
Using the adjusted cost functions we define the following equilibrium concept for the differential
game under consideration.
Definition 7.3.1   An  .\ -tuple -F  =   1 721..       .7 1  )   e   Fi   is  called a soft-constrained feedback
Nash equilibrium if for all i the following inequality holds:
.,1,( /·'..t·o) < JAT-,{ f.')..l'  ) (7.30)
for all initial states .r„ and for all /·' E ID„, "   such  that  F_   ( F)  E  Yx.                                                               01/ 1
The following theorem. which is a straightforward generalization of Corollary 7.2.5, in particular
of (7.13), provides  a  set of sufficient conditions to obtain soft-constrained feedback  Nash  equi-
libria.
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Theorem 7.3.2 Consider an  X -player  in nite-horizon  stable  linear  time-invariant  differential
game. where the information structure of the players is a feedback pattern and where  they are
restricted to linear time-invariant strategies.  Let the costfunction of player i  be given by 0.28)
(see Section 2.3 for the terminology and notation).  Assume that the matrices  (2, and  lt„ are sym-
metric and that 11„ > 0 and \," > 0 for all i = 1..   . X. Defne S, .= B, 1{7,  BJ . S„ :-
11,R-„i R,JR-„  13'1 , and \\'i .= E \,-iEl for all i.j = 1.     . N wth,   4  j· Assit„te there exist
X real symmetric ii x n matrices X,. and N real symmetric n :. n matrices 1„ such that
1                               1




..1  -  S  .h.'.r,  +  11.,X, is stable for  each  i  --1.         . N , (7.32)
.J= 1
\
.1 - X .5.\5 is stable: (7.33)
#-1
.\                                                                  \
Qi + ATE+ ¥3 - 1)(¥"'.t, .-, + 1."i.5.11;)- ),44+62)..1.K'.t ., 20 (7.34)
1*i i*i
Then the  X -tuple offeedback matrices 1 Ft.....Fr) with
17,  :=  - RT,1  BI Xi (7.35)
is a soft-constrained feedback Nash equilibrium and
7,(Fi.....Tx..ro}  =.4.r,.i·o (7.36)
Note that if the matrices Q, are positive semi-definite, the inequalities (7.34) are trivially satis-
lied  with  }i   = 0. Similar  sets of algebraic Riccati equations  as (7.31) showed  up in Theorems
5.3.2 and 6.4.3.  The fact that the matrix.4 is replaced by the matrix. i in Theorem 6.4.3 is due to
the input-output structure considered in Chapter 6. It has the advantage among other things that
some additional structural assumption can be imposed on this matrix in order to exclude trivial
equilibria; see Remark 6.4.2. The disturbance term in equation (6.51). i.e.  1,-2.\.1 1.'A't.\.,coin-
cides  with the disturbance  term in equation  (7.31)  if we  set  1,   =   i f/ However, it clearly  has
a different interpretation. Indeed, in Theorem 6.4.3, the parameters -,  are endogenously deter-
mined by equation (6.126). Here the matrices 1, are exogenous parameters. This makes the set
of sufficient conditions of Theorem 7.3.2 easier, at least structurally. The positive definiteness
condition (6.122), i.e. .\', 2 0. only shows up in Theorem 6.4.3. This is due to the positive cost
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functions considered in Chapter 6 (automatically induced by considering an input-output struc-
ture). In contrast to this positivity requirement, the additional stability requirement (7.33) needs to
be imposed in the indefinite cases considered in Chapter 5 and in the present chapter. To end this
discussion. note that in the disturbed case one ends up ,vith the additional stability requirement
(7.34) (or 6.124 in Chapter 6).
In the rest of this section we assume that /4,  =  0 for all i  Fe j and we consider the simplified
two-player scalar case.   Let  ..1  =  ct,  (2,   =c l„  .K,   =  .:„  and  I t, = lt·. Recall  that the numbers
.:, and w, are nonnegative; assume further that .:,  4 0. First. we consider the set of inequalities
(7.34). This system reduces to
qi + 2„1/1 - 2. 26/1.1/2 - ·.1//i 2 0: (7.37)
72 + 2,1,11 - 2.4,1.411/2 - ·'iflf 2 () (7.38)
Under the coordinate transformation  6,    =    », 4,. these inequalities describe regions. borders  of
which are the hyperbolas Ct and C: studied in Section 5.6.  In the next proposition we show that
the inequality constraints are in fact automatically satisfied in the present case.
Proposition 7.3.3 For all real numbers ti. 0. 12· S,31, there exists a pair 1!1,98 satisfying the
inequalities (7.37) and (7.38).
Proof     One can easily geometrically verify the existence of a point on the red  line in Figure 5.1
satisfying the inequalities. This can formally be seen as follows. Substituting
Ul    =   1.          42   =   (a   -   .4 1  f  ) / . ,2
inthe inequalities (7.37) and (7.38)produces /z 2 -(/1/., and (..t/ - ct)2 2 -92.:2. respectively.
Clearly. one can find either a sufficiently small or a sufficiently large value of L which satisfies
both inequalities. L_1.
Thus in the two-player scalar case with zero cross control matrices a set of sufficient conditions
for a soft-constrained feedback Nash equilibrium is given by (7.31)-(7.33). This set reduces in
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this case to
qi + 2,1.t·i + 111.1- ..1 )·ri- 2.»...,·1·r, = (J: (7.39)
,/2 + 2,t.l·2- 2..1.1'1·1·2 + Ct<'2 -·:2 j.1·3 = (J: (7.40)
a + Cui - :1).1.1 - .:2.1,2 < (J: (7.41)
(t - ..1·1·1 + C 11'2 -·'2)4 < 0: (7.42)
Cl - .: 1.t· 1 -.02·t· 2 < (). (7.43)
(7.44)
Under the coordinate transformation 6, = :'.1,. and the notations 0, := .:,0 and 4 := 11',/·., - 1.
this system changes into
at + 2afl  + 21 fi - 261 52  = O:     02 + 2(16 - 261 6 + 48           0 (7.45)
u + $1 6  - 6  < 11: (t - 4 1 + 42<Z < 0: (7.46)
a- 41 -6 < 0. (7.47)
Note that the situation 21   =  42  - -1. which corresponds to  f   = 0, agrees  with the undisturbed
case. i.e. with the system (5.36)-(5.38). Apparently, essentially two extra parameters. i.e. 4 and
2„ and also two extra linear inequalities appear in the disturbed case compared to the undisturbed
case. The number of soft-constrained equilibria generated by Theorem 7.3.2 equals the number
of intersection points of the curves described by (7.45), henceforth denoted by Ct  and Cz, respec-
tively, which lie in the intersection of halfplanes described by the inequalities (7.46) and (7.47).
hencefurth denoted  by  .1'.
Proposition 7.3.4 The curves C, and C, are hyperbolas.
Proof    We only prove this proposition for Ci : the proof forC, is similan Rewrite the first equation
of (7.45) as
[C 1            FE,1                      [-4,  11
c i        6, j   .1,·,    1  : ,1    -12„       t, 1    1
[<2.1 [#23 - '71 = t)·   ·4CI :=    1    0 
The matrix .121 has eigenvalues
«,    , ». 1 9  +  IiI  +  fA t   : =  - -2    -   v             4
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It is easily seen that Al  <  0 and A,  >0 for all values of -·1 · Thus. since .1·,  has a negative and a
positive eigenvalue, the curve C, is a hyperbola.                                                                   0
Unfortunately. one can easily construct examples (take for instance a =  1. 41  =2, and 42  =  1)
such that the constraint set .1' is empty. In such cases it can immediately be concluded that no
soft-constrained equilibria can be obtained from Theorem 7.3.2. The fact that situations exist in
which no equilibria are generated by Theorem 7.3.2, shows once more the importance of studying
the necessity of the sufficient conditions listed in this theorem.
7.4 Stochastic Interpretation
The theory of Sections 7.2 and 7.3 can be interpreted stochastically by means of a linear expo-
nential quadratic Gaussian (LEQG) criterion. The aim of the present section is only to show the
outlines of this stochastic interpretation and not to discuss the model itself in detail.  The one-
player problem is as follows.
Problem 7.4.1 Consider a linear noisy system
.i'  =  ..1.r  +  B u  +  A' 11' (7.48)
with it· a stationary white Gaussian noise with zero mean and covariance F.  tr{ t ) NCT) I.)  =  3( / -
:- 9. and the cost functional L   Y -* 87, defined by
L C t. 1 =Ilii, 1 1"RE,·N 1,  - -i .f (.t·to.i· + 1,7. Hit) ,// 
. (7.49)
\ ,0
The number o is positive, the matrices (2 and R are positive semi-definite and positive definite,
respectively. Determine,  if it exists, a feedback matrix  F  f  Y such that  L{F)   5   L C /·' )  for all
F E Y.                                                                                      0
It is well-known that this problem is related to the H. control problem [53.62,1071. Runolfsson
11071 has shown that a solution of Problem 7.4.1 can be obtained from the stabilizing solution of
the algebraic Riccati equation
0 + .17..\. + X.1 - X.K.\. + s.-crEET, = 0.   S := HH-t HT. (7.50)
which also generates the saddle-point solution for the soft-constrained differential game related
to the H. control problem [9]  for i sufficiently large. More precisely.  if C (2..4 ) is observable, a
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positive number - - can be defined such that (7.50) has a positive semi-definite stabilizing solution
if and only  if 1   >   - -.  In that case the matrix.1-.h.\' is also stable. Runolfsson [107. Example 3.1]
proved under an additional controllability assumption that this stabilizing solution also generates
the  solution for Problem 7.4.1 as stated  by the next theorem.
Theorem 7.4.2 Consider Problem 7.4.1. Assume that C.\. H) and C.-\.1·.j are controllable and
that (Q. .\) is observable.  Let 1.  be the infimum of all numbers -t for which the algebraic Riccati
equation (7.49) has a positive semi-definite stabilizing solution X .  Ut  \- .'4 X , 1· j is controllable.
then-F :=  - Ii-' lil X  is a solution of Problem 7.4.1 and /.(T)= 1/(21.2)tr{/·.'t..\.E).
The link between this theorem and Theorem 7.2.4 is obvious.
Next, consider an \-player infinite-horizon stable stochastically disturbed linear time-invariant
differential game, where the information structure of the players is a feedback pattern and where
they are restricted to linear time-invariant strategies. See Problem 7.4.1  for the precise assump-
tions concerning the noise. The system equation is
1     1
.i =  . i t Z 13,1..,/1 .1' +
1':11. (7.51)
./= 1
and the cost function of player i is the functional L,  : Fr  -*  #f, defined by
1 1 / \
L il 1.'j .. . F, ) =  liin  - log 1·: pxi,-
<f'' ' t'2, + x F,«R„ F,j .1 cl,  .     C. )7' » » 1' 9-z-" .; ..1
The numbers „ are positive, the matrices R, are symmetric, and the matrices Q, and R„ are
positive semi-definite and positive definite. respectively.
Definition 7.4.3   An  .\ -tuple  F  =  C /·' t. . Fx ) E Y.\· is called an LEQG feedback Nash equi-
librium if for all i the following inequalities hold:
L,(P') 5 ./,(/·'-,(F)) (7.53)
for all matrices /:'. and for all /·' e 111 such that /·'_,C t,) E Y.\.                                 0
Theorem 7.4.2 can straightforwardly be generalized to the .1--player case, i.e. we easily obtain
the following result.
164 7.5. Concluding Remarks
Proposition 7.4.4 Define S, .- B, RT.' Bl and S., := B, R-;  1{„ R-„' B ,1 forall i.j = 1.    . X
with i  *  j.  Assume there exist  J  real symmetric 11  1  11  matrices satisfying
.r, 20: (7.54)
\                                                     \
9, + . 11 X,  + .\,..1 - E ( X' .. ' .\5  + .\. ' .5 X, 1 - .r' .S .\., + E .\., th.,1.\.,  +
.itt 1*1
+ 1,-2.\.,1.'ETx, = 0. (7.55)
\
i := .1 - \- .hi.\., + 7,-JEEI.\'; is stablefori = 1..   ..1 (7.56)
,=1
\,
1 := .-1 - S .F'.\., is stable·. (7.57)
,= /
CL.,8,1,Cl. E}, and l.\'.E) are controllable for i -1.. .Ni (7.58)
tV,. A, j is observable. (7.59)
Then the  N -tuple ffeedback matrices (F,.. . /·'x  )   with
77,   : =   - / - '  B,TE
is a LEQG feedback Nash equilibrium and
/.,(F) = { 1/27/,tr (/:7.X,E)
A link between this proposition and Theorem 7.3.2 is obvious; for a more detailed analysis of the
conditions listed in this proposition we refer to the discussion following that theorem.
7.5 Concluding Remarks
Concluding remarks on the indefinite soft-constrained differential game are given in Section 8.2.4.
The soft-constrained feedback Nash equilibrium concept and its relation to other robust equilib-
rium concepts introduced in this thesis are discussed in Section 8.1.4. A preliminary version of
this chapter has been presented by J.C. Engwerda at the Fourteenth International Symposium of




8.1.1 Moving Horizon Strategies
In Chapter 3 we have introduced a moving horizon solution concept for.\ -player infinite-horizon
time-invariant differential games. Below we summarize the definition, the main theorems, coro!-
laries, propositions, and figures, as listed in the following table.
page number page number
Definition 3.2.1    : 32 Corollary 3.3.2      :           36
Theorem 3.3.1      : 35 Proposition 3.2.2    :           33
Theorem 3.3.7     : 39 Proposition 3.3.3   :          37
Theorem 3.3.9     : 41 Proposition 3.3.4   :          38
Theorem 3.3.11   : 42 Proposition 3.3.5   :          38
Theorem 3.4.4      : 56 Figure 3.2              :           43
Theorem 3.4.5     : 58 Figure 3.5            :          55
Theorem 3.4.8     : 61 Figure 3.6            :          59
Figure 3.7            :          62
In Definition 3.2.1 the moving horizon solution concept has been defined. Moving horizon strate-
gies have the property that at each point in time 1 the actions of the players correspond to initial ac-
tions of an open-loop Nash equilibrium on the time horizon It. 1 + Ll, for some fixed horizon length
L.   The  time-invariance of the differential game has been exploited to construct time-invariant
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moving horizon strategies. How these specific moving horizon strategies can be determined has
been formulated in Proposition 3.2.2.
The moving horizon concept has been further analyzed in a linear-quadratic setting.  In this set-
ting, we have shown in Theorem 3.3.1 that unique moving horizon strategies exist if and only if a
certain matrix is invertible.  It is well-known [45] that open-loop Nash equilibria for finite-horizon
linear-quadratic differential games can be obtained from a system of asymmetric coupled Riccati
differential equations, under the condition that this system has a solution on the complete plan-
ning horizon. Similarly. under the same condition, where one takes the moving horizon length /
as planning horizon. the moving horizon strategies can be obtained from the same system of Ric-
cati equations. This is stated in Corollary 3.3.2. In Theorem 3.3.7. we have shown under certain
conditions that the control functions corresponding to the moving horizon strategies constitute in
the limit L  »  x an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the infinite-horizon game. The series of
Propositions 3.3.3-3.3.5 can be used to determine the moving horizon solution and to study its
stability in more detail. These propositions however require restrictive assumptions on the system
data. Nevertheless, it has been argued that it is not unlikely that these assumptions are satisfied in
applications. Furthermore, they hold in the scalar case; a special case which one often encounters
in economic applications. We studied the scalar moving horizon solution comprehensively in Sec-
tion 3.3.2. In Theorem 3.3.9 it is shown that the moving horizon strategies exist for each horizon
length L. This theorem additionally states that if the open-loop system is stable. the moving hori-
zon closed-loop system  is also stable for each horizon length /.. Alternatively, if the open-loop
system is not stable. a critical value has been determined which has the property that the moving
horizon closed-loop system is stable if and only if the moving horizon length is larger than this
critical value.
The analytic tractability of the moving horizon concept has been illustrated by a government debt
stabilization game [115]. This game is played between a fiscal and a monetary authority. They
both have their own objective. but they also have the common objective to stabilize the govern-
ment debt. Closed-loop analytic formulas for the moving horizon government debt and the cor-
responding fiscal and monetary strategies have been obtained. The results are summarized in the
Theorems 3.4.4.3.4.5. and 3.4.8 and illustrated by the Figures 3.5-3.7. For instance, it has been
shown that the government debt dynamics reaches a steady state value for sufficiently large values
of the moving horizon length.  It has been assumed that the initial debt exceeds the target debt.  If
this initial debt excess is sufficiently small, the difference between the steady state debt and the
target debt is always larger than this difference. Alternatively, if the difference between the initial
debt and the target debt is large enough. a critical value exists, which has the property that the
difference between the target debt and the steady state debt is smaller than the difference between
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the initial debt and the steady state debt if and only if the moving horizon length is larger than this
critical value.
In conclusion. the analytic computability of the practical relevant moving horizon feedback strate-
gies has clearly been illustrated by the economic example.  It is a promising example for other ap-
plication fields to study the moving horizon concept; especially when feedback Nash equilibria
cannot be determined analytically. Such projects will benefit from further theoretical research.
8.1.2 Noncooperative Disturbance Decoupling
Let us briefly review Chapter 4 in mathematical terms. The decoupling problems investigated
in that chapter involve a two-player linear input-output differential game where the information
structure of the players is a feedback pattern and where they are restricted to linear strategies.  The
equations are
.i· =(.1+ lit/''i + B.2+ 2).t' + A'it'.   21 = (.1.t'·   22 = ('2,1'.
The closed-loop impulse response from the disturbance,t· to the output s, of player i is the matrix
function  71 (1) = ( 'i(-'(A+Bi Ft +B2+2 I F . The system is said to be disturbance decoupled for player i
i f 71  =  0. A player who aims to construct a feedback matrix /·i  such that the system is disturbance
decoupled for him is said to face the noncooperative disturbance decoupling problem (NDDP).
In solving this problem, he has to take the strategy of the other player into account. In Section 4.3
we have distinguished between two types of solvability of the NDDP:
(i) The NDDP is said to be uniformly solvable for player 1 if
3 F, E M /7  & XI V  Fi E IR./.. Ti -0
In Theorem 4.4.4, page 70, it is stated that this the NDDP is uniformly solvable for player
1  if and only if
im  /f,   E] C niax V(.4. iiii Hi. ker( '1)
(ii) The NDDP is said to be universally solvable for player 1  if
V /·6  f   R"'2 X"  3  12'1  f  # "' 1 "'  11  =  0.
In Theorem 4.5.4, page 73. it is stated that the NDDP is universally solvable for player I  if
and only if
itti/·.' C tiiaxl;(.··1.1111/31.ket('11
lili /32 C liiax VA.-1. ini Hi. ker('1 1 + itii Ut.
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The solutions obtained for the two solvability problems of the NDDP are stated in terms of nec-
essary and sufficient conditions involving controlled-invariant subspaces. Such spaces have been
extensively studied  in the literature [15,118]; hence, these conditions are easily verified.   Fur-
thermore, decoupling feedback strategies can easily be found using standard techniques from ge-
ometric control theory. In these respects, the results of Chapter 4 can immediately be applied.
This stands in contrast to the results of other chapters, which often involve complicated systems
of coupled Riccati-type equations.
8.1.3 Infinite-Horizon Feedback Nash Equilibria
In Chapter 5  we have defined (Definition 5.3.1, page 82) the concept of a feedback Nash equilib-
rium for the class of .\-player infinite-horizon linear-quadratic time-invariant differential games
where the information structure of the players is a feedback pattern and where they are restricted
to linear time-invariant strategies. Additionally we have imposed a coupled-constraint condi-
tion on the strategy spaces, which states that an .r-tuple of strategies internally stabilizes the
closed-loop system. Furthermore. the state weighting matrices are not required to be positive
semi-definite. For this class of differential games, feedback Nash equilibria are characterized by
solutions of a coupled system of symmetric algebraic Riccati equations that satisfy an additional
stability requirement, i.e. in Theorem 5.3.2, page 83, it is stated that a feedback Nash equilib-
rium exists if and only if a solution of this system of Riccati equations exists that has the addi-
tional stability requirement. Hence, equilibrium properties (e.g existence, the number of equi-
libria, equilibrium costs, numerical algorithms) can be studied by means of the set of algebraic
Riccati equations, which is not an easy problem; several authors have been working in this direc-
tion [46,51,99.79,122]. This system of Riccati equations does not seem to have received any
attention for indefinite state weighting matrices. In Section 5.6 we investigate this system for the
two-player scalar case under the additional assumption that the cross control weighting matrices
are zero. It turns out that the equilibria are characterized by the intersection points of two hyper-
bolas in a certain half plane. These hyperbolas are determined by three scalar parameters.  One of
these parameters completely determines the center, asymptotes, and principal axes of each of the
hyperbolas. These characteristics are listed in Table 5.1, page 96. The positions of the hyperbolas
with respect to their center is determined by the other two parameters; see Table 5.2, page 96. A
number of examples, each showing a different possible situation, are depicted in the Figures 5.2-
5.9,94 and 95.  It is shown that zero, one, two, or three equilibria can occur and it is geometrically
argued how this depends on the parameters. The results are summarized in Table 5.3. page 98.
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name information structure definition result
A risk-sensitive memoryless Def. 6.4.1 Thm. 6.4.3
perfect state page 138 page 141
B soft-constrained feedback Def. 7.3.1 Thm. 7.3.2
page 158 page  159
C stochastic feedback Def. 5.5.1 Thm. 5.5.2
variance-independent page 88 page 88
D LEQG feedback Def. 7.4.3  Prop. 7.4.4
page 163 page  164
Table 8.1: Overview of the Robust Equilibrium Concepts
8.1.4 Robust Equilibria
The robust equilibrium concepts that have been introduced in this thesis are listed in Table 8.1.
The definition and characteristic properties of the concepts A and B will be briefly reviewed here.
This review also included a discussion about the sufficient conditions that have been derived to an-
alyze and determine robust equilibria. Concepts C and D are stochastic interpretations of the feed-
back Nash equilibrium concept (discussed in Section 8.1.3) and concept B, respectively. These
interpretations are straightforwardly based on the well-known connections between LQ and LQG
control theory (certainty equivalence principle) and between H. and LEQG control theory [62,
53]. Concepts C and D are not further discussed here.
The concepts A and B fit in the scope of .\--player infinite-horizon stable deterministically dis-
turbed linear-quadratic time-invariant differential games where the players are restricted to linear
time-invariant strategies (see Table 8.1 for the information structures). For simplicity, consider
the case .1  - 2. The differential equation involved is given by
.i· = (..1 + Bl/21 + 82/6).r + Ew.   .i·(0) =.ro.
The stability property in such a differential game states that the matrix ..1  +  /31 1·'i  t  82 /·'2  is  sta-
ble, i.e.  the pair of feedback matrices C /·I. fi) is required to be in the set .Fz (clearly, this is a
coupled-constraint condition). In addition the pair (.1,    81  821) is required to be stabilizable, thus
ensuring that the set Yz is nonempty. The disturbance u· is assumed to be an element of the space
Lt (0. x). In concept A the players have certain beliefs about the size  of the disturbance.   Each
player has a risk-sensitivity parameter ,·, expressing this size, i.e. player i believes that the norm
of the disturbance is bounded by the parameter,·t. These parameters are exogenous. In contrast,
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no constraints on the disturbance are considered in concept B. The quadratic cost functions of
the players in both conceptsl are given by (the distinction between the concepts is indicated by
superscripts .1 and H)
./14 ( / 1 · /·'1. 11'..t'o ) =  lf .i. i ( (2, + /·'11 Ri 1 /.1 + /·'f H,2 /'.2 1.1.df :
1)
'114< 1.,1. Fl. u'..ro)      .   s.flQ·i +  FI Hi,1.,1 +  1''I Rzzl·-tj.rilt·.
0
.l t' 1 1.'l . 1.,1. 11'. .r,3 j =     l.rt. l(.J 1 + 1·'11 R,1 1·'1 + 1·'I 1< 11 FL).r - "'1 \.11'jill ..
.191 Fl. 1.,1. u...r<,) =   l·11(Ql + F  R„Fi + I''IR:1Fl),1.- 11.1"\·iu·jilt.
0
For simplicity reasons. in concept A it is assumed that (2,  2  (1. This restriction has not been
imposed in concept B. In both concepts it is assumed that /4, > 0. The cost functions in concept
B are of the soft-constrained type: each player has a soft-constrained parameter 1   which he uses
to weight the disturbance term explicitly in his cost function. It is assumed that 1, > 0.
The uncertain frameworks for the concepts A and B are designed in such a way that if the dis-
turbance is not active (t,· = 0). the framework coincides with the framework for which feed-
back Nash equilibria are defined in Chapter 5. For active disturbances. the robustness of the risk-
sensitive and soft-constrained equilibria is expressed by adjusting the cost functions according to
worst-case disturbances. The adjusted cost functions for the risk-sensitive and soft-constrained
concept are given by
-.4./, ( /' i. t'...ri,) = sit , ./,1(j·'t. 1.'2. lt'..1'1, )
11„·115,·,
-H1,  < /.1./.3..l'„} -     011j,    ./,HI Fi. /'.2. U...1.0).
11.El.1((}.. 1
These adjusted cost functions show the specific characteristics of the parameters 4  and  1, .  The
parameter ,·, expresses the level of risk-sensitivity of player 1. If the value of 1·, is small. player,
has relatively low costs but his adjusted cost function incorporates only disturbances with a small
size, i.e. he is not risk-averse. For larger values of i·„ player, is more risk-averse, which results
in larger costs. The parameter 1, has a similar characteristic, but in an inversely proportional way.
1 Actually. an input-output structure has been considered in Section 6.4. the section in which concept A has been
introduced. The Ls, norm of the outputs represents the cost functions.  It is well-known that this representation can
easily be written in the format shown here.
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Indeed, for large values  of    1,11, the negative disturbance  term in  the cost function of player i  has
a relatively high weight. Since player i maximizes over all disturbances in his adjusted cost func-
tion, worst-case disturbances have a relatively small size, i.e. he only incorporates disturbances
with a small size in his adjusted cost function. Hence. large values of 11 1, express a risky behav-
ior of player i, and for smaller values of this quantity he is more risk-averse.
Using the adjusted cost functions, the robust equilibrium concepts are naturally defined in the
following way.  A pair of matrices C /·11. F2 )  f  .Fi is called a risk-sensitive memoryless perfect
state Nash equilibrium if
,/14(19.--6..ro) 5 ./i-1( 1.'1·  '2··ro) forall matrices I·'i such that (I·I. 1·'2 ) E ·72.
4(FbFb.ro) 5 .124(771. Fi..t·o) forall matrices /·.2 such that C -F, fi ) E .Tz
The initial state .t·o is considered to be a fixed parameter in this definition. In general, a pair of
equilibrium matrices depends  on the initial state.   A  pair of matrices  (F i. F, )   E  .F2 is called a
soft-constrained feedback Nash equilibrium if
JIB(Ti. 6.·ro ) 5 .118 C Fl.772. ·ru ) for all .t·o f R' and Fi such that (1·'1. 72 ) E Hz:
./f (Ti. 772..1 0 )   5  ./28(771. I·'2..To)  forall  .ro  E   B'   and  Fz  such  that  (71·  15)  E  F2.
Here, the initial state ,t·o is not part of the information pattern of the players; accordingly, equilib-
rium matrices are required to be independent of the initial state.
In the Theorems 6.4.3 and 7.3.2 a set of sufficient conditions is presented for robust equilibria
in terms of matrix equations.  For the case X  =  2 and R12  =  R21  = 0, these conditions are as
follows.
Each sextuple C X1, ·\.2, Pi· t 2· 1,1, 72 ), with C X1, 12)' and C P · PJ ) pairs of real symmetric 11 x N
matrices,  and  ( 71.72)  a pair of nonzero real numbers, that satisfies system  I below  (with S   :=
BIBI), generates a risk-sensitive memoryless perfect state Nash equilibrium.
\'1 · /2 20:
Qi  + AT.\.1  + .rl·1 - .rl ·512  - 350#rl  - X1·5.1- 1  + lf.2.\'1EET.\,1  = 0:
92 + ..iTA.2 + X2-1 - .\.2.5.1 - 1 - X1• '1-X·  - X2·t''2- 2 + 1.i2.\.·2EE  .4=0:
I <    ..11  := .4 - 31 .rl  -  . '.2-r2 + - -1 EET.\.1 is stable:/1
12  :=  A - 3'i.\ 1  -  .9X2 + 7;2 EET.\.2 is stable:
fE + RA, =  -LEETE.     i = 1.2:
--1  1- r)         2
1  ·io / i.1.0 = 1.1
Each quadruple C.\'1..\'2.  3, 62 )  of real symmetric n  / 0 matrices, that satisfies system II below
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(with S, := /3, H 3). generates a soft-constrained feedback Nash equilibrium.
'  Qi + .1 1 .\.1  + Xt .1 - .\'t .V.\'2  - ,  '2.h.,-\.1- .\.t .<1.\'t  + .\.1 El i-1 /...t .\.1  =0:
Q2 + .1 r .\.2 + . 2.-1 - .\'2·h.1 .\.1  - .\'1.t'.1.\'2-  .\.J.'•'.2. '  + .6EirE'.\.2 =0:
.-1,  := .·1 - .h'l -rl  - .6.\.' + E, i-1 E.T.\., is stable:
II <    ..1, :=  .1 - .'·'1 -rl  - ·6.\.2 +  l:'1 3-1E7 X2 is stable:
.1 - 5,1-\.1 - .....2-r2 is stable:
(21 + .17 ¥i + #A - 1 I .4231 - 12.... ¥i - 3 1.Ki l 1 2 (1:
92+ .1/19+ 32-1 - 32.411;- 11.4.16- 12.4.1122 1).
System I has the following interpretation. The first inequality requirements are due to the posi-
tivity of the cost functions. The second and the third equation form a system of coupled algebraic
Riccati equations. which typically shows up in the context of a Nash equilibrium with feedback
or memoryless perfect state information patterns and linear time-invariant strategies. The fourth
(fifth) condition in system I states stability of the closed-loop system in a risk-sensitive memo-
ryless perfect state Nash equilibrium and under a worst-case disturbance of player 1 (player 2)
The disturbance terms  in the second  up to fifth condition involve  the two real unknowns  -1  and
7 2, which are endogenously determined. They follow from the sixth and the seventh condition  in
system I, i.e. they are specified by the risk-sensitivity parameters and the initial state. Actually.
the sixth equation is artificial: due to the stability requirement, this Lyapunov equation always
has a unique real symmetric solution. The seventh equation states that worst-case disturbances
for player i have norm equal to the value of his risk-sensitivity parameter.
The first four conditions of system II have similar interpretations as in system 1. The fifth condition
states that a soft-constrained feedback Nash equilibrium is internally stabilizing. In system I. such
a condition did not show up because it is automatically satisfied due to the positivity requirements
of the matrices .\, in that system.  The last two conditions in system II are decoupled and show
up due to the possible indefiniteness of the matrices (2,  and (2,
If k' -0, both systems coincide with the system characterizing feedback Nash equilibria for
infinite-horizon games (see Theorem 5.3.2). The complexity of that system has been illustrated
by the scalar case in Section 5.6. Clearly systems I and II are even more complex. System I has
an extra difficulty in the sense that the parameters -1, are endogenously determined. This in con-
trast to system II, in which the corresponding parameters 1, are exogenous. The complexity of
systems I and II has been illustrated by an analysis of the scalar case in Sections 6.4 and 7.3. re-
spectively. In these sections. one finds a further elaboration on the specific problems encountered
in this simplified case.
Both robust equilibrium concepts which have been introduced in the context of deterministically
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disturbed differential games, were motivated from the successful development of H. control the-
ory. The complexity of the systems I and II show that generalizations from control problems to
nonzero-sum differential games are by no means straightforward. Nevertheless. the results in this
thesis. i.e. systems I and II. provide a suitable starting point for investigating robust equilibria in
economic applications.
8.2 Other Results
8.2.1 An Equivalence Result in LQ Control Theory
In preparation of characterizing infinite-horizon feedback Nash equilibria in Chapter 5, an equiva-
lence result in the context of the indefinite regular zero-endpoint infinite-horizon linear-quadratic
(IRZILQ) control problem [119] has been derived in Section 5.2. Specifically, it has been shown
that if the class of admissible control functions is restricted to those which can be written as linear
time-invariant state feedback laws, the IRZILQ problem has an initial state-independent solution
if and only if the corresponding algebraic Riccati equation has a stabilizing solution. The neces-
sity part of this statement is a substantial contribution to the rich LQ control-theoretical literature.
This part has been shown by means of a matrix differentiation argument.
8.2.2 Bounded Worst-Case Disturbances
In a risk-sensitive memoryless perfect state Nash equilibrium. each player has his own worst-
case disturbances. These disturbances depend on his risk-sensitivity parameter, i.e. on his upper
bound of the disturbance norm. In Section 6.2, we studied existence and uniqueness problems
of such bounded worst-case disturbances for a given internally stable closed-loop system and a
given upper bound. Specifically, we considered the system
.i· = .1.r + Eu:   .r(O) =.ro.   S = ('.r
with .-1 stable. For a given positive number ,·, bounded worst-case disturbances are elements of
Ll{ 0. x }that maximize  11 41  subject to the constraint  11 it·Il  5  1.  It has been shown that the  H.
norm s. - of the system plays an important role in this maximization problem.  It is well-known
that this number -, - is equal to the L, operator norm of the bounded linear operator G  :  u·  4  2
where z  is the output of the system for zero initial state. Theorem 6.2.13, page 109, states that for
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each -t  > s -the algebraic Riccati equation
(.Tc• + .1 T.\· + X. 1 + 3 -2-\·EET .r = 0
has a stabilizing solution -\1 . Furthermore. if r  <  lini.4...  11 tr- 11. with
11'., := 1-2.Erx.,6.   6 = CA + 3.-21:'ETA...)£.   (CO) =.ro
then there exists a -3   >  1.  such that the disturbance  tr:  is a bounded worst-case disturbance.  It
has been argued that one typically expects  liu·.11 to approach  x  in the limit 1   1  7
-
Hence,  in this
case. a bounded worst-case disturbance exists.
Theorem 6.2.13 is not completely satisfactory for the following three reasons: (i) it contains the
sufficient condition  r  <  linl-,4,•  11 1,1,11.  (ii) this condition is implicitly formulated with respect to
the data of the problem, and (iii) Theorem 6.2.13 does not answer the question whether or not w:
is a unique bounded worst-case disturbance. The problem has been further analyzed in Section
6.2.2 in order to address these issues.  In this section the maximization problem has been put in a
more general framework: given two Hilbert spaces .1'and ki a bounded linear operator T from
1.  to  Y, an element  go    E    Y.   and a positive number  r     > 0, maximize   I | lit,  +   T.r   I   subject  to
.t·|1  5 r. Clearly, the problem defining bounded worst-case disturbances fits in the scope of this
general problem by setting .1.' = I.4(O.x), Y =  Lt'(0.x). T = 9. and yo(t) = ('44.ro. A
solution of the general problem is presented in Theorem 6.2.18, page  113. This solution has been
used in order to study the three issues formulated above in more detail. For instance, under the
condition i·  <  Ihii.,4..  11 ur,Ilit wasfoundthatthethe number -3 is unique if and only if the function
11·0(t)  :=  ET P, 1 4.7·0 is not the zero function, where P is the solution of the Lyapunov equation
·1TP   PA = -(1(' (Theorem 6.2.22. page 120). Furthermore, if 11141-·•  lit'.,11 is equal to
infinity,  it·.  is a unique bounded worst-case disturbance.  If this number is finite, bounded worst-
case disturbances F can possibly be obtained from solutions of the equation (7 -2 - 9.9)IF =  u·o
with norm equal to ,·. However, it has been shown by means of an example (Example 6.2.24,
page  125) that this equation may have no solution, implying the existence of situations in which
bounded worst-case disturbances do not exist.
8.2.3 Worst-Case Disturbance Attenuation with Nonzero Initial State
In preparation of studying risk-sensitive memoryless perfect state Nash equilibria in Section 6.4,
the corresponding one-player optimal control problem has been investigated in Section 6.3. This
problem consists of minimizing the worst-case output of a linear system by choosing an appro-
priate internally stabilizing linear feedback law. Here the worst-case output is the output which
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is maximal with respect to norm-bounded disturbances. Specifically, the system under consider-
ation is given by
.i· = {.1 + /3/·'}.i· + 1'.'LA ,1'(0   = .1'(1. 2 =1( +/)/.' ),1






This problem has been approached using zero-sum game theory, i.e. a saddle-point solution of the
related two-player zero-sum game  X  =  C Y.  /f, .I l r l'2}  has been determined under certain condi-
tions. These conditions involve the following matrices
(2 :=(.1 11 - Dll)T t))-1 l)T )(.:
3  : =  .1  -  M C O I l) ) -1/ )7  C  ' :
K := BC /)rl))-1 HT
Theorem 6.3.5. page 133. states that i f the algebraic Riccati equation
(2 + Tr.\  +.\.3 -.\.*.\  + 0-2.\· A'/:,7 -\·  = 0 (8.2)
has a positive semi-definite stabilizing solution .\1 for some -,  4 0. and if 11 u..11 = 1·, with
u... := 0-2£7 -r.6.   d =(.1 - S.\'. + 7-2/...1...1..\.. }c.   c((}) = ,1' 
then the pair C t.,. It'- ), with
I. :- -cl.,1 1,F (D'('+ BI.\. )
is a saddle-point solution for the zero-sum game X. Hence, under these conditions the matrix
Fl. attains the minmax value (8.1). This result has been exploited in Section 6.4 to determine
sufficient conditions generating risk-sensitive memoryless perfect state Nash equilibria (system I
in Section 8.1.4). The sufficient conditions under which the saddle-point Solution ( /'  . tt·., ) exists
have been further investigated in the part of Section 6.3 following Theorem 6.3.5.  It is well-known
from  //  . control theory that if the system under consideration has no zeros on the imaginary axis.
then the algebraic Riccati equation (8.2) has a positive semi-definite stabilizing solution if and
only if -   >  - : where -, - denotes the infimum of all closed-loop operators,i·,»  :  for zero initial
state, obtained by varying /·" E Y. This result has been formulated in Theorem 6.3.7, page  134.
The next question that has been investigated is whether or not a- > - - exists such that 11 ic·» 11  =  1·.
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It has been shown that liu: 11  is decreasing in  -  and that it converges to zero in the limit -
x. Thus under the condition that r   <   lirm, 1,·  11 1,·..11, there exists a number 5    >   -  such  that
Iii,·. 11  =  i· and the feedback matrix  F..  attains the minmax value (8.1). This result is formulated in
Theorem 6.3.10,  page  137.  It has been argued that one typically expects  || 111 || to approach  x  in
the limit -  1- - .I n this case a saddle-point solution always exists. Although the setting is more
complicated here. the condition ,·  < liti .1.· 11 u·.. 11  is of a similar nature as the condition found in
Section 6.2 under which bounded worst-case disturbances exist (see also the Section 8.2.2). It is
an interesting point for further research to extend results obtained in Section 6.2 to find precise
conditions under which the norm 11 it·.. 11 is bounded in the limit 7   1-,: and to find conditions under
which the number, is unique.
8.2.4 Indefinite Soft-Constrained Differential Games
In preparation of studying soft-constrained feedback Nash equilibria in Section 7.3, an indefinite
soft-constrained differential game has been investigated in Section 7.2. This game involves a lin-
ear system
.i· =(.1+ /:1/·').,· + A'tt·.   .1·(0  = .t·„
and a quadratic cost functional
·1( /·'. tr..1'0) =    9'1{(2 + /·'t R/·').1 - lt'11.1,) dt
[J
with the matrices H and 1 positive definite. The matrix (2 is not assumed to be positive semi-
definite; in particular it can be indefinite. The indefinite soft-constrained differential game is the
two-player zero-sum game C Y. LA C (1.x) . . /C· . · . .r o) ) . Since the information structure that is con-
sidered in the .\-player context of Section 7.3 is a feedback pattern, we have been looking for
saddle-point Solutions C i. 11' )  of the soft-constrained game with the matrix /·' independent of the
initial state. In Theorem 7.2.4. page  150. it is stated that such a saddle-point solution exists if (i)
the algebraic Riccati equation
Q  +  ..1 t  .,+  I. 1  -  .\' HR_ '  H t  .\.  +  .\. 1:' 1 " - '  / 7  -\'   = 0 (8.3)
has a stabilizing solution .\' with the additional property that the matrix .-1 - N.\' is stable, and
(ii) if the matrix inequality
(2+.-11) +1-.1- 1 BR-1/17.3 2 11
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has a real symmetric solution 1 ". This latter inequality showed up due to the possible indefinite-
ness of the matrix Q. Of particular interest for the soft-constrained equilibrium concept is the
upper value of the soft-constrained differential game. Clearly this upper value has been straight-
forwardly derived from the saddle-point solution. A converse statement has been formulated in
Theorem 7.2.7.  page 155. which states that if the upper value exists. then the algebraic Riccati
equation (8.3) has a stabilizing solution with the additional property that the matrix  .1  - .v.\'  is
stable. This theorem has been shown under a restriction of the set of admissible feedback matri-
ces.
8.3 Open Problems and Further Research
An interesting topic for further research on moving horizon strategies is to obtain more stability
results forthe class of linear-quadratic games. A local result (Proposition 3.3.4, page 38) has been
obtained. However, this result requires the solution of a matrix differential equation and is there-
fore rather implicit. Easily verifiable conditions are much preferable. For this, one needs to study
the dynamics of the eigenvalues of the solution of this differential equation. Proposition 3.3.4 has
been derived under some symmetry conditions. It is an important issue to see whether local sta-
bility results can be obtained under weaker conditions. Clearly, also global stability results are of
interest.
In the two versions of the disturbance decoupling problem studied in Chapter 4, the decoupling
player has either no information about the other players' strategy or he has complete information.
Problems can be posed in which the decoupling player has the information that the other player
is also looking for a decoupling strategy. Similar solvability questions as in Chapter 4 can be
addressed to study this version of a noncooperative disturbance decoupling problem.
The nonscalar algebraic Riccati equations which characterize feedback Nash equilibria are a chal-
lenging point for further research. Conditions under which one can immediately decide how many
solutions these equations have are not known. Likewise, there is a need for numerical algorithms
to obtain these solutions. Precise conditions under which the algebraic Riccati equations have
zero, one. two, or three solutions in the two-player scalar case can be found along the same lines
as for the positive case in [461.  This particular problem is left open in the thesis.
Chapters 6 and 7 contain several open problems. Necessary and sufficient conditions under which
|| tt'., || is bounded for ill-in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 were not obtained. Furthermore, the existence
of worst-case disturbances  in both sections is unclear  if the limit litil-,4-.  11 11...Ii exists  and  if the
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disturbance bound is larger than this limit. Numerical solvability of the systems which generate
risk-sensitive and soft-constrained Nash equilibria needs more attention. These systems relate
to sufficient conditions for robust equilibria. Clearly a set of necessary and sufficient conditions
describing all the robust equilibria is preferable; a start in this direction has been made in Chapter
7. Nevertheless, the theory has reached a level in which sufficient material is available to study
robust Nash equilibria in economic applications.
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In dit proefschrift is een aantal modellen ontwikkeld waarmee onzekerheid in een differentiaalspel
gemodelleerd kan worden. Deze modellen zijn gebaseerd op ontwikkelingen in de systeemtheorie
en regeltechniek op het gebied van regelen met voorspellingen op basis van modellen, versto-
ringsontkoppelend regelen en de //, regeltechniek. Verder is er een kader geformuleerd waarin
feedback Nash-evenwichten voor lineair-kwadratische diff'erentiaalspelen met een oneindige be-
slissingshorizon volledig gekarakteriseerd worden door oplossingen van een stelsel algebraische
Riccati-vergelijkingen.
In hoofdstuk 3 is een oplossingsconcept gedefinieerd voor de klasse van tijdsinvariante differen-
tiaalspelen gebaseerd op regelen met voorspellingen op basis van modellen. Deze manier van
regelen wordt gekenmerkt door het continu opschuiven van de beslissingshorizon met vaste leng-
te. Het onzekerheidsaspect hangt hier dan ook met name samen met de lengte van de beslis-
singshorizon in een differentiaalspel.  Door het voortdurend opschuiven van een eindige beslis-
singshorizon zijn de spelers in staat om continu een actie uit te voeren gebaseerd op een ver-
lengde beslissingshorizon. Hierbij is het uiteraard van belang dat de spelers voor hun beslissingen
actuele informatie kunnen gebruiken. Om die reden is ervoor gekozen om het oplossingsconcept
te definieren voor differentiaalspelen met een feedback informatiestructuur. De beslissingen die
op ieder tijdstip genomen worden zijn echter afkomstig van een open-loop Nash-evenwicht voor
het probleem met een eindige beslissingshorizon. Op deze manier zijn open-loop en feedback-
elementen samengevoegd in 6dn oplossingsconcept voor differentiaalspelen. Hierdoor is het con-
cept zowel praktisch relevant als analytisch berekenbaar.
Het oplossingsconcept is verder uitgewerkt voor linear-kwadratische spelen. in het bijzonder door
een analyse van het scalaire geval en van een economisch voorbeeld op het gebied van de invloed
van fiscaal en monetair beleid op de hoogte van de staatsschuld. Deze analyses illustreren de ana-
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lytische berekenbaarheid. Verder is er speciaal aandacht besteed aan de stabiliteit van het concept
en in het bijzonder aan de relatie tussen stabiliteit en de lengte van de door de tijd schuivende
beslissingshorizon. Het blijkt dat een korte beslissingshorizon kan leiden tot instabiele dynami-
ca. Een voldoend lange beslissingshorizon leidt wel tot stabiliteit. In een dergelijk spel behalen
de spelers hun voordeel met name in de aanvangsperiode. Op de lange termijn is het concept
uiteraard niet voordelig, daar een evenwichtsconcept gebaseerd op een oneindige horizon voor
lange-termijn-doelstellingen beter geschikt is.
In de overige hoofdstukken is de onzekerheid in een differentiaalspel gemodelleerd door het aan-
brengen van een additieve verstoringsterm in de differentiaalvergelijking. De centrale vraag in
hoofdstuk 4 betreft de mogelijkheid voor een speler om een feedback-strategie te kiezen waardoor
zijn uitgang ontkoppeld wordt van de verstoring. Uiteraard spelen de acties van de andere spelers
hierbij een rol. Er wordt aangenomen dat de andere spelers ook een feedback-strategie kiezen.  Op
basis van deze informatie is er onderscheid gemaakt tussen twee manieren van oplosbaarheid voor
het ontkoppelen van een uitgang van de verstoring. (i) De ontkoppelende speler is niet in staat om
de strategieen van de andere spelers waar te nemen; nodige en voldoende voorwaarden op de sys-
teemparameters zijn gevonden waaronder deze speler een ontkoppelende feedback-strategie kan
kiezen.  (ii) De ontkoppelende speler is wel in staat om de strategieen van de overige spelers waar
te nemen; nodige en voldoende voorwaarden zijn gevonden waaronder deze speler voor iedere
keuze van feedback-strategieen van de andere spelers een ontkoppelende strategie kan kiezen.
Het feedback-Nash-evenwichtsconcept voor linear-kwadratische spelen met een oneindige be-
slissingshorizon staat centraal in hoofdstuk  5. Het belangrijkste resultaat  van dit hoofdstuk  is
dat ieder feedback Nash evenwicht in een dergelijk spel correspondeert met een oplossing van
het bijbehorende stelsel van algebrarsche Riccati-vergelijkingen die aan een extra stabiliteitseis
voldoet. Hierbij is aangenomen dat de spelers niet een strategie kunnen kiezen waardoor de dy-
namica van het systeem instabiel wordt. Verder hoeven de toestandsgewichten in de kostenfunc-
ties niet noodzakelijk positief-semidefiniet te zijn. Het resultaat is gebaseerd op een resultaat
voor een corresponderend regelprobleem: er bestaat een lineaire, begintoestands-onafhankelijke,
tijdsinvariante. intern stabiliserende toestandsterugkoppelingswet die een kwadratische kosten-
functie minimaliseert dan en slechts dan als deze gegenereerd wordt door de stabiliserende op-
lossing van de bijbehorende algebraische Riccati-vergelijking. Dit resultaat is een bijdrage aan
de linear-kwadratische regeltheorie. Ook wordt er een stochastische interpretatie gegeven van
het feedback-Nash-evenwichtsconcept. hetgeen leidt tot een stochastisch variantie-onafhankelijk
feedback-Nash-evenwichtsconcept.
Het bestuderen van feedback-Nash-evenwichten in het kader van hoofdstuk 5 reduceert tot het
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bestuderen van het bijbehorende stelsel van algebraische Riccati-vergelijkingen. Belangrijke vra-
gen zijn: hoeveel oplossingen heeft dit stelsel en hoe kunnen deze uitgerekend worden? In het al-
gemeen wordt er aan dit soort problemen minder aandacht besteed in dit proefschrift. Desalniet-
temin is het twee speler scalaire geval uitgebreid geanalyseerd. Het blijkt dat de oplossingen van
de Riccati-vergelijkingen die aan de extra stabiliteitseis voldoen corresponderen met snijpunten
van twee hyperbolen in een zeker halfvlak. Met behulp van dit geometrisch inzicht is vastgesteld
dat het aantal feedback-Nash-evenwichten kan varieren van nul tot drie. Dit aantal kan eenvoudig
met behulp van de systeemparameters en een geometrische analyse bepaald worden.
In de hoofdstukken 6 en 7 is een tweetal robuuste Nash-evenwichtsconcepten gedefi nieerd en hun
relatie met stelsels Riccati-vergelijkingen bestudeerd. Het kader van hoofdstuk 5 is ook in deze
hoofdstukken gebruikt. Dit betekent onder meer dat de spelers niet een strategie kunnnen kiezen
waardoor de dynamica intern instabiel wordt. De theorie van de hoofstukken 6 en 7 kan door het
overeenkomende kader handig vergeleken worden met hoofdstuk 5. De robuuste evenwichtscon-
cepten zijn beide gernspireerd op de // , regeltechniek. De concepten in hoofdstuk 6 en 7 genera-
liseren respectievelijk het verstoringsverminderingsprobleem met begintoestand ongelijk aan nul
en het zwak-begrensde differentiaalspel naar een niet-nulsom differentiaalspelkader.
Het robuuste evenwichtsconcept van hoofstuk 6 heet een risicogevoelig Nash-evenwicht. Iedere
speler neemt aan dat de verstoring begrensd is door een gegeven getal. Hij drukt zijn risicogevoe-
ligheid  uit door de keuze  van dit getal.   In  het //, regelprobleem wordt ook aangenomen  dat de
verstoring begrensd is. Dit betreft de berekening van de H..  norm. Dit komt namelijk neer op
het maximaliseren van het quotient van de normen van de uitgang en verstoring. Hierbij wordt
gemaximaliseerd over alle verstoringen in de eenheidsbol. Echter in het criterium wordt de be-
gintoestand gelijk aan nul genomen. Dit is niet het geval in het robuuste evenwichtsconcept van
hoofstuk 6. Om de relatie met een stelsel Riccati-vergelijkingen te bestuderen zijn het correspon-
derende nul- en Mn-speler geval uitgebreid geanalyseerd. Hieruit is gebleken dat de bij een ri-
siscogevoelig Nash-evenwicht passende informatiestructuur een geheugenloze structuur is met
volledige toestandsinformatie.
Het robuuste evenwichtsconcept van hoofdstuk 7 heet een zwak-begrensd Nash-evenwicht. Het
verschil met hoofdstuk 6 komt naar voren in drie aspecten: (i) de norm van de verstoring is on-
begrensd, (ii) de spelers wegen de verstoring expliciet in hun kostenfunctie met behulp van een
negatieve term en (iii) de toestandsgewichten zijn niet noodzakelijk positief-semidefiniet. In een
zwak-begrensd Nash-evenwicht minimaliseren de spelers hun maximaal verstoorde kosten. Door
de eerste twee aspecten valt de 1 -speler situatie samen met het zwak-begrensde differentiaalspel.
In dit spel wordt in de literatuur het toestandsgewicht over het algemeen positief-semidefiniet
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gekozen. Vanwege het derde aspect is daarom het  1 -speler geval ook uitgebreid geanalyseerd.
Door de eventuele indefinietheid van de toestandsgewichten bestaat het stelsel voldoende voor-
waarden dat zwak-begrensde Nash-evenwichten beschrijft niet alleen uit Riccati-vergelijkingen
maar ook uit Riccati-ongelijkheden.
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